The youngest member of a powerful clerical dynasty, Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim's death this week raises questions for the Iraqi Shia, writes Salah Hemeid Thousands of Iraqi Shias gathered last Saturday for the funeral of one of their leaders and a man who assisted in reshaping Iraq by helping to end the decades-long Sunni domination and empower the Shia to be the rulers of the oil-rich country. This man, Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim, was buried in the holy city of Najaf in a funeral that was also meant to show the Iraqi Shias' continuing clout. Al-Hakim, born in 1950 in Najaf, died on Wednesday in Tehran in Iran, where he had been receiving treatment for lung cancer, to which he eventually succumbed. Al-Hakim also lived in exile in Iran for nearly 30 years, finally returning to Iraq in 2003 after US-led forces toppled the Saddam regime. At his funeral, mourners looking to pay their final respects watched as the flag-draped coffin with the leader's black turban atop it was paraded through the streets of his birthplace. The youngest son of Grand Ayatollah Mohsen Al-Hakim, one of the century's most-renowned Iraqi Shia clerics, Abdel-Aziz was buried in a public square next to his late brother Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim, whom he had succeeded as leader of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) in 2003 after the latter's assassination in a car bomb in Najaf. Abdel-Aziz was the only member of the family to grow old, escaping the curse of assassination that haunted the influential clerical Shia clan. The SIIC, previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), was founded by exiled Iraqi Shia groups in Iran in 1980 with help from the Iranians, in order to fight against the Saddam regime in the war that raged in the 1980s between the two neighbouring countries. Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim played a key role in the group's struggle against the then Iraqi government, including commanding the Badr Corps, a militia group that joined the Iranian army in fighting in the 1980-1988 war. He also represented the SIIC in talks with the Bush administration to prepare for the war that toppled Saddam, securing a key role for his group in the new government, and some say the role of king- maker in post-Saddam Iraq. The soft-spoken black-turbaned mullah later orchestrated the formation of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and entered into a coalition with the Iraqi Kurds that has since been in control of both wealth and power in the new Iraq. Yet, his close connections to Iran and his plans for a Shia federal entity in the south have been regarded with increasing suspicion even by many Iraqi Shias, while Sunnis have long considered him to be a symbol of sectarian division. Al-Hakim's death comes at a time of increasing uncertainty in Iraq and of a sharp split within the Shia ruling bloc. A new alliance formed by the SIIC to contest the next parliamentary election only a few days before he died had left Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki's Dawa Party out, raising doubts about the Shias' ability to form a united bloc. His death also leaves his former party in a weakened state after it was defeated in provincial elections in January by Al-Maliki's Dawa Party. Dawa's electoral gains have come at the SIIC's expense, and they have emboldened Al-Maliki, pushing him to seek overall leadership of any new Shia alliance in next year's parliamentary elections. As expected, Al-Hakim passed the torch to his son and successor, Amar Al-Hakim, a 38- year-old cleric who has been leading the Shahid Al-Mihrab, an organisation affiliated to the SIIC. After the burial, the younger Al-Hakim read what he said was his father's will to the thousands of mourners. In it, he said, his father had asked Iraqis to unite, to preserve the constitution and to take part in January's elections, which he described as "a religious and national duty." The will also praised Amar as a trusted and experienced leader who is "capable of continuing the path of struggle and taking full responsibility." Amar al-Hakim officially took charge of the SIIC on Tuesday, after its Shura Council, the highest decision-making body, said it had chosen him to head the group. However, the move has also raised questions about whether he will be able to hold the organisation together. One key challenge is expected to come from the SIIC's other top leaders, whose loyalty to the youthful successor to Abdel-Aziz is in doubt. If dissent appears within the ranks of the SIIC leadership at a time when the organisation is anyway at a low point after January's electoral defeat, then that could weaken it further and cause it to lose the popularity that Abdel-Aziz and his elder brother Mohamed Baqir had cultivated. Amar Al-Hakim has sought to present himself as a worthy heir to his father, but there are doubts that all party leaders will stand behind the younger Al-Hakim. Insiders say he may face tough competition from some members of the old guard, who believe that the Al-Hakim family may be getting more than its fair share in an organisation that was formed to represent the Shia community as a whole and not the house of Al-Hakim. Some reports have also suggested that while Amar will be the head of the group, a SIIC top official, Humam Hamoudi, will head the coalition, and another SIIC official, Adel Abdel-Mahdi, will head the next government if the new alliance wins next year's elections. Such a division of responsibilities will make the untested Amar only a figurehead in an organisation that has already been weakened by new political voices in Iraq's Shia community. Another challenge facing him will be Muqtada Al-Sadr, the firebrand young Shia cleric whose Al-Sadr family is considered to be the traditional rival of the Al-Hakims. Al-Sadr, who commands the Sadrein Trend, a key Shia group that competes with the SIIC for the Shias' hearts and minds, was probably no match for Abdel-Aziz, but he will certainly try to nudge the incumbent Amar out of the leadership of the Iraqis Shias. In a letter of condolence to the SIIC, Al-Sadr extended the hand of friendship to Al-Hakim's followers, saying he would be their "brother and partner in life and death" if they chose to work with him "to liberate Iraq and seek its unity and sovereignty." The implicit message can be interpreted as an invitation to SIIC supporters to join Al-Sadr's ranks after Abdel-Aziz's demise. However, the most daunting challenge to Amar's aspirations for Shia leadership will certainly come from Al-Maliki, who must now hope that the death of Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim will bring an end to the most powerful generation of the foremost Iraqi Shia dynasty. Al-Maliki knows that the same magic will not be in place for Amar, and the last of the Al-Hakims will not be able to carry the family's standard with the same confidence into the future. On Monday one of Al-Maliki's closest aides, Sami Al-Askari, said that the Dawa Party would not join the SIIC-led Iraqi National Alliance "because of differences of views." He said that Al-Maliki would go ahead with plans to form his own cross-sectarian bloc to fight in next year's election. If Al-Maliki's alliance wins sweeping votes in the next parliament, as they did in January's local elections, then the SIIC will be further weakened, if not totally irrelevant, for millions of Iraqi Shias. Amar Al-Hakim might have inherited traditional authority in the Iraqi Shia community, but he now has to prove that he is able to lead the SIIC and the new Shia bloc in the face of old and new Shia voices. Many of these are dissatisfied with his organisation's performance, especially its closeness to Iran, failure to achieve national reconciliation, and aloofness in combating governmental corruption.
