While the tactical aftermath of Israel's attack on the Mavi Marmara will play out in the coming weeks, the strategic aftermath is profound and sets the tone of a new era in the region, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* The disastrous Israeli interception of the Freedom Flotilla carrying humanitarian relief for the people in Gaza marked a turning point in the history of the Middle East and in the history of Turkish-Israeli relations in particular. The incident sent unprecedentedly powerful shockwaves through regional and international power equations. Granted, in this region long accustomed to countless acts of Israeli state terrorism, whatever storms that erupt over Israeli belligerence seem always to blow over. But Israel's act of piracy against the Mavi Marmara on 31 May 2010 is proving different. The crisis isn't over yet; it may continue to rage for several weeks. What is certain is that the region will not be the same as before. Turkey, the main protagonist in these events, has so far handled the crisis with consummate skill. Its top officials -- President Abdullah Gèl, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu -- have succeeded in ordering domestic ranks and in greatly enhancing Turkey's profile at the regional and international levels. Their goals appear to be to tighten Israel's international isolation and to strip it of its conventional diplomatic strengths, namely the support of international public opinion and Washington's unqualified backing. The environment and strategic balances of the Middle East have undergone numerous changes during the region's lengthy history. Yet the abilities of the various parties to correctly assess the nature and implications of the changes, and to redesign their strategies accordingly, have varied considerably. Turkey has -- sadly -- paid in blood for its return to the region. However, it takes more than blood to alter regional balances; it takes a focus on clearly set goals and the ability to capitalise on one's own strengths and to neutralise the strengths of adversaries in accordance with astute readings of subtle changes in the features of the regional scene and in the direction of the compass of international alliances. Turkey applied all these skills superbly during the recent crisis. There is nothing inherently fixed or immutable in Turkish-Israeli relations since 1949. When Turkey became the first Islamic state to recognise Israel it did so in the context of the demands of the Turkish-US alliance, which was primarily aimed against the former Soviet Union, which had long loomed menacingly over the Anatolian peninsula. When Tel Aviv entered under the American umbrella during the Cold War, Turkish-Israeli relations were established within the framework of participants in a larger alliance aligned against an opposing camp. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the dynamics of the link between Turkey and Israel changed. They were now two Middle Eastern powers that shared two chief characteristics: they were both close allies of the US and they bordered the same hostile Arab countries (Iraq and Syria). Turkish-Israeli relations remained close, even if they were no longer part of an international alignment. The US occupation of Iraq in 2003 dramatically altered regional balances once again. The Arab countries emerged as losers from the Zionist-supported occupation, which had neutralised the Iraqi factor in Arab-Israeli power equations and had stripped the Syrian front of its strategic depth, demographically and militarily. On the other hand, as balances shifted further in favour of the rising Iranian star in Iraq and the Levant in general, and with the rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara, Turkey no longer felt as surrounded by hostile countries as it had in the past. The removal of Iraq and Syria as potential threats to Turkey thus eliminated one of the post-Cold War cornerstones of Turkish-Israeli relations. If Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) was motivated by its fundamental premises to put the breaks on the development of Turkish-Israeli relations, this desire coincided with the change in the dynamics governing Turkish-Israeli relations. Therefore, the Turkish move away from Israel was prompted by higher national interests, not just by the interests of the JDP, as Zionist propagandists claim, and it is certainly from this perspective that we must view Ankara's handling of the crisis with Tel Aviv. The Zionist occupation power attempted to paint the Freedom Flotilla as a "band of Islamist activists bent on supporting a terrorist organisation [Hamas] with the support of the ruling party in Turkey." Nothing could be further from the truth. The convoy, in fact, was a fully multinational multi-faith expedition of humanitarian activists. It consisted of representatives of 32 nationalities, diverse religions and different political ideological persuasions. The Turkish prime minister in his address to the Turkish parliament could, therefore, confidently belie Israeli allegations as he levelled -- rightfully -- scathing accusations against Israel for its criminal behaviour aboard the Mavi Marmara. At the same time, Turkey pre-empted the inevitable slur of "anti-Semitism" that Zionist propagandists customarily hurl at anyone who criticises Israeli policy and behaviour. Erdogan drew a clear distinction between his