KHARTOUM - Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir signed a ceasefire deal on Tuesday with Darfur's most powerful rebel group as part of an agreement setting the terms of peace negotiations. The accord with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is a step forward, but Bashir will have to do much more to achieve his stated aim of "healing" the Darfur conflict. * JEM is not the only rebel group in Darfur. The insurgent Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) headed by Paris-based Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur rejects the deal and says it will keep fighting. "We are interested in peace, but not this ceremonial peace," Nur told Reuters. Nur's SLA says it still controls territory and has the loyalty of hundreds of thousands of Darfuris, despite recent reports of infighting among its supporters. JEM may have the largest military insurgent force. But its leadership is dominated by one clan of the Zaghawa ethnic group. No deal will hold without the support of the region's many other groups, including Abdel Wahed's Fur.
* What about Darfur's Arabs? Darfur's Arab militias remain a huge military force that will need to be accommodated in any final agreement. Many commentators have painted them as the villains of the conflict -- as Darfur's notorious Janjaweed raiders. The characterisation ignores Arabs who joined rebel groups or took no part in the fighting. Even pro-government fighters feel they have been unfairly demonised. Many Arab communities feel they have been as marginalised as any of the non-Arab groups who started the 2003 Darfur revolt, and their loyalty to Khartoum is far from guaranteed. * Ceasefires have failed before Tuesday's signing comes almost exactly a year after the last JEM/Khartoum ceasefire which the rebels say broke down in a day. JEM has already accused Sudan's army of attacking its positions near the Chad border since an initial version of the latest agreement was signed on Saturday. Khartoum denies the accusation. Khartoum will have to keep this deal going for a substantial period before other rebel groups feel confident enough to seek similar settlements.
* The chance of new rivalries The new closeness between Khartoum and JEM could end up creating new tensions. The deal could be particularly threatening to Minni Arcua Minnawi, the leader of the only SLA faction to sign a failed 2006 peace deal with Khartoum. Minnawi, also a Zaghawa whose forces have clashed with JEM, became a senior presidential assistant after the accord. His position as the most prominent Darfuri in the government could be challenged if Khartoum follows through with its promise to give JEM official positions as part of a final peace deal. Any alliance between Khartoum and JEM against Nur's SLA could actually increase violence. Under the framework deal, JEM will turn into a political party after the final peace deal. The sudden arrival of a new power base in Sudanese politics could have a disruptive effect in elections, due in April -- assuming JEM and Khartoum meet their self-imposed deadline of a final deal by March 15.
* Long negotiations to come Tuesday's framework agreement is only three pages long. But it contains a long list of subject headings for talks. There is a real question mark over whether JEM and Khartoum will be able to reach so many agreements in so little time. JEM has already signalled March 15 might be unrealistic, and is asking Khartoum to postpone elections -- a highly controversial move in other parts of Sudan's political arena. Bashir has clear short and medium-term aims in signing Tuesday's accord. Once those are achieved, there is no guarantee he will feel the need to follow through to a long-term peace. Bashir wants a diplomatic coup in the run-up to elections, and to deflect the International Criminal Court's case against him for alleged war crimes in Darfur. A temporary ceasefire deal with his main military opponent in Darfur would also give him the space to deal with the SLA and other enemies. JEM has long-term political ambitions that could be satisfied by a deal. Neighbouring Chad has been seen as a major supporter of JEM, giving it weapons and safe havens for its troops. Earlier this month Chad and Sudan agreed to end their long-running proxy war, saying they would no longer arm and host each other's rebels. Many analysts have suggested this new thaw in relations may be behind the new JEM/Khartoum deal, with Chad pressing JEM to make up with Sudan's government. If true -- and JEM denies any link -- it is not an altogether encouraging sign. Any peace deal relying on continued good relations between the cantankerous oil-producing neighbours is on shaky ground indeed.
