Fighting in the north of Lebanon raises key questions about the regional matrix of Islamist resistance alliances, writes Dyab Abu Jahjah Since the beginning of fighting in Nahr Al-Bared between the Lebanese army and Fatah Al-Islam (FAI) almost two months ago, many theories have been circulating on the nature and identity of the Islamist group. While the Lebanese government accused Syria of standing behind FAI, using it as cover to launch destabilising attacks on Lebanon, these allegations were gradually toned down, as no real evidence was forthcoming to sustain them. In the meantime, cells of Islamist fighters were dismantled in the northern and eastern regions of Lebanon, cells linked to FAI. This along with arrests and the captured bodies of dead FAI fighters all revealed a strong presence of Saudi and other Arab Gulf nationalities in FAI, alongside a very strong Lebanese presence. It appeared beyond doubt that FAI is a typical Salafi jihadi group attracting Arab fighters from Morocco to the Gulf, and also tapping into the reserve of Lebanese Salafism strongly represented in the north. The group's spokesmen have declared on several occasions that they intend to train fighters to liberate occupied Jerusalem and also to participate in the jihad in Iraq against the US occupation. They also declared that they have no connection whatsoever to Al-Qaeda, and even less so to any Arab regimes -- including Syria -- since they perceive them all to be "enemies of God and collaborators". The issue of the relationship of FAI with Al-Qaeda was also widely debated and instrumentalised in internal political squabbling between the Lebanese government and the opposition. Segments of the opposition were convinced that FAI is a cover for Al-Qaeda while other segments were not so sure but preferred this thesis to the Syrian scenario proposed by the government. The main question one should ask before determining the connection, if any, between FAI and Al-Qaeda is how did Ayman El-Zawhri approach the fighting in Lebanon in his three speeches since the battles began. The surprising answer is: not at all. El-Zawhri did not mention the ongoing battle in any of his three messages, despite referring to an attack on UN troops in Lebanon and blessing it. This is an interesting stance from an organisation always keen to claim responsibility for any significant act of resistance that adopts a Salafi-jihadi discourse. Al-Qaeda claims responsibility when an act is carried out by it or a group organically linked to it, and gives blessing when an act is carried out by a group that is not linked to it organically but adheres to the global ideology of Salafi jihadism. In this sense, blessing the attacks on UNIFIL was a consistent position of El-Zawhri since he himself made calls to attack them, naming Lebanon a land of jihad since the deployment of UN troops after the July-August 2006 Israeli aggression on Lebanon. His silence on events in Nahr Al-Bared suggests several things. First, it appears that El-Zawhri does not consider FAI as Al-Qaeda. Second, it appears that El-Zawhri does not consider the fight lead by FAI as a just fight worthy of mentioning in his speeches. Third, it appears that El-Zawhri is not yet in a position to declare war on the Lebanese state and army. Of course his silence can also mean that he is still forming an opinion on what is happening, but this is very unlikely. As background, it's important to note that El-Zawhri was always careful in dealing with the Lebanese situation, paying a lot of attention not to take a position that would draw Al-Qaeda into any alignment with the Future Movement of the Hariri clan, which enjoys the widest representation of Sunnis in Lebanon. El-Zawhri has made it clear that following an American agenda will only lead to catastrophe, alluding to the strong alliance between Hariri and the Siniora government and the US. At the same time, El-Zawhri cannot align himself with the Lebanese opposition, which is mainly Christian and Shia, positioning himself against the general Sunni sentiment in the country. So the position of Al-Qaeda in Lebanon is not at all a comfortable one. What is happening in the north is making that position even more complicated. FAI might have served as a logistical facilitator for the Iraqi jihad by providing training camps, safe haven, and passage routes for Arab mujahideen heading towards Iraq or coming from it. Such a role is also beneficial for Al-Qaeda, as it is for all the other Salafi jhadi groups in the Iraqi resistance, but when FAI abandoned this role and went into full confrontation with the Lebanese state it is no more an asset to Al-Qaeda. It even became a liability. In this light we can read the handling of the biggest Salafi jihadi group in Lebanon, Osbat Al-Ansar, which is barricading Ain Al-Hilweh camp near Sidon. Osbat Al-Ansar is a 1,000 fighters-strong jihadi group with roots in both the Palestinian and Lebanese community in Sidon. Since fighting started in the north it was feared that a new front would be opened in Sidon, and that the Lebanese army would be overwhelmed and would collapse. A small jihadi splinter group called Jund Al-Sham, also based in Sidon, tried to pick a fight with the Lebanese army to relieve pressure from their FAI brethren in the north. Instead of joining forces with Jund Al-Sham, Osbat Al-Ansar played a substantial role in calming the situation, dismantling Jund Al-Sham almost by force. Since then the Sidon situation stabilised, leaving the army to concentrate on eradicating FAI in Nahr Al-Bared. Connecting the behaviour of Osbat Al-Ansar to the statements of El-Zawhri we start to get the picture. Al-Qaeda is not willing -- yet -- to open a front with the Lebanese state. Partly it cannot alienate Lebanese Sunnis that are pro-government. The Sunnis in Lebanon are the natural reservoir for any future project that Al-Qaeda might launch in Lebanon. Also it is not ready yet to engage and win a confrontation. It seems that Al-Qaeda, while calling for attacks on UNIFIL and maybe executing such attacks, is still focussing on using Lebanon as a logistical hub for the fight in Iraq, while building a significant fighting force that can serve a shift in strategy in the future. In all this, the relationship with Hizbullah is another problem that Al-Qaeda in Lebanon has to solve. Far from the brutal anti-Shia line of Abu Musaab Zarqawi, El-Zawhri seems to be more pragmatic in approaching the Shia, especially in Lebanon where he tacitly qualified them in his speeches last summer as leading jihad in Lebanon. While an alliance with Al-Qaeda is unthinkable from the perspective of Hizbullah, which sees itself as a national resistance movement that is not interested in the global jihad vision of Al-Qaeda, and also because of deep doctrinal animosity between Shia Islamism and Salfism, for El-Zawhri such an alliance -- or at least a pacific pact -- with Hizbullah is a necessary strategic goal in order to guarantee a future presence in the southern, mainly Shia, regions of Lebanon where Al-Qaeda might envisage opening a front with Israel and UNIFIL in the future. Reaching such a pact, however, seems very unlikely since the strategic and ideological visions of both parties are virtually irreconcilable. How will Al-Qaeda deal with this in the medium to long term is the key question, with some forces that are keen to disarm Hizbullah, or drag it into an internal quagmire, perhaps seeing in this a devilish opportunity. If Al-Qaeda were to strike an accord with Hizbullah it would not be the first time that Al-Qaeda would serve American interests while believing it is fighting them.
