It is the word genuine, writes Abdel-Moneim Said*, that causes most eyebrows to be raised, especially as pertained to last week's meeting in Riyadh I am often approached by media representatives asking about current affairs in Egypt and the Arab world. Their questions help in pinpointing the shifting focus of the international media. Last week it was the reconciliation meeting in Riyadh between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia that most sparked the most interest. Whether Arab or foreign, the first thing people who approached me wanted to know was whether any reconciliation was "genuine". The question was invariably conveyed with a hint of malicious humour, an attempt to conjure the mutual mistrust that is woven through the history of inter-Arab antagonism. There would be rising inflection on the word "genuine", a verbal conspiratorial wink suggesting the whole thing, from the beginning to end, is some kind of deception, or, at best, that the reconciliation will be so short lived as to be of little consequence. In answering their question I would first register a reservation concerning terminology. In the realm of international relations reconciliation has generally been reserved for instances of armed hostility, when the differences between the antagonists are at their sharpest but also when the parties concerned realise that they must reach an accommodation for coexistence. Such a condition does not exist among the Arab states. A somewhat milder term needs to gain currency: "clearing the air" has recently emerged as a contender, a phrase that suggests the harmful dust stirred up by storms and, by extension, the need to dispel residual nastiness after a quarrel so that life can return to normal. It, too, hardly reflects the situation between the Arab countries that met in Riyadh. There are differences, yes, but very specific ones, many concerning Lebanon and Palestine, areas in which Syria disagrees with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Back to the original question. The word that carries the most punch is also the one that is the most ambiguous. For where does a "genuine" reconciliation begin? Where does a false one start? The question is even harder to answer when you sense that your interlocutor is seeking to imply a transformation of inter-Arab relations from a state of antagonism to one of conformity across international and regional policies and relations. The definition is narrow and black-and-white. Unfortunately, Arab political thought makes little room for coexisting opposites. It does not handle grey areas, or more subtle shades of the spectrum, very well. The not inconsiderable confusion in terminology leaves us no choice but to assess the Riyadh summit on the basis of commonly accepted notions of relations between countries, where diverse and sometimes conflicting interests can drive them apart, even to the point of animosity, or, conversely, can alert them to the greater common interest involved in steering away from the brink and working out common accommodations. From a purely objective perspective, the parties that gathered in Riyadh varied considerably in land area and wealth, social composition, political and economic order, and even their cultural norms. They differ in their proximity to various sources of threat and in the ways they assess such threats. The perpetual problem of the Arabs has been their tendency to ignore all such factors and to subordinate them to a concept of Arab nationalism in which the linguistic/cultural bond supersedes all other considerations, the ironic consequence of which is to render all forms of practical cooperation out of reach. Such is the dogmatism among many that they will accept nothing less than total conformity. Any divergent ideas are viewed as a form of treachery, or indifference to the will of the Arab masses. One of the consequences of this is that inter-Arab relations have lacked the kinds of political support that help countries overcome their differences and contradictions. The stormiest crises in Arab relations occur when one Arab country finds itself in open conflict and demands all other Arab countries, often preoccupied by their own problems and concerns, drop everything to rally to its side. Anything less than absolute support is then regarded as breaking ranks and conspiring with the enemy, generally Israel and US imperialism. We do not have to look far back in history for examples. The recent Gaza crisis and Sudan's current crisis with the International Criminal Court illustrate the syndrome very clearly. My hope is that the "Arab reconciliation" in Riyadh is an expression of the realization of just how limited past formulae have been. What happened, in essence, was a meeting in the face of challenges that no one can afford to ignore in an attempt to identify the opportunities it is in everyone's interests to seize. Cairo and Riyadh probably have no problem with this. Both have attained a degree of political maturity and established sound mutual relations founded on traditional Arab bonds but also, and more importantly, on common strategic and economic interests and a practical division of labour according to their ability to advance these interests. Within this framework Syria is not easily ignored. It occupies an intersection between in the crises afflicting Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. It is a part of all these problems, and certainly a part of the solution. Yet Syria has always found it difficult to deal with these relations from the perspective of individual states with particular national interests. Damascus carries enough baggage from the 1950s and 60s to throw any number of spanners into Arab relations and further complicate already complex issues. In recent years it has dealt with Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine from the perspective of Syrian interests, but in a manner so heavily cloaked with revolutionary dogma as to obviate any understanding with others over these interests. Now the situation has changed, or so it appears. Damascus has taken a series of positive steps, such as establishing diplomatic relations with Lebanon and agreeing to a lesser degree of political dominance over Beirut. It displayed a good amount of practical cooperation with Egypt during the recent Gaza crisis, helping to bring about the ceasefire and working to promote the Palestinian reconciliation process in Cairo. Syria may have been motivated by questions pertaining to the occupied Golan Heights and how its chances of regaining them might be aided by the arrival of a new administration in Washington or, conversely, harmed by the results of the recent election in Israel. None of these developments are remote from the consciousness of policy-makers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose sights are also trained on the new reality in Iraq following a US withdrawal and the strategic vacuum that the Iranian leadership will scramble to fill, parading beneath the banner of fighting Israel, championing Islam, defending Palestine and, as always, fighting imperialism. The reconciliation, then, has everything to do with how to deal with these realities and the intricacies of their attendant circumstances. These were the matters that shaped the agenda in Riyadh. The meeting was not a family reunion after a long separation or a grand photo-op. It was a recognition of the need to search for common interests and deliberate on serious issues. * The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