condemnation of Israel and Turkey's attitudes towards the Jewish people with whom it has a long history of amicable relations. He said, "Turkish Jews are an integral part of our people and they protest what was committed against their fellow citizens by Israeli pirates." Erdogan further called upon the Israeli people to censure their government and to pressure it into ceasing such aggressive acts. The prime minister's remarks were praised by Turkish Chief Rabbi Isak Haleva, who expressed support for the steps the Turkish government is taking. Erdogan delivered a painful blow against the extremist Netanyahu government and Foreign Minister Davutoglu followed through in his speech at the UN Security Council. Both officials pulled the rug from under Israel's false claims and allegations as they turned up the heat against Netanyahu internationally and domestically in Israel. Their astute management of the crisis also helped them press their own demands, which ranged from the tactical -- such as demands for the release of detainees, for the immediate return of their citizens to Turkey and for an international investigation into the incident -- to the strategic, notably the lifting of the blockade against Gaza. This two-pronged approach complicates the situation for the adversary, which will need to address the tactical demands as it comes under increasing pressure to lift the blockade. If, indeed, the blockade were lifted it would mark a resounding victory for Turkey and a grave defeat for Tel Aviv. The approach has the additional advantage of paving the way for an immediate response to Turkey's tactical demands, the rapid gains from which strengthen its case and broaden its international support. The chief stumbling block on the way to the realisation of Turkey's major strategic objective (the isolation of Tel Aviv) is Washington. Whereas Turkey has deftly neutralised the international opinion card that Israel could once wield so well, the Washington card, where Israeli influence has a powerful impact on foreign policy decisions and is less affected by public opinion, is another matter. Yet once again Turkish calculations hit the mark and succeeded in limiting Washington's options. True, the US UN representative obstructed the issuing of a resolution in the Security Council explicitly condemning Israel and the US did not fully support Turkey's demands of Israel. However, the US now appears to be open to the idea of lifting the blockade on Gaza, which is no insignificant development. What this implies, of course, is that Washington needs Turkey much more than before. It needs Turkey's help in order to withdraw from Iraq, to deal with the Iranian nuclear question, and to improve Washington's image in the region. These issues are extremely important to the Obama administration and Israel appears to have nothing positive or constructive to contribute to them. It is in this context that one can understand why Mossad Director Meir Dagan recently told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, "Bit by bit, Israel is becoming less of a strategic asset to the US and more of a burden." The weakening Arab position with respect to Israel gave the latter an opening to strengthen its manoeuvrability in its relations with Washington. However, when Washington resisted Tel Aviv's pressures to launch a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, the Netanyahu government moved to expand Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem as a means to blackmail Washington, which was trying to kick-start a "peace process" (even if the US's motive behind this drive was merely to improve its image in this region, as opposed to realising a truly just and lasting peace, which would have set it on a collision course with Tel Aviv). None of this would have happened if there had been a minimal strategic balance between the Arabs and Israel. The vacuum on the Arab side of the equation helped Tel Aviv and Ankara expand their margins of influence in Washington, making it increasingly difficult for Washington to restrain either of them. It is little wonder, therefore, why the Obama administration played for time before issuing a reaction to the Mavi Marmara incident and why it has tried to remain on the fence in the dispute between Turkey and Israel. Sooner or later, however, it will have to make a choice and already it looks like the decision will be Turkey. Herein resides the deeper geopolitical significance of the Freedom Flotilla incident. Israel has met with a strategic defeat because it no longer possesses the range of options it had from 1948 to 31 October 2010. In fact, its options are now very limited. In his speech before the Turkish parliament, Erdogan stopped just short of breaking his country's relations with Israel. A rupture in Turkish-Israeli relations would enable Tel Aviv to circumvent Turkish pressures at this juncture. The bilateral relations will therefore continue, but the dynamics that shape them have changed. Turkey is no longer a strategic partner to Israel and Israel is no longer Washington's foremost partner in the region. Regardless of how the aftermath of the Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara plays out over the next few weeks, the larger backdrop will be the increased regional and international isolation of Israel and the continued rise of the Turkish star. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
