Two of America's key strategic allies at the east end of the Mediterranean are at loggerheads. Ever since the deadly flotilla incident in May, harsh words have flowed from Tel Aviv and threats have issued from Ankara. Although Prime Minister Netanyahu stated on Israel's behalf that “We regret the loss of life”, Foreign Minister Lieberman reaffirmed that Israel “has no intention of apologizing to Turkey” or to the families of the nine people who died on the Mavi Marmara. Israel claims that its soldiers, who were assaulted when they boarded the Turkish ship, acted properly in self-defense. Hence an apology is inappropriate. Last week, Turkey's foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, publicly gave Israel three options: apologize, agree to be judged by an international panel of inquiry, or suffer the loss of diplomatic relations with Turkey. This ultimatum comes in the wake of other adverse actions taken against Israel since May. Military hardware contracts have been cancelled, as have joint military exercises. Turkey's ambassador has been recalled to Ankara. Israeli military planes have been refused entry into Turkish airspace. Of course the problems between Turkey and Israel did not start with the flotilla. One can trace them back at least to 2002, when “moderate Islamists” of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the Turkish election and Recep Tayyip Erdogan subsequently became prime minister. Newspapers tend to focus on confrontational events to account for the decline in Turkish-Israeli relations. For example, at Davos in January 2009 Erdogan stormed off the stage during a heated exchange with Israeli President Peres. That was triggered by Operation Cast Lead, with the extensive death and destruction visited upon Gaza by the IDF. Erdogan also felt betrayed. Just days before the Israeli attack, then-Prime Minister Olmert had come to Ankara to discuss Turkish mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. That two-year project, during which Turkey had mediated five rounds of talks between Israeli and Syrian officials, was undermined. and suspended when military operations began in Gaza. Underneath such events, however, a governmental and societal process of reorientation, both foreign and domestic, has been undertaken by the AKP, a process of greater identification with Muslims, Arabs, Palestinians, and, within the Palestinian community, specifically with Hamas. That direction obviously leads away from close cooperation with Israel. Recent direct contacts between Israel and Turkey to defuse the current tense situation have proven unproductive to-date. On June 30, Israeli cabinet member “Fuad” Ben Eliezer held a not-so-secret meeting in Brussels with Davutoglu. The meeting's only apparent result was a bruised ego for Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman, who was left out of the loop. Likewise, U.S. efforts to bridge the growing gap between Ankara and Jerusalem have failed so far. On June 26, President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan met privately during the G-20 session. According to news reports, Obama cautioned Erdogan not to sever ties with Israel. When Netanyahu came to the White House on July 6, Obama encouraged him to apologize to Turkey. The issues between the two countries and the two leaders are personal and emotional as well as strategic. Turkish lives have been lost. Turkish ships have been seized. Turkish pride has been offended. Israel feels that it was set up by the Turkish government, that its soldiers were brutally ambushed and put in an untenable position where they had no choice but to use deadly force. From an American perspective, and given the important stabilizing role that the U.S.-Turkey-Israel strategic triangle has played in the region for decades, it behooves the Obama administration to redouble its efforts to keep this set of relationships intact. Turkey's recent support of Iran on the nuclear issue in defiance of the U.S. furnishes one more reason to try some creative diplomacy in order to slow down, if not reverse, Turkey's slide away from the west. What more could the United States possibly do to head off a rupture between these two important allies? It could raise its own profile from private to public and from exhortation to mediation. The president could offer to personally intercede in the row between the two prime ministers in a tripartite mini-summit: Obama, Erdogan, and Netanyahu. Or he could designate someone to mediate on his behalf with high-level representatives from the two countries. Perhaps George Mitchell, Hillary Clinton, or even Bill Clinton could handle this difficult assignment. If the White House issues a public summons or invitation to the two parties to meet under its auspices, and if such a meeting does takes place, it might allow either or both parties to climb down from their obstinate positions regarding the flotilla incident and its aftermath. The upshot might be that the Israeli-Turkish relationship is salvaged or at least temporarily patched up. A successful U.S. intervention would be a feather in the administration's cap, one of the few for its Middle East policy to-date. A U.S. mediator, whether the president or his envoy armed with the full backing of the White House, could meet behind closed doors with Turkish and Israeli leaders to hammer out substantive actions and face-saving devices to allow all sides to claim success. A Netanyahu apology would perhaps be more palatable to the Israeli public if it were seen as the result of arm-twisting by Israel's big brother. A reluctant Erdogan could publicly assert that due to Obama's personal intervention, certain U.S. promises (perhaps regarding further relief for Gaza), and Israel's commitment to return the impounded ships shortly, he had decided to refrain from breaking off diplomatic, military, and economic relations with Israel. The appearance or reality of pressure from the highest levels of the U.S. government might make it easier for Israel and Turkey to step back from the brink. Although there is always a downside risk involved in a diplomatic initiative, that risk is limited in this case. The parties might refuse Obama's good offices. Alternatively, they could accept and the subsequent mediation efforts could fail to prevent the severing of Turkish-Israeli relations. However, since that appears to be the direction things are headed in without U.S. intervention, even an unsuccessful attempt to prevent it would likely be applauded. An expenditure of some political capital to keep the network of regional U.S. alliances from fraying any further seems like a good investment. America could use a win in the region. Israel would have a breather from bad publicity and further isolation, and Turkey would keep its options open for facing either east or west in the coming years. Now is the time, Mr. President, to come to the aid of your allies. ** To read more from Michael Lame, go here for his blog BM
