Throughout the Gaza crisis the Muslim Brotherhood failed to pay even lip service to Egyptian national interests. Abdel-Moneim Said* examines the reasons why This is the second article in response to the fax I received from Essam El-Erian commenting on an article I published in Al-Masry Al-Yom. Beneath the headline "A squandered opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood" I argued that the recent Gaza crisis had offered the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) an opportunity to show that it was deserving of official recognition but that it had forfeited this chance by siding with regional forces opposed to Egypt. The MB's position, I continued, emanates from its long-held rejection of the modern Egyptian state, its belief in the primacy of the Islamic "nation" and the consequent prioritisation of sectarian over national allegiance. El-Erian's response to my article contained eight paragraphs. In the first he insisted that the MB does recognise the modern nation state. In the second, he asserted that many other forces shared the group's aspiration for unity across the Islamic world. Last week I responded to these two paragraphs. This week I will proceed to the third paragraph, in the hope that this dialogue will be of benefit not only to the MB but all political forces in Egypt. El-Erian writes in his third paragraph that "in the eyes of the Muslim Brotherhood Egypt is a leader of the Arab world and a fundamental partner in the leadership of the Islamic world. In moments of crisis all look to it for guidance, which brings certain duties and obligations, as is the case with all nations that history, geography and inherent potential have elevated to positions of leadership." There is no contending that this view converges with that of Arab nationalists and Nasserists who believe that history and geography have fated Egypt to shoulder a regional role. Indeed, it overlaps with the position of the National Democratic Party which believes Egypt is destined to exercise specific roles in the region. But such a concept of leadership presumes, first, an ability to independently assess the situation in any given crisis. Secondly, it assumes an ability to weigh certain options against others in light of regional and international realities. With leadership comes real responsibility, far more substantial than occasional forays over the airwaves of Al-Jazeera. Whatever action is taken must be carefully calibrated so as not to unduly strain the capacities of a country with a population of more than 80 million, people whose needs must be taken into account and for whose sake all forms of reckless behaviour that court danger must be avoided. Egypt's "regional" role during the Gaza crisis -- from the moment it warned Hamas against ending the ceasefire through to its efforts to mediate a renewal or, at best, to sustain the ceasefire, in practice if not on paper, as a way to pressure Israel -- was entirely realistic. Unfortunately, Hamas did neither this nor that. Instead of heeding the advice of the leading "regional power" it called off the truce and fired 60 missiles into southern Israel, assuming that, as Khaled Meshaal estimated, the war would last no more than three days. One cannot help but be struck by the coincidence that not long before Hamas abandoned the truce a well orchestrated propaganda campaign had been set in motion against Egypt. It began when the Iranian "masses" attacked the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran. It was quickly escalated to demonstrations echoing the same anti-Egyptian slogans in Damascus, Beirut, Sanaa and other capitals. The pretext for these demonstrations was Egypt's alleged closure of the Rafah border crossing. The odd thing is that in preceding months -- certainly since the declaration of the truce in June and during Egyptian-brokered negotiations between Fatah and Hamas, a period during which Egypt was fulfilling its "regional" role -- Hamas was fully aware of Egypt's situation and the regional and international restrictions it faced vis-à-vis the crossing. It also knew that Egypt sustained the movement of food and medicine across that border, sometimes with Israel's cooperation but more often in defiance of Israel. Yet Hamas kept up its attack on Egypt. It staged a mass breakthrough into Egyptian territory, it boycotted the signing of a reconciliation agreement with Fatah and then started a war that could not have been more poorly planned and timed, coming when the Palestinian rift was at its most fraught. During the ensuing Israeli offensive Egypt was the only "player" to actively campaign for a ceasefire, to furnish aid to the Palestinians, to push for the passage and subsequent implementation of a Security Council resolution and ceasefire, and to prepare for the reconstruction of Gaza. Other Arab and Muslim governments did nothing beyond staging demonstrations and issuing anti-Egyptian statements. How did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood react to all this? They could have acted responsibly, through their representatives in parliament and their many independent media outlets. They could have cooperated with the host of NGOs seeking to relieve the suffering of Palestinians, have been fair and objective in their assessment of Egypt's handling of the crisis, criticising the bad while encouraging the good. But instead of behaving like a responsible political group they acted as a political militia. They cheered as Hamas destroyed the border fence and protested alongside other anti-Egyptian demonstrators. They failed to issue a single statement condemning the assault against Egypt's embassies abroad or Egyptian security forces at the border. They swallowed every word of the Hamas line and then regurgitated the group's statements as issued in Damascus, and by Iran and Hizbullah, calling upon Egyptians to revolt and on the Egyptian army to stage a coup. Put simply, the Muslim Brothers made no distinction between the Egyptian state and the Egyptian government. Since they reject the very concept of the modern nation state they have no problem when it is attacked, just as long as the attack comes from "Islamic" forces that have obtained divine blessing. With regard to the government the MB was unable to understand, let alone appreciate, its assessment of the situation, of the available options and the costs of war or peace. All they did come up with was a gush of zealotry devoid of any of the calibrations needed to ensure the lives and welfare of peoples and nations. The Muslim Brothers believe that in exercising its "regional role" Egypt should follow Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran rather than continue along the line it has set itself, a line that has seen Egypt liberate its territory. And according to El-Erian, in being pulled along behind Hamas Egypt will be exercising its role as a fundamental partner in the leadership of the Islamic world. If the Muslim Brothers and El-Erian had been fair and objective, they would have used the same standards to judge other "leading" Islamic countries and movements which continue to claim that they lead the rejectionist and resistance forces. But the Brotherhood did not call upon Tehran to launch any of its long-range missiles during the battle. Nor did it urge Syria or Hizbullah to open a second front, even though portions of their territory remain occupied. Nor did it suggest that Turkey sever diplomatic relations with Israel and stop sending it spare parts for its war planes. Instead, the Brothers directed all their demands at Egypt and expected Cairo to do everything, including creating the concrete circumstances for a new war with Israel. Not one of the 88 Muslim Brothers in the People's Assembly submitted a proposal for financing such a campaign through levying a war tax, for example, or diverting a chunk of development allocations to the purchase and manufacture of arms. Apparently Egypt's regional role, in their view, is to rush headlong into danger and to face a ruthless, brutal enemy armed with nothing beyond their slogans and cheers. Is this what the Muslim Brothers really want for Egypt? Could it be that they have no qualms about the destruction of the Egyptian state? Do they believe it must be destroyed in order to provide the ruins on which they hope to build a huge edifice comprising the whole of the Islamic world? * The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
