Attempts to intimidate Hamas on the Shalit affair don't seem to work, says Saleh Al-Naami Once again, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have poor satellite TV reception due to the return of unmanned Israeli fighter planes flying in the Strip's skies. These jets had disappeared for two weeks and now their return has affected reception equipment, forcing many Palestinians out of their homes in the evenings. Emad Al-Hassan, a 45-year-old electrician living in Deir Al-Balah, is clearly upset by them. He told Al-Ahram Weekly that their return is an indication of the Israeli army's intentions of resuming its attacks on the Gaza Strip. "These planes collect intelligence in preparation for attacking targets," he said. Many Palestinians agree with him. These people's fears gained credibility Monday morning when the Israeli army's planning department submitted a document proposing a resumption of military raids against the Gaza Strip in response to Palestinian "violations" of the truce agreement. The document, which was publicised by Haaretz newspaper last Monday, states that Israel should make a military response to every missile the Palestinian resistance fires on nearby settlements. It also claims that Palestinians have fired seven missiles and five mortar shells since the beginning of the truce, and says that Israel should not accept this. It recommends that the Israeli army undertake "localised attacks" in response to each missile launch. The document deems such action necessary in order to redraw the conditions for a truce between Israel and Hamas, prevent the continued opening of fire against settlements, and regain Israel's defensive strength against the Palestinian resistance. Yet many observers in Israel hold that by directing threats while making a show of strength, Olmert's government is trying to convince Hamas to engage in marathon negotiations in Cairo to reach a prisoner exchange agreement that would guarantee the release of the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. As Israeli journalist Amos Hariel says, Israel is threatening military force since the other forms of pressure have failed to convince Hamas to agree to negotiate over Shalit's fate. Hariel adds that Israel's insistence on not reopening the Rafah border crossing or allowing the commercial crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip to function at normal capacity will not result in Hamas agreeing to engage in marathon negotiations over a prisoner exchange agreement. Ben Kasbit, the top commentator for Israel's second largest newspaper, Maariv, says that the Israeli threats aim not only to force Hamas to agree to negotiations over Shalit, but also to convince it to submit a new list of Palestinian detainees. The current list requested in exchange for Shalit includes names no Israeli government can agree to release, he says. Hamas realises that Israel is not serious about carrying out its military threats for now at least, as doing so would make it unlikely that an agreement over Shalit could be reached. And yet despite this, Hamas has responded with a counter threat. Hamas politburo member Osama Al-Mazini holds that should Israel undertake any attacks against the Gaza Strip, this would be an "uncalculated risk. Israel knows well that resuming attacks against the Gaza Strip will not lead to Shalit's release but rather the opposite, and that it might even allow Hamas to capture more soldiers," he told the Weekly. "We are confident that any military action against the Gaza Strip will result in the slaughter of Olmert and his government." Al-Mazini says that to force Israel to end its blackmail, Hamas at first apologised to Egypt for its inability to participate in indirect negotiations with Israel over the Shalit file and then went back on its word and agreed to negotiations even while holding on to all of its conditions for releasing the soldier. "Hamas won't enter into negotiations with Israel from a weak position, and this file won't be closed until Israel carries out its obligations according to the truce agreement, in particular, to lift the siege and reopen the Strip's crossings," he said. Al-Mazini says Hamas doesn't consider reopening the commercial crossings sufficient for determining Israel's seriousness, but that it will rather make its judgement based on the types and amounts of goods Israel allows to enter the Gaza Strip. He further denies the claim that Israel has changed its position on the prisoners who are supposed to be released in return for the release of Shalit. He says that Israel agreed to only 71 names out a list of 450 prisoners Hamas gave to Egypt. He also says that Hamas considers 1,000 Palestinian prisoners to be the minimum number acceptable in return for Shalit's release, and stresses that Israel does not have the right to object to names proposed by Hamas for release. Al-Mazini rejects the Israeli proposal to transfer Palestinian West Bank prisoners released in the exchange to the Gaza Strip, stressing that Hamas "won't accept replacing imprisonment with exile." In an attempt to lift Hamas's ceiling, Al-Mazini says that it will insist on the release of prisoners belonging to all of the Palestinian factions and from all of the Palestinian territories, including Palestinians living in Israel and a number of Arab prisoners, and especially those with long sentences. Al-Mazini denies the claim that Hamas has shown readiness to submit a new list of prisoners to exchange with Shalit. Rather, he accuses Israel of trying to create a rift between Hamas and Egypt by spreading a rumour that Hamas is involved with another mediator, and recommends that Tel Aviv halt its attempts to "fish in murky waters". Yet it is clear that Israel is trying to exhaust all means of employing the truce agreement in its favour, particularly by exploiting Hamas's agreement to not include the West Bank in the agreement, allowing Israel to step up security measures against Hamas there. The Israeli army has announced that it is currently waging a tireless campaign against Hamas's civil institutions in the West Bank. Israeli army commander of the central region Gad Shamani says that all of Hamas's charitable institutions will be closed throughout the West Bank. These new measures will include the closure of educational, health, social, and sporting institutions that offer services to tens of thousands. Also among the institutions the Israeli army will close are those that support thousands of orphans. Israeli army sources have stated that they are acting on the assumption that allowing Hamas to offer services to the Palestinian public at a time when the Salam Fayyad government is performing poorly will allow Hamas to strengthen its popularity. To grant credibility to its actions against Hamas in the West Bank, the Israeli army has accused it of establishing "state institutions" in the West Bank. Yet Haaretz correspondent Avi Yishkarof holds that in stepping up oppressive measures against Hamas in the West Bank, Israel is acting on the assumption that Hamas and the other resistance factions are intent on taking military action against Israeli targets from the West Bank during the truce without leaving fingerprints that could indicate who is responsible for them. Yishkarof reported a prominent Israeli security source as saying that the operation a Palestinian in Jerusalem carried out recently with a bulldozer, and which killed three settlers and injured dozens, is a clear example of the kind of operations the Palestinian factions are carrying out without leaving fingerprints that allow Israel to determine their perpetrators and subsequently follow up on them. Palestinian researcher Nehad Al-Sheikh Khalil says that through its measures against Hamas in the West Bank, Israel is trying to send a message to the movement that it is capable of harming it, and that it should show more flexibility with regard to the Shalit file. "The primary reason that led Israel to reach a truce agreement with Hamas was the Shalit file," he told the Weekly, "and Israel's need to close it grew after it reached a prisoner exchange agreement with Hizbullah." Khalil describes Israel's insistence on tying closure of the Shalit file to reopening the border crossings, using threats of military operations in Gaza and pressure on Hamas in the West Bank as a "hands-off battle. It's entirely clear that the discussion is revolving around an attempt by both sides to break the other's will and push it towards offering concessions in the prisoner exchange agreement." Both Hamas and Israel want to close the Shalit file. Immense pressure is being placed by public opinion and the Israeli media on Olmert to close the file, and Hamas wants to gain a political achievement before Palestinian public opinion. As such, it is expected that both parties will soon end negotiations with a deal. Until that happens, however, each will continue a show of strength in a "hands-off" battle.
