Common logic demands that negotiations between two bitter rivals should be handled by a strong and influential mediator, one who controls the means to force the parties into reconciliation. In the case of the Fateh-Hamas rivalry, now celebrating almost two and a half years, Egypt is perceived as such a mediator. It holds the keys to the only outlet to the world of one and a half million Gazans; its relationship with Israel could guarantee Israeli acceptance of the results of its mediation; and it has the ability to mobilize most Arab countries in support of reconciliation. Hence Egypt can offer what no other Arab country can deliver. Yet, the potential embodied in Egypt s mediation efforts has been eroded with time. Egypt s efforts have been hampered by personal hatred between Fateh leader Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal, the brutal assassinations of Fateh activists in Gaza and arrests of Hamas activists in the West Bank, political divisions and a large dose of lost prestige. Nevertheless, the dialogue between Hamas and Fateh still proceeds under Egyptian aegis and has even reached the stage of a draft reconciliation agreement. Hence, one can argue that the deep rivalry between Hamas and Fateh by itself is not enough to block negotiations. Other factors should also be considered. Perhaps the most important of these are the strained relations between Egypt and Syria. The latter, as the host country of the leaders of Hamas and other Palestinian factions, was quick to jump at an earlier opportunity to co-sponsor the mediation effort. While declaring its support for Palestinian reconciliation and even claiming credit for the Mecca agreement of February 2007, Syria thereupon accused Saudi Arabia of obstructing Arab unity. Syria was later accused by Saudi Arabia and Egypt of being responsible for the Mecca agreement s failure and of being an Iranian puppet. But it was not the intra-Palestinian conflict that caused inter-Arab strife. Relations between Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were already frozen as a result of the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 and the insults President Bashar Assad directed at Egypt and Saudi Arabia for not supporting Hezbollah in the Lebanon war of 2006. Mining Palestinian negotiations then became a useful lever for Syria to establish its status, become part of the Palestinian conflict and, most importantly, break the Egyptian and Saudi monopoly over a conflict that involves international players such as the US, France and Britain with which Syria was keen to mend relations. From an Egyptian point of view, the Fateh-Hamas rivalry became a race where Syria, Egypt and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia were competing not only over how to materialize Palestinian reconciliation but also over the credit for achieving it. Egypt, in its effort to contain Syrian influence, had also to block Qatari attempts to play a role in the conflict, to politely decline Turkish good offices and to publicly attack Iranian interference in what is traditionally defined as the Arab sphere . Not surprisingly, all these states are perceived as Syria s allies or at least friends. The inter-Arab arena is but one battleground, albeit a crucially important one, where Egypt has to survive. Indeed, Cairo s international status depends considerably on its ability to solve or at least manage regional conflicts. As Israeli-Palestinian negotiations seem to be going nowhere, the intra-Palestinian conflict becomes a showroom for Egypt s capabilities. Yet now the Syrian competition is becoming tougher than ever. With the new American outreach toward Syria, Damascus new peace with Saudi Arabia and Europe s courtship, Syria can present itself as a potential substitute for Egypt, at least in the intra-Palestinian sphere. This turn of events renders Egypt a party to the negotiations rather than just a mediator. With Palestine as with Lebanon, it is organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah rather than state structures that have the power and capacity to create or dismantle inter-Arab coalitions. This serves as an additional factor that encourages the prolongation of reconciliation negotiations. But if, paradoxically, before the change in Syria s status it was a mutual Syria-Hamas-Iran interest to delay reconciliation, now it is clearly a Syrian-Egyptian interest to hasten the solution. It only remains to ask who will be the first to announce victory and take the credit. The bigger dilemma is whether or not such a reconciliation can last. The draft agreement suggests a mechanism for possible cohabitation between Fateh and Hamas. Yet the survival of a cohabitation agreement depends now not only on the support of the Arab states but on the willingness of Israel and the US to cooperate with a Palestinian unity government. Are we going to see a repetition of the Lebanese scene, where France dragged the US into rapprochement with Syria? Will the US recognize a Palestinian national unity government, thus forcing Israel to follow suit Dr. Zvi Bar el is the Middle Eastern affairs analyst for Haaretz daily, Israel. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org.
