Dialogue between religions does not exist; only dialogue between individual perceptions delegated, ostensibly, to represent all, writes Azmi Bishara As the conflict subsided between international political systems bearing ideological torches the influence of talk of the clash of civilisations increased (with religious affiliation generally at the core in the minds of the pundits who espouse this take on global affairs) and dialogues between religions and between cultures spread like wildfire. As I have often observed, the paradigm of history as the product of a conflict between civilisations, cultures and religions, and the concept of dialogue between them as the answer, are two sides of the same coin, the difference being that the notion inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue as an alternative to such conflict is not a theory but merely the reaction to a theory. As much as I disagree with it, the paradigm of a clash or conflict between cultures does merit the term theory. The notion of dialogue as a response does not, as it simply accepts the culture-clash theory as given and offers no analytical constituents of its own. It is a value judgement that takes the premises of the culture-clash theory as axiomatic. It therefore grants that mankind is divided into homogeneous cultures, distinguishable from one another by quintessential ideas (with religious ideology at their core), traits and mentalities; that these cultures are the primary determinant of the culture and behaviour of states, communities and individuals; and that they are mutually contradictory and in a state of conflict. I, of course, take issue. Cultures are diverse and far from homogeneous; they are not governed by -- and hence explainable by -- a single principle or idea (such as materialistic or spiritual, belligerent or peace-loving, xenophobic or tolerant, rational or violent, etc). I also believe that they are in constant mutation, with religions and cultures interacting with the givens of time and place over history; that there are no limits to this process, which inherently refutes the notion of a "pure culture". It is rare to find a religion in the world that has not inherited many of its elements, whether scripture, ritual or forms of popular worship, from other sources. As for cultures, they are not pure by definition. They evolve through the interplay of communication, wars, commerce, translation, migration, natural disasters and other such normal and extraordinary phenomena. Culture and religion are interwoven, and they evolve and diversify. But they don't have dialogues. People have dialogues. People negotiate. I will distinguish between dialogue and negotiation later. Here, I would like to stress that to assemble a group of clergymen or intellectuals from different faiths and cultures around a table in a hotel or in some cave does not signify a dialogue between religions and/or cultures. It means that some people have come together to talk and that these people happen to be religious figures and/or intellectuals. At best, we can say that these individuals represent particular perceptions of their religions or cultures, and that their personal perceptions may be shared by others. But to maintain that they represent a whole culture or religion is excessive. It elevates them to paragons of a culture, or to prophetic or even divine stature, and it opens the way for them to set their particular perception of their culture or religion in stone. We thus have a situation whereby, in a gathering of such venerable authorities, after one lays out the immutable traits, beliefs and mores of his religion or culture he cedes the floor to the next who does likewise, and so on, in a collective game of make-believe. But the game gives rise to a dangerous paradox. In granting these individuals such a monopoly over the representation of their own cultures or religions, the tolerance and flexibility they show towards the "other" on the outside is countered by an exclusionist tendency and rigidity towards alternative perceptions and diversity on the inside. In fact, religions are not especially tolerant of one another. The revealed religions, in particular, claim a monopoly on truth by virtue of divine revelation. They may show some indulgence to their predecessors, regarding themselves as the completion or culmination of those faiths, while accusing those who continue to adhere to them as having misinterpreted the creed or erred from the true path. But, being the final truth, they have no tolerance whatsoever for religions that come later historically. Religious tolerance is an idea and practice, not of a religion per se but of the practitioners of a faith, specifically those individuals who have reached conviction in the need for religious tolerance or who have adopted a moral stance on the basis of a tolerant interpretation of their religious scriptures and creed. It is people who are religiously tolerant and among these are affiliates of a certain religion who interpret their faith in a way that justifies the tolerance of other religions. The act of pinning down the essential traits of a religion or culture is a quixotic attempt to prevent its evolution. But it does not work. All that it succeeds in doing is preventing the development of the participants or practitioners themselves. Dialogue can serve the cause of the development of these people if they realise that they are individuals -- mere individuals. Then dialogue makes sense. When participants remain modest and operate on the assumption that they are distinct persons, as opposed to "sides" or "parties", then dialogue between them can certainly be meaningful. Indeed, hosting religious officials or their affiliates, along with intellectuals, in dialogues as though they were representatives or delegates of certain religions or cultures is a deliberate political act. It has nothing to do with dialogue and everything to do with appointing advocates of particular ideas or agendas as representatives of their religions and cultures. It is a political tool or a media gambit, or both, in the service of a political objective. Real dialogues take place between individual people in everyday life, not around tables that transform the participants into representatives of different sides. ON DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION: Even if participants are specifically elected to engage in this activity, they represent solely the people who elected them, not a religion or culture. If they were delegated by an institution, government or organisation to sit around a table with others similarly delegated they are not acting in their capacity as men of religion or intellectuals but in the capacity of politicians. Whether as representatives or delegates, when they talk to one another they are not