The July 23 Revolution and pacts (31). The US and the Baghdad Pact (vi). ‘Measures more effective than alliance'. I (the author) hereby admit that I had intended to present the US role in, and attitude towards the Baghdad Pact in three episodes only. However, as I was giving the final touch I have come across significant material that shed more and more light on the subject: The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVI The Presidency: The Middle Way Part IX: “Concerning My political Intentions”, December 1955 to April 1956/Chapter 19: The Goal: ‘A “Durable Peace”. The document is a letter sent by President Eisenhower to UK Prime Minister Robert Anthony Eden in connection with the situation in the Near East. I thought it worthwhile to reproduce those parts of the document that are most directly concerned with the US attitude towards the Baghdad Pact. Words in parentheses are the author's and are meant for clarification: “Dear Anthony: “I share your concern over the current developments in the Middle East and know that Foster (Dulles) has discussed them with Selwyn Lloyd (UK Foreign Secretary). “We face a broad challenge in our position in the Near East and to our objectives of strengthening our ties with those countries. I believe that our reaction should consist not of isolated moves, but a carefully thought out programme. “The Soviets have made abundantly clear even in their public statements their intentions towards the Near East. It is of course true that some of the moves by Nasser, though for different reasons, have the effect of assisting the Soviets. It may be that we shall be driven to conclude that it is impossible to do business with Nasser. However, I do not think we should close the door on the possibility of working with him. For one thing, such a decision would cancel out any prospects of obtaining now an Arab-Israeli settlement. “I agree thoroughly with you on the necessity of aiding our friends and have written you separately with respect to the additional Centurion tanks for Iraq. However, I question whether alliance by the United States to the Baghdad Pact now is the right answer. Measures apart from the actual accession to the Pact such as our recent decision to increase aid to Pakistan and Iran may be more effective support for our friends. This is particularly true when drawbacks to adhere are considered, such as the effect on the other Arab states and probable demands for arms and security guarantees to Israel………………..” Sir Anthony Eden had told the US President on March 4, 1955 that there was no doubt that the Russians were ‘resolved to liquidate the Baghdad Pact'. “In this undertaking”, Eden wrote, “Nasser is supporting them and I suspect that his relations with the Soviets are much close than he admits to us.” Eden thus urged the US to join the alliance as such a move would impress Nasser ‘more than all our attempts to cajole him have yet done'. The British Foreign Secretary and the US Secretary of State had met in Karachi, Pakistan while they were attending the second meeting of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) Council. They discussed the question of US adherence to the other pact, the Baghdad Pact. On March 19, Eden wrote Eisenhower that ‘as a result of Selwyn Lloyd's report on his visits to the Baghdad Pact countries, Britain had carefully reexamined its policy towards Egypt'. He hoped the US and Great Britain could unite on this issue…… Thus, Nasser's strong objection to the Baghdad Pact, as well as his now evident rapprochement towards the Communist bloc had weighed considerably with the US officials who decided not to accept membership of the pact and only gave financial assistance in deference of their decision. The influence of Egypt in the region was reflected in a statement by US Deputy State Department Undersecretary Coy Henderson, in which he admitted that the decision to reject the pact was ‘due to the US sincere desire to retain close, friendly and effective ties with the nations of the area'. [email protected]
