Last June 25, when Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted by Palestinians from Israeli territory, Israelis knowledgeable about the history of prisoner exchanges between the two sides remarked that either Shalit would be returned within weeks - or the process would take years. A similar prognosis was offered immediately after the July 12, 2006 abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel chose to respond to the abductions militarily. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also proclaimed that Israel would not buy its soldiers' freedom by releasing Arab prisoners. This sealed the fate of the abducted soldiers to spend prolonged periods of time in captivity. It was perfectly clear then, as now, that being blackmailed into releasing terrorists from Israeli prisons in order to repatriate abducted Israeli soldiers would weaken Israel's overall deterrent profile and encourage more attempts to abduct Israelis. It was also clear, Olmert's remarks notwithstanding, that eventually Israel would "pay for the soldiers' release. It was almost as if the entire affair had been choreographed in advance: Israeli resolve not to release prisoners; Israeli military retaliation that ends inconclusively; Israeli acceptance of the need to negotiate a prisoner exchange; prolonged negotiations during which Israel initially rejects the Arab demand to release large numbers of Arab prisoners but eventually accedes; difficulty in formulating an agreed list of prisoners among diverse Palestinian factions; more prolonged negotiations. The most painful example of this ritual gone awry concerns Israeli aviator Ron Arad. Israel turned down an initial deal because the price seemed too high. By the time it came around to accepting a higher price, Arad had disappeared in the hands of Lebanese Shia groups or Iranians. Israel is currently stuck somewhere in the middle of this process. Negotiations over an Israeli-Palestinian prisoner exchange are nowhere near conclusion. The recent optimistic media spin that accompanied the delivery to Israel of a list of several hundred Palestinian prisoners reflects the Palestinians' need to signal to the international community that they are making progress toward a prisoner exchange that will, they hope, open the gates to financial support and diplomatic contacts. It also reflects Olmert's need to be perceived by the Israeli public as "delivering. But realities on the ground are harsher. Israel quickly reviewed the Palestinian list and expressed "disappointment and reservations because it comprised so many senior militant commanders and others with "blood on their hands whose deeds were carried out in recent years. At the same time, there were hints that Israel might agree to release those incarcerated since before the Oslo process began, however heinous their deeds. There will certainly now be a negotiating pause while Israel registers its objections via Egyptian mediators and the Palestinians discuss among their various factions the identity of alternative candidates for the list. From the Israeli standpoint, there are a number of lessons to be learned from the latest repetition of this ritual. First, no Israeli government can withstand the social, political and military pressures within Israel to pay ransom in the form of prisoner exchange in order to repatriate imprisoned Israelis. This is especially true regarding soldiers. It is critical for morale and motivation that serving troops and their families know that the government will invest huge efforts to rescue them if they fall into enemy captivity. Hence there is something to be said for avoiding non-credible statements about refusing to negotiate, and getting involved in prisoner exchange talks from the start. Second (and to his credit, Olmert appears to have recognized this before the Shalit abduction, but had no time to act on his insight), keeping thousands of Palestinians in Israeli prisons thanks to draconian sentences that would never have been applied to Israeli Jews who commit capital offenses, merely feeds Palestinian determination to go to any lengths and accept any degree of suffering in order to get the prisoners out. Once the current prisoner exchange drama is over, and before another one can begin, the government must readjust its approach to the incarceration of Palestinians so that even the worst Palestinian terrorist offenders have a realistic chance of being released through legal procedures sometime in their lifetime, just as do Israeli rapists and murderers. If Israelis are honest with themselves, they will acknowledge that as long as they insist on never releasing Arab prisoners through institutionalized procedures, they will be released in prisoner exchanges. Better to institutionalize the process: this will reduce the danger of additional Israelis being abducted, while building trust realistically with Palestinians. But if more abductions take place, this will also strengthen Israel's resolve not to release early the young prisoners, most of whom invariably take up arms again. This has been the pattern in most recent prisoner exchanges, with devastating consequences for Israeli security. Finally, for political purposes - to mute criticism from the right and from the families of Israeli victims of terrorism - but also in terms of fairness and balance, when a prisoner exchange occurs or, preferably, when veteran Palestinian terrorist prisoners are released by Israel voluntarily, the Israeli government can and should release Israeli terrorists incarcerated for prolonged periods for attacking Palestinians. The prisoner issue will only end when there is a permanent and comprehensive political settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That appears far away. Hence Israel must rethink this highly emotional issue in the most rational way possible. The sooner the better. Yossi Alpheris a former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and was a senior adviser to Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter publishing contending views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