dialoguing but negotiating. For a dialogue to be fruitful, it must take place between persons in their capacity as individuals with independent ideas and personalities. Once they assume a representative capacity their talks become negotiations. Negotiations are subject to certain principles that the parties are delegated to defend, as well as to balances of power, calculations of cost and benefit, and the like. This applies equally to the give-and-take between individuals representing the interests of a company or certain groups in the workplace. Of course, you will find elements of dialogue in negotiations whenever negotiators have the leeway to express themselves culturally or intellectually as individuals. And the reverse is true: dialogue may contain elements of negotiation. However, it is nevertheless possible to differentiate between them on the basis of what we have observed above. Moreover, it is desirable to keep the two apart, because to conceptually confuse the two could be detrimental to stakeholders in both worlds: the world of dialogue and the world of negotiations. To illustrate the adverse consequences of people negotiating when they are thought to be dialoguing, or dialoguing when they are thought to be negotiating, I have chosen an example of each, both of which we encounter numerous times per year. - It can cause no end of confusion when someone who does not have the capacity to negotiate on behalf of a movement, party or a state meets someone who does. The former can talk with the other, with no obligation to anyone, whether simply out of goodwill, or for his personal amusement, or to make a name for himself or to actually influence events in a certain direction. The latter is meant to negotiate, in the name of the body or people who entrusted him with representing their cause. He is accountable for everything he says and does. Take for example a foreign journalist or a liberal Israeli intellectual "sympathetic" with the Palestinian cause. This journalist or intellectual coaxes a Palestinian leader or an Arab ruler into acknowledging this and conceding that, if only to please him, in a purely personal capacity, or so that he can relay a good impression to the folks back home. So said Arab official obliges and issues remarks to the desired effect, even though he may not be empowered to make the requested concessions. In a situation such as this the intellectual or journalist, wittingly or not, becomes a vehicle for normalising relations that may appear to be equal on the surface but are, in fact, far from equal. He simultaneously becomes a tool in the service of his government's policy by having wheedled political concessions out of the adversary free of charge. Negotiations generally take place between two or more parties, even if individuals represent them. There is no connection between the number of individuals and the number of parties. As soon as the so-called negotiating process begins, there arises the illusion of two (or more) equal teams. Therefore, if the relationship is unequal, as is the case with, say, the relationship between an occupier and the occupied, it is better that some major issues are taken care of before negotiations open. Otherwise, onlookers will assume that the injured party is capable of taking care of itself and securing its rights or, at least, that by merely sitting at the negotiating table it has equal rights. But negotiations not only create the impression of a parity that does not exist, if they take place outside of an agreed upon framework they will cast to the winds all international resolutions and laws when and where the negotiating parties so agree. Negotiations have rules and principles, and those who think they have nothing to lose merely by negotiating would be advised to bone up on these. - Confusion of another sort arises when individuals from the same society are placed in the position of having to negotiate as though they represent different factions, cultures or religions in that society. For example, clergymen from different sects or religions in that same society are brought together to discuss their various views. Here the "civilisational dialogue" mode is transposed inward into a single society, becoming another facet or branch of the inter-cultural/inter- faith dialogue industry described above. The clergymen are not speaking as individuals but rather as exponents of their sects or religions or as representatives of their co-religionists. Again, this is not dialogue but negotiation, imposed on a single people by construing them as divided into separate, distinct entities that the religious officials claim to represent. Lines are drawn where they do not exist, for the purpose of being able to represent one side or the other. And the distinctions and differences are etched ever more firmly and clearly by those seeking to secure a monopoly over speaking in the name of one side or the other in the timeworn tradition of producing new political leaderships that no one has ever asked for but that arise nevertheless against the backdrop of the sectarian or factional polarisation they help foster and that will secure their places sooner or later. This type of situation can and does occur in a society in which people cooperate or compete as individuals at work, in public and private life, and evolve and make their societies evolve through their daily practical interaction and real-life intercommunications, even if they happen to come from families that follow different religions or sects. However, as soon as their interactions as individuals are pinned down with labels such as "Sunni-Shia relations" or "Muslim-Christian relations" they are being artificially pegged and corralled into purportedly homogeneous groups with distinct interests and mentalities, groups that are in a state of conflict or coexistence or other such faces of the coins that transform people from their own masters into particles of groups. Instead of persons with a multiplicity of diverse traits and idiosyncrasies, you get identity units whose traits are determined first and foremost by their membership in those groups. Then, before long, the relations between these groups can become charged by a sudden external factor. With the Pope's visit, the Arab media resounded with such expressions as how this visit would be "harmful" or "beneficial" to "relations between Muslims and Christians", and the Pope being "the guest of the Muslim people". Yet there was one people doing the hosting, a people that belongs to the same society, that speaks the same language and that interacts with one another as individuals every day, and that consists of both Muslims and Christians. Such are the examples that crop to mind in this context, not because they are the most important but merely because they are the most recent.
