According to Hamas sources, groups supposedly affiliated to Al-Qaeda in Gaza are but paid and protected pro-Fatah criminal cells, reports Saleh Al-Naami Despite the exhaustion apparent on his face, the young officer made a point of shaking hands with his soldiers and thanking them for their efforts. It had been a long night of clashes and incredibly harsh conditions. For over 11 hours last Tuesday night, this officer and his rapid response soldiers had pursued members of the Daghmash family that lives in Al-Sabra, a southwest neighbourhood of Gaza City. The dismissed Haniyeh government and its security forces announced that the targets of this campaign had been charged with several cases of murder and theft but had refused to hand themselves over to security. The military confrontation resulted in the death of 11, including a policeman, and the injury of dozens. Forty-eight hours following this showdown, the Army of Islam organisation -- one that embraces the programme of Al-Qaeda -- issued a statement claiming that seven of those killed were from its ranks. It further accused the Haniyeh government of targeting the organisation. At first glance it may seem difficult to reconcile the two statements. The Palestinian police said it was targeting members of the Daghmash family charged with crimes while the Army of Islam organisation said the Haniyeh government and Hamas targeted it due to its affiliation with Al-Qaeda. Yet a closer look at the real source of difference between Hamas and the Army of Islam provides a window onto small Palestinian organisations that emulate Al-Qaeda. Following the development of these organisations provides answers to several questions. Is the environment in Palestine conducive to the development of organisations espousing the thought of Al-Qaeda? What are the real motives for the creation of these organisations? Do they serve the agendas of Palestinian forces that are inimical to Hamas? What is their future? Anyone who lives in Gaza knows that in many cases the line dividing Al-Qaeda-affiliated organisations and those involved in organised crime is thin. Some of the leaders and members of these Islamist organisations belong to families known for their corruptibility, embezzlement, and even highway robbery. They benefited from their close relations with the Gazan security agencies of President Mahmoud Abbas before Hamas took control, and have applied their previous tactics since transferring their activity to Islamist organisations. Ihab Al-Ghasin, Interior Ministry spokesperson for the Haniyeh government, says that many of those who were targeted were "simply tools of the Ramallah government and its security circles, as well as leaders of the security agencies who tried to overthrow the legitimate Haniyeh government." He told Al-Ahram Weekly that: "They employed their leadership in these organisations to create an appearance of the dissolution of security, particularly through the kidnapping of foreigners to embarrass the Palestinian [Hamas] government in collusion with the Ramallah government." To show how closely these organisations coordinated with the Ramallah government, Al-Ghasin pointed to their targeting of churches, Internet cafés and wedding halls as confirmation of Abbas's claim that under Hamas Gaza had turned into an "oppressive Islamic emirate". He also confirmed that documents had been found that prove there are relations and coordination between the two. Yehia Moussa, deputy head of the Hamas bloc in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), says that these organisations have tried to conceal their real motivations and the roles they undertake on behalf of other Palestinian parties. He says that contrary to the impression that some international media tries to establish, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip realise the difference between these organisations and the ideas that they claim to espouse. Palestinians know that some of these organisations in fact have relations with Palestinian leaders who in 2004 tried to overthrow the democratically elected Hamas government. Moussa adds that although these groups are not widespread, they accuse those who disagree with them of being infidels. He worries about the possibility, however small, that their presence will eventually result in a trend of each side declaring the other apostates. Moussa also disapproves of the fact that these groups did not participate in clashes with Israel prior to the truce. "All the leaders and members of these organisations were asleep in their beds while Hamas and the other factions were fighting the occupation forces that had raided cities and refugee camps in the Gaza Strip," he told the Weekly. "We are certain that the members of these groups will disappear completely when the truce with Israel collapses." He calls on them to take part in confronting occupation forces, as they were supposedly not created for Israel's sake. Moussa also calls on the Haniyeh government and its security forces to strike with an iron fist at these groups and to apply the law in confronting them. Nihad Al-Sheikh Khalil, a researcher specialised in Islamist movements, says that it is unlikely that groups espousing the thought of Al-Qaeda could find a foothold in the Gaza Strip, given that they can't offer anything new to the Palestinian factions. The factions remain active in the resistance, and even during times of truce mobilise forces on the assumption that a new wave of clashes with Israel is bound to break out. "These groups don't possess a hard Salafi core to their thought, as they do in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Rather, they are groups that have developed on the margins of the resistance factions and who have benefited from the conflict between Fatah and Hamas," he told the Weekly. Al-Sheikh Khalil adds that these groups benefited from the "dissolution of security" that took place in the Gaza Strip prior to the military settlement to the Fatah-Hamas conflict and Hamas's taking control of Gaza. He says that some of the members of these groups followed the directives of leaders in the Palestinian Authority security agencies prior to the military takeover. In many cases they undertook criminal operations that aimed to sabotage security in Gaza with the aim of embarrassing Hamas and showing its government as incapable of imposing control. The most prominent indicator of a lack of security was these groups' kidnapping of foreigners, including the kidnapping of Alan Johnston, the BBC correspondent in Gaza. His abduction, like the others, was commissioned by Palestinian leaders seeking to embarrass Hamas. Al-Sheikh Khalil underlines that these groups do not rest upon a solid ideological foundation, but rather seek protection from their families, which have relations with leaders of the disbanded security agencies in Gaza. Khalil also says that Hamas and its government were hesitant in dealing with these groups at first and held back from using force against them for two reasons. First, some of these groups claimed to raise the banner of resistance against the occupation, and so Hamas did not want to look as though it were crushing the resistance. Second, Hamas is extremely sensitive about confronting groups it differs with ideologically, especially if they wave Islamic banners. He says that the Hamas government tried in the beginning to address the threat formed by these groups through dialogue on ideological points. For example, Hamas sought the aid of sheikhs with a Salafi-fundamentalist orientation to try to convince these groups to release Johnston on the basis of Islamic law prohibiting kidnapping. Al-Sheikh Khalil says that the turning point in relations between Hamas and its government and these groups took place when these groups tried to impose an unnatural social order upon Palestinian society. Another contributing factor was the growing impression that they served agendas with no relation to Salafi movements. Many of their members acted as mercenary killers with the aim of spreading chaos. Khalil says that the Hamas government made a mistake when it did not marry ideological dialogue to security confrontation in its dealings with these groups, as that would have limited the threat they posed. Yet he also stresses that the Gaza Strip has never formed fertile ground for the spread of extremist organisations, supporting this claim with the fact that these groups have only spread in two small areas in Gaza and within a family context and with the support of other forces. There is no real presence of organisations that espouse the thought of Al-Qaeda in Gaza, as there is no gap for them to fill. Resistance to the Israeli occupation remains the most prominent challenge in Palestine, and thus the most important justification for forming organisations. The organisations that have adopted the thought of Al-Qaeda have nothing to offer that the other factions don't, and their failure to contribute to the resistance proves that it is not on their agenda. Given the problematic character of their members and the people's repulsion by them, it can be said safely that they have no real future in Gaza.
