Lodged between the US and Russia, Turkey's management and enhancement of its strategic profile is an object lesson to the Arabs, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Russia last week for talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin marked a qualitative shift in relations between the two countries. Topping the agenda of this visit were security arrangements Ankara hopes to conclude in Eurasia against the backdrop of the heated contest between Moscow and Washington over this region. Erdogan was accorded a much warmer welcome than customary diplomatic conventions require. Moscow made a generous offer to the US's strategic ally: the Russian S-400 strategic air defence systems to take the place of Turkey's decades-old dilapidated Hawk and Herakles systems. The missile systems in question have never before left Russia where they are used in the anti-ballistic missile belt for protecting Russian cities. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to take a closer look at what lies behind this unprecedented offer. Countries' foreign policies are founded on a strategic vision of their role in their geographic environment and of the network of regional and international alliances that best serves the promotion of their national interests. Applying this general rule to Turkey, we can encapsulate its strategic vision in the term, "strategic depth", which is the title of a book by the eminent Turkish political scientist Ahmet Davutoglu, who was appointed minister of foreign affairs a few weeks ago. According to this vision, Ankara should strive towards a relative equidistance from political camps and axes, engage more closely in the issues of mutual concern with its neighbours, and diversify its regional and international alliances. In so doing, Turkey will be able to use its strategic depth to influence regional and international players. Turkey is a close strategic ally of the US and joined NATO decades ago, which safeguarded its national security and its international role during the Cold War period. With the change in the structure of the international order following the end of the Cold War, Turkey needed to re-examine its geo- strategic functions and consider ways to preserve its international weight and standing. However, the "strategic depth" theory is not intended to lead to Turkey's withdrawal from its close alliance with the US, which made it one of the countries to profit from the Cold War. Rather, it advocates drawing closer in a carefully calibrated way with other international poles, such as Russia, so as to acquire greater manoeuvrability with which to secure and regenerate its influence. Augmenting Ankara's desire to diversify its international relations is the fact that its key geographic location places it in close proximity to explosive regions and armed conflicts. It is sufficient to recall in this regard that the Russian tanks that entered South Ossetia in the summer of last year were only 160 kilometres away from the Turkish border. Turkey's desire to upgrade its missile defence system is understandable in light of its increasing regional involvement. Equally logical is its desire to obtain security guarantees from both Moscow and Washington. It is naturally keen in particular to steer clear of that slippery slope that led Poland to find itself caught between the Russian and American giants. Resigning itself to the American embrace without a proactive strategic vision for enhancing its role, Warsaw ultimately forfeited all margin of manoeuvrability. Modern technology holds the key to upgrading Turkey's defence systems. Two anti-ballistic systems occupy centre stage in this technology: America's latest version of its Patriot missiles (the PAC-3) and Russian S-400s, otherwise known as Triumph missiles. Choosing between the two is probably tougher from the political standpoint than in terms of design specs. Consider, for example, that there is no military alliance between Russia and Turkey, which inherently subjects the supply of Triumphs, their spare parts and delivery systems, to further negotiations at every political turning. Add to this the problems that these missiles have never been put to the test under actual combat conditions, and that while specialist military magazines have praised the components of this system as among best such military hardware in the world, it remains uncertain whether Russia will expand its production in time to supply Turkey the agreed-upon quantities of it. Therefore, if Ankara does decide to go ahead with the purchase this will be first and foremost a political decision. Moscow is naturally aware that the security guarantees Turkey is looking for in order to detach itself from the US- Russian dispute over missile shields are difficult to deliver in view of Ankara's strategic international alliances. One can not help but to suspect, therefore, that Moscow is not truly interested in exporting this sophisticated weaponry to Turkey, if only out of the fear that the secrets of this technology are leaked to the West. Obviously, the more the Pentagon knows about the Russian missile system, the more it will be able to identify its weaknesses and the more vulnerable the system would become in any military confrontation. It follows that the only way Moscow would be able to circumvent this problem, if it transpires that it is serious about a deal, is to insist on sending Russian experts to operate the missile batteries, a condition that Turkey, as a NATO member, is very unlikely to accept. One is thus forced to conclude that as generous as the offer may appear on the surface, it is little more than a gesture, albeit a significant one. Moscow does not want the ballistic shield that Washington intends to install in Poland and the Czech Republic to extend to Turkey and is wielding the offer of its advanced missilery as a means to influence Turkey's strategic options. However, it is unlikely that it would actually follow through on the offer. From the perspective of Ankara, let us not forget that Turkey imports a large portion of its energy needs from Russia. In addition, its interests in the Caucasus variously overlap or diverge from those of Russia and in order to have a stronger hand in this region it must disassociate itself to a considerable extent from Western positions in general and those of the US in particular. A salient instance of this desire is Turkish opposition to the US stance on Georgia. By all means, Ankara does not want to win a new enemy in Moscow and merely for the two to proceed with negotiations over the S-400 missiles enhances this impression. In addition, the negotiations -- just negotiations -- would strengthen the image Turkey is seeking to forge for itself: a country with a will of its own and determined to preserve an even distance from all sides. One can further predict that negotiations will continue for some time, even if they lead to nothing, because their mere continuity will benefit the morale of both sides. Through its application of Davutoglu's "strategic depth" theory, Turkey is working to incrementally readjust the conditions of its alliance with Washington. To Arab countries it is imparting a most edifying lesson to the effect that a strong alliance with the US need not prevent them from levering circumstances in favour of the advancement of their national interests. The latter is best accomplished with the greatest possible freedom of movement and manoeuvrability, as opposed to meekly submitting to the American embrace without an independent strategic vision or the political acumen to pursue one. The intensifying competition over Turkey and its strategic depth, in and of itself, underscores that country's considerable value in international politics. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
