The irony of history is such that the creation of an independent state of Palestine now depends on the same factors that led to the creation of Israel, writes Samir Ghattas* It has been a full 90 years between the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 and the reaffirmation of the "Bush vision" in Annapolis in November of this year. The two have several elements in common, not least of which are the powerful emotions they have stirred. The Arabs have long held the Balfour Declaration responsible for officially inaugurating the Zionist project to establish a state in Palestine. Today, they are highly suspicious of the intentions behind the Bush vision and doubt whether it will culminate in its declared objective to create an independent Palestinian state before the president leaves the White House and retires to his Texas ranch. On the other hand, significant sectors of Israeli opinion, largely from the ultranationalist and religious right, fear that the Bush vision will do for the Palestinians what the Balfour Declaration did for the Zionist movement. Others, outside of the Middle East, have drawn the same conclusion. The widely disseminated Economist, for example, featured on the cover of its 24 November edition a picture of Bush with the caption, "Mr Palestine". If we are to draw a meaningful comparison between the Balfour Declaration and the Bush vision we must attempt to detach ourselves from the fears and suspicions that gave rise to these widely divergent views. More importantly, we should take a closer look at the part the Balfour Declaration played in the establishment of the state of Israel, thereby establishing a basis for judging whether the Bush vision can play a similar historical role in the establishment of a Palestinian state. Well before the Balfour Declaration, in accordance with an exchange of letters between the Sherif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon in 1915, Britain promised the Arabs to recognise an independent Arab state defined by borders agreed upon by both sides. On 5 December 1918, British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon reaffirmed this pledge and said that McMahon's promise to the Sherif Hussein included Palestine among the areas that Britain had committed itself to including in a future independent Arab state. History, as we know, took a different direction altogether. Balfour's pledge of 1917 to establish a homeland for the Jews in Palestine superseded the 1915 pledge to the Arabs. Most Arab political analysts attribute this about-face to subjective factors, such as the duplicity of British colonialist policy and its underlying anti-Arab sentiments, on the one hand, and Balfour's personal religious convictions and his Christian Zionist tendencies. Perhaps it is time to recognise that, in fact, it was British strategic interests, as opposed to the whims and fancies of British politicians that ruled the day. Certainly, too, the same applies to US policy, even under Bush. We should not delude ourselves with the notion that the Messianic leanings of either Balfour or Bush were the ultimate determinants of the declaration of the former and the vision of the latter. During World War I, the post-war fate of Palestine was the subject of intense debate among international powers, Britain and France above all. One of the first suggestions at the time was to internationalise Palestine, a proposition that Britain initially favoured so as to prevent France from securing sole control over the area. Anglo-French rivalry over the issue was further reflected in the Sykes- Picot Agreement of 16 May 1917. No reference was made in this document to the establishment of a Jewish homeland. Quite to the contrary, it stated that, "France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab state or a Confederation of Arab states in areas A and B." Under the agreement, Palestine was partitioned into three areas, one to be administered by France, the second by Britain and the third by an international condominium. Britain, however, prompted by strategic considerations pertaining to its overseas empire, had its eye on the whole of Palestine and saw in the Zionist movement a way to circumvent the Sykes-Picot Agreement. At the same time, it hoped to take advantage of the Palestinian national movement. In 1919, Britain proposed to delegates of the first Palestinian national congress to retract their position that Palestine was the southern province of Greater Syria and to declare, instead, the Palestinian demand for independence from Greater Syria under an arrangement backed and supervised by Britain. The Palestinian congress rejected the British bid. Zionist leaders, on the other hand, seized the opportunity to back the British horse and, after coordinating with British leaders, notified France, in February 1917, that as much as they admired France's great contribution to civilisation, they preferred British guardianship over Palestine. The Millerand government in Paris needed little more proof of British designs to extend London's control over the whole of Palestine. As significant as the Balfour Declaration was, it would not acquire tangible force until after it was wed with the British mandate over Palestine in accordance with a League of Nations resolution adopted in San Remo conference in 1920. With this resolution, the Zionist question was internationalised and the international community became responsible for the fulfilment of the Balfour pledge to establish a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. The preceding point has vital bearings on the Bush vision today. Although Bush withdrew his proposal to the Security Council to adopt the Palestinian-Israeli joint statement in Annapolis, and in spite of the widespread disappointment this change of mind aroused, the very fact that Washington even attempted such an initiative reflects its realisation of the need to fully internationalise the Palestinian question if there is ever to be a chance of transforming the