Piecemeal management of crises will not lay the foundations for a stable and prosperous future, writes Gamil Mattar* Seasoned intelligence experts in the US complain that such traits of our modern age as speed and brevity have overturned the balance of the American intelligence system. Increasingly rapid response tactical operations have gained priority over long-range strategic planning activities. It is a development they deplore. Their grievance, as significant as it may be with regard to US foreign policy conduct, begs numerous questions about our own societies. Have not these same traits affected policymaking here? Or our intellectual and cultural life? Our approach to education? Or our intelligence and national security agencies? Surely every Arab, regardless of his or her nationality, realises that our officials, whether of their own volition or in spite of themselves, now prefer to devote the bulk of their time and effort to urgent and immediate problems, and to postpone attention to less pressing issues even if some of those issues are of greater and more far-reaching import. What, for example, are the foremost preoccupations of policymakers in the largest Arab country -- Egypt? Are they contemplating how to forestall a terrorist attack that could happen today or tomorrow? Are they worrying about how to quench the thirst of Egypt's Delta soil, and the inhabitants of that soil, or are they fretting over whether Ramadan will descend before preparations are in place to ensure that markets are sufficiently stocked with that season's nuts and dried fruit, and that month's television programming is sufficiently packed with appropriate serials? Or perhaps they are pondering the quickest way to announce secondary school final examination results, and how exactly to pitch the figures so as to satisfy the most important and the oddest pressure group in Egypt because of its fluctuating and unidentifiable membership and because of the way it magically coalesces to form the most powerful and influential constituency in the country. Of course, they give considerable thought to how the government or party or security agencies should respond to a writer or political analyst who criticises the government's position on this issue or that, and how to stymie the growth of an emerging political party, or how to deal with an opposition party that only survives by the grace and support of the government. Then, too, there are those interminable tasks of traffic planning and control, suppressing workers' strikes and protest demonstrations here and there, and boosting the morale and resources of those agencies that, as powerful and well established as they are, are increasingly strained by such inconveniences. And it all gets so much more difficult and complicated with every passing day. But then this is largely because policymakers handle things piecemeal. Certain problems they feel they can safely ignore, confident in the formidable power of security forces to restore the order of oblivion. With others they might make a slight concession, confident in the government's ability to take back with one hand what it gave with the other. And around it goes. As the instances multiply, so too do the solutions, each unconnected with the other and all unconnected to any strategy for development or the advancement of public welfare. This phenomenon does not apply solely to Egypt. In most of the Arab world, in these extremely crucial times, decision-makers think and work tactically, not strategically. Emergencies, sudden flare-ups of trouble, crises of every sort demand a quick appraisal of causes and immediate action. We expect that of our leaders. The problem is when officials, politicians and their advisers start to think that such behaviour, whether successful or not, is all that is required of them and is sufficient justification for perpetuating them in power. All that emergency treatment, hasty patchwork, rapid ad hoc reprioritising (or de-prioritising) of mundane and not so mundane problems are not what it takes to make a strong modern state or a government with a prominent position in the world. Rather, these types of activities are indicative of a government that is merely keen on getting through the day. Whether those who embarked on a political career realise it or not, a government whose primary creed is to dispose of business as soon as it lands on the desk is not the type of government capable of laying the groundwork for progress and solidifying the foundations of future stability and prosperity. Nor is this the type of government that produces original thinkers. What it does produce, perhaps in plethora, is intelligence gatherers "in all specialisations". They write about politics and the organisation of the state, about universities and their teachers, about the media and the media establishment. They produce some excellent work and, indeed, some work that is very necessary for the daily running of government. But in the final analysis they are not writers but filers of intelligence reports. They do little to contribute to the politicians' potential for strategic thinking based on what people believe in, the sources of their concerns and problems, and scenarios for the future. So, somewhere along the line, strategy overshadowed tactics, and concern for the greater picture gave way to a focus on details. Details can be vital. But with today's generations, both here and in the West, attention to detail, indeed some of the most transient and trivial ones, has become something of an obsession. According to a veteran US intelligence officer, 15 