Was an Israeli attack on Syria averted by good defence? asks Sami Moubayed Israeli warplanes violated Syrian airspace on 6 September, penetrating deep into Syrian territory to Deir ez-Zour near the border with Turkey. Syrian defences confronted them, forcing the four Israeli warplanes to drop their fuel and ammunition in order to secure a rapid exodus. News of the Israeli intrusion was surprisingly released not by Israel, as one would have expected, but by the Syrians themselves. A few days before that, Ehud Barak had said that his country was not interested in war with the Syrians, despite serious mobilisation of Israeli troops on the border with Syria. The Syrians seemed to believe him and that is why they consider what happened on 6 September as foul play. Syria's allies Turkey, Russia and Iran immediately condemned the attack. The United States and Israel refused to comment. Had they planned a military attack and succeeded, they would have certainly trumpeted it to the world media. The fact that they were silent meant they were embarrassed. Violating airspace is common in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, but not as frequent when it comes to Syria, where the Golan front has been quiet since 1973. Back in 2001, Israel struck Syrian radar posts in Dahr Al-Baydar in Lebanon. In October 2003, they hit the Syrian village of Ain Al-Saheb near Damascus, claiming that it was being used as a training camp for Palestinian militants during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The camp was in fact empty. The last time Israeli violated Syrian airspace was in June 2006. All of these events were seen merely as Israeli muscle-flexing; by no means did they imply that Israel was interested in going to war against Syria. This time, however, the mood is different in the Middle East. Despite these provocations and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, President has always been saying that he is ready for peace talks with the Israelis. Since then neither the Israelis nor the Americans seemed to be interested in talking to the Syrians. Former prime Minister Ariel Sharon was certainly not in a hurry to restore the Golan to Syria, and nor is his successor Ehud Olmert. US President George W Bush, who has been at odds with the Syrians since 2003, repeatedly announced that the time was not ripe for Syrian-Israeli negotiations, claiming that Syria "just had to wait" to start its talks with Tel Aviv. He was punishing the Syrians for their stance on Iraq. Things slowly began shifting by 2006. The Israeli performance in the Lebanon war was devastating for Prime Minister Olmert. He failed to secure Israel's two main objectives: release of the two abducted Israeli soldiers, and the crushing of Hizbullah. Hizbullah's ability to withstand the Israeli might for over 30 days was attributed to the backing of Syria and Iran. The rational centre in Israel began arguing that peace with Syria would defuse two major problems for Israel: the border with both Syria and Lebanon. Since crushing Hizbullah is very difficult it would be senseless for a second round in Lebanon. It would be wiser, many Israelis reasoned, to go to war with Syria to neutralise Hizbullah and cut off its main supply line. This would end the Hizbullah danger, they believed. In 2007, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Syria with a message from Olmert. He clearly wanted to appeal to the Syrians for three reasons. One was to elicit support from the Israelis who call for peace rather than war with the Arabs, after the defeat of 2006. Another reason was to divert public attention from the failures of the Lebanon War in 2006, which threatened to bring down his entire Kadima- led cabinet. The Winograd Report on the summer war nearly ruined the Israeli premier, accusing him and his top officials of gross mismanagement during the Lebanon War. Barak was already making a thundering comeback to Israeli politics and Olmert needed fast solutions, with minimal damage. So long as sending messages to the Syrians required no serious action on his part, he seemed willing to do that. In July 2007, he went as far as appearing on Al-Arabiya TV and sending a peace message to the Syrian leader: "I am ready for direct talks with you [President Assad]. I am ready to sit with you and talk about peace, not war," He added, "I will be happy if I could make peace with Syria. I do not want to wage war against Syria." All of the developments make the 6 September Israeli incursion into Syria all the more confusing. If the Syrians are committed to peace, not war, as they have been saying since 2000, and so are the Israelis, then why would there by such a provocation by the Israeli army? One theory says Israeli does not want war, but was interested only in hunting for training camps for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah. Another theory claims that Israel wanted to test how strong Syrian defences were, especially after reports were leaked saying that Syria obtained new missiles from Russia. A third, less believable, argument claims that Israel wanted to see if it could reach Iran without being spotted by Syrian radar. This would be in preparation for an upcoming US war with Iran. Syrian MP Mohamed Habash believes that "what happened was an attempted attack. But it definitely failed and that is what led to the contradictions in Israeli declarations." Former MK Azmi Bishara seconded Habash's opinion, claiming that what happened on 6 September was "an aerial operation, not an [airspace] violation in order to send a message." He described the operation as extremely serious, pointing out that it may have been carried out to test Syrian defences. Speaking from Rome, Vice- President Farouk Al-Sharaa said: "all I can say is that the military and political echelon is looking into a series of responses as we speak. Results are forthcoming." All options were on the table, the Syrian VP was saying, without ruling out military responses. When asked what kind of retaliation was expected from the Syrians, however, he replied: "I cannot reveal details." In retrospect, one might revisit the assurances of Defence Minister Barak. Was he bluffing in a manner similar to what former Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat did during the October War of 1973? Sadat made sure that a constant stream of false information was given to Israeli intelligence. For example, Egypt made it public that it did not have trained or qualified soldiers to work with the new weapons that came from Russia. It also sent messages to Israel that it had a major problem with spare parts for its tanks and airplanes. In May and August 1973, he threatened to go to war. The Israelis mobilised to fight and Sadat did nothing. Every time, the mobilisation cost Israel $10 million. He became the boy who cried wolf. That is exactly what Sadat wanted. One week before the war on 6 October, the Egyptian army began moving to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movement towards the canal, did not do anything in response, thinking that this was one of Sadat's many promises of war. He needed these gestures, they believed, to build his reputation in the Egyptian street. Movement of the Syrian army towards the Golan Heights was puzzling but not worrying because Israel was convinced that Syria would not go to war without Egypt. The Israelis were caught off guard by Sadat in 1973. It looks like Barak tried to do the same with the Syrians in 2007, but failed.