Bush vision from a hazy dream into a concrete reality. Turning back to the first half of the 20th century, it is important to note that the marriage between the Balfour Declaration and the British mandate was not sufficient to give birth to the Hebrew state. Indeed, over the 20 years following San Remo, the Zionist movement gradually shifted to opposition to, and then confrontation with, British policies in Palestine. Its first disappointment came in 1922 when the British eliminated Trans- Jordan from the Palestinian mandate territories, a decision that was reaffirmed in 1927 when the British government declared, "Trans-Jordan is not part of Palestine". The Zionist movement had set its sights on a state on both sides of the Jordan River. As Zionist opposition intensified and tensions mounted in Palestine, British policymakers realised that they had to draw a distinct line. This took the form of the McDonald White Paper, approved in the House of Commons by a majority of 268 to 139, stating, "His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country." It further stated, "The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State." Both the Zionist and Palestinian national movement rejected the White Paper. Following World War II, the Zionist movement, realising that the British mandate with its embodied Balfour Declaration had performed its initial function and would go no further towards the fulfilment of the Zionist state project, shifted its allegiance to the victor of that war. Britain, for reasons of its own, quickly reconciled itself to this development and, on 14 February 1947, turned over the entire problem to the UN and washed its hands of its own commitment to the realisation of Palestinian statehood. On 29 November 1948, after nine months of deliberation, the UN General Assembly issued Resolution 181, partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish, the other Arab, linked by an economic federation. The majority of Jewish settlers in Palestine greeted the partition resolution with greater jubilation than they did the subsequent declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948. Militant Zionists, however, were of another opinion. They accused David Ben Gurion of treachery for having settled not only for just a portion of what they claimed to be the whole land of Israel, but also a portion that did not include Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria or Hebron. Ben Gurion held firm against the storm of criticism. The partition resolution may not be what his people wanted, he said, but it was what they needed at that time. He was also fairly certain that the Arabs would reject the partition. In addition, historical documents reveal that a quarrel ensued between Ben Gurion and the first Israeli foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, over the issue. Whereas Sharett held that Israel would not have been created were it not for the fact that the question had been internationalised, producing the partition resolution, Ben Gurion maintained that the state was the product of the efforts of the Jews in Palestine. This internal dispute was prompted by considerations that have little to do with the issue that concerns us today. As we have observed, the Balfour Declaration, alone, could not have brought about the establishment of the state of Israel. Indeed, this could not have been accomplished had it not been for three primary and interrelated factors. The first is demographics. By 1947, the Zionist drive had succeeded in raising the number of Jewish settlers in Palestine to approximately 64,000 compared to about 133,000 Palestinians. This demographic reality placed the parties before three choices: mounting conflict between two rival populations, an agreement to live together peacefully in a bi-national state, or the partition of Palestine into two separate states. Sixty years after its establishment, Israel is confronted with essentially the same three options. Immediately upon his return from Annapolis, Olmert issued a press statement saying that if the country were not re-divided into two states, a Palestinian and a Jewish one, Israel's future would be in jeopardy. Internationalisation was the second factor, the development of which we have followed from Anglo-French rivalry over Palestine through the Balfour Declaration and the British mandate up to the UN partition resolution and the creation of Israel. Perhaps the lesson we should derive from this, today, is that it is futile to rain more curses upon the international community and its incessant conspiracies against the Arabs. Instead, examine the rise of the state of Israel as a basis for revealing the part the Bush vision might play in establishing an independent Palestinian state. It is clear that the Bush vision does not have the force the Balfour Declaration had after it was wed to the British mandate, and it is doubtful that this vision will see the light of day unless, too, it is combined with a process of total internationalisation. The means and mechanisms of that process are well known. They are printed in black and white in the UN Charters and attendant documents. Only through a drive to set these means and mechanisms in motion and to keep them going will it be possible to create a viable, democratic independent Palestinian state. The third factor that contributed to the establishment of the state of Israel is unflagging drive and resolve. Without this, the other two factors would probably have come to nothing, or at least so the history of the creation of Israel suggests. As was the case with the Balfour Declaration, it is doubtful that the Bush vision will come to fruition unless it, too, is driven through by a combination of the same three factors. In fact, what is needed to bring forth a Palestinian state from the ghastly womb of the Israeli occupation is not so much a vision but a historical process akin to surgical intervention. * The writer is director of the Middle East Forum thinktank centre, Cairo.