years ago an American intelligence officer would devote 60 per cent of his time to producing ideas and concepts and long-term or mid-term plans. Today, that figure has dropped to 20 per cent. Here, like in the US, people have come to value speed over quality. Like Americans, they eat fast food, they are in a rush, they dream in a flash, and they expect quick and easy solutions. Surely everyone knows that fast is not a substitute for quality; that speed is not the key to solid foundations; and that haste makes waste. Even so, in Egyptian and Arab academic circles in general, there are mounting doubts over whether our societies are building a solid and constantly accumulating store of knowledge and know-how. In advanced societies, doctorate theses and research papers form the basis for overall scholastic progress. But in our universities, Arab professors complain, doctorate theses and research papers are dashed off virtually overnight; they are filled with few facts, most frequently cribbed from others, and they are devoid of creativity or innovative thought. In short, our universities are producing more faceless reports. This tendency toward tactical thinking, which is to say towards concentrating on the trees and even the needles on the ground and not the forest, is not a healthy development. The many criticisms that have arisen in the West over recent years with regard to the performance of such vital government agencies as the National Security Council and the CIA make this perfectly clear. Carl Ford, former head of the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, complains, "It's been a long time since American intelligence officials did any intelligence work... Most analysis specialists have no idea how to prepare a strategy paper that would help policy planning." Ford believes that this grave shortcoming is the product of the constant rush policymakers of today are in, because of their need to make instant decisions. "Instant" is one of the hallmarks of our age. Instant decisions require instant information. Both are tactical by nature. But tactical thinking does not produce long-term results. Take, for example, the threat of a terrorist attack. Naturally, this requires a rapid response. So does the next terrorist threat, and the one after that. Meanwhile, amidst all this rush for tactical information in order to produce tactical decisions, thought to a comprehensive strategy that will get to the root of terrorism is postponed, with the result that the problem not only persists but also proliferates. Even so, we find today more and more people who scoff at any suggestion of reviving the art of strategic thinking as an indispensable complement to tactical thinking. Most rulers believe that their time is too precious to waste in reading prognoses of their country's future. But the bitter fact is that long-range solutions rarely outlive a ruling regime, if that long, and therefore never have a chance to prove their ability to bring stability, security and prosperity, if that is their purpose. The equally bitter truth, which appears to perpetually elude rulers, here and elsewhere, is that ad hoc solutions that are brought to bear on our problems do not produce lasting results. In fact, they are not solutions at all, but palliatives. Certainly nothing commensurate with the magnitude of the problems that face today's world, including epidemics such as Avian Flu and AIDS; desertification, water pollution and rampant construction on agricultural land; the effects of global warming; the sudden rise in mass migrations of peoples in search of better ways of life or fleeing war zones and strife stricken areas; and the concomitant horrendous rise in corruption, drug and arms smuggling, and any other number of crimes. All of these crises, individually and combined, have bred a host of other problems, all of which are growing ever more severe and intractable because of the failure of international community leaders to come up with strategic solutions. The world is in the grips of new types of problems, all of which carry additional dangers. In this region, we have seen how such problems can trigger a general trend towards extremism and fanaticism and how that trend has exacerbated the dangers of mass repression and genocide. But even more and perhaps graver problems are lurking right around the corner, as science moves ever more intrepidly into the era of biotechnology and genetic engineering. All of these problems, whether latent or malignant, defy solution by means of tactical thinking and ad hoc remedies. Only when we strike a balance between tactical thinking, in order to control the immediate effects, and long range strategic thinking in the political, social and economic domains, will it be possible to achieve tangible progress. We must learn, or relearn, how to think on two planes at once: how to deal with the here and now, and how to look ahead in terms of a prognosis of how the problems of the here and now will affect the future. The conditions and morale to which we have sunk today should be sufficient to alert us to the dangers of flying by the seat of our pants. The only way we are ever going to check the deterioration is to start thinking in a way that brings us back to our goals, or brings our goals back to us. It is also the only way to defeat the alliance between the forces of fear and defeatism and to destroy the idols of self-indulgent pragmatism that are worshipped by many of those who control the strings of decision-making processes in the Arab world. * The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
