The possible induction of Al-Qaeda inspired groups into Syria could make an intractable conflict irredeemable -- at least for the UN, writes Graham Usher The bombings in Damascus on 10 May did not shock simply because of the scale of the carnage. In method, audacity and brutality reminded everyone of the Al-Qaeda inspired violence that in 2006 helped tip an insurgency in Iraq into a full blown sectarian war. The same discourse can be heard from the Al-Nusra Front (NF), an obscure jihadist group that has claimed the bombing and most of the others that have hit Damascus since March. "We tell the regime," said a muffled voice over a video aired by the Associated Press, "stop your massacres against the Sunni people. If not, you will bear the sin of Alawites," he said, referring to the heterodox sect to which President Bashar Al-Assad and much of the Syrian ruling elite belong. The insertion of foreign jihadists into the Syrian insurgency is a dire prospect. It could harden what is already an increasingly intractable conflict between the regime and resistance, radicalising both. It might widen the confessional and ethnic divides between Syria's majority Sunnis and its minorities, including the Alawites. And it would surely mark the end of the already expiring peace plan of UN-Arab League special envoy, Kofi Anan. That envisions an end to the conflict based on a ceasefire and a political transition agreed between government and opposition. The only transition sought by Al-Qaeda and its offshoots is the political disintegration of Syria as a unitary state. The UN lacks the mandate, firepower and capability to do anything to prevent such a break up. Not everyone believes the jihadists have entered the Syrian cockpit. At a recent anti-government rally in Idlib protesters raised the chant: "When are you going to understand? There is no Al-Qaeda here". Syrian opposition activists insist the wave of bombings -- including the Damascus blast -- have been orchestrated by the regime to tarnish them and divert attention from its primary responsibility for the violence. Certainly regime apologists were swift to smear the Syrian armed opposition and its foreign backers (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Libya) with the same blood as Al-Qaeda: Syria's UN Ambassador Bashar Jaafari said he had 26 "confessions" and 12 corpses of foreign fighters in Syria to prove as much. Still, the idea that the Syrian regime would stage a bombing that killed 55 mostly security personnel at one of its premier military intelligence headquarters officered by Alawite loyalists and notorious for its torture of opponents would seem to push the conspiracy envelope a little too far. This was too great a loss to be self inflicted, said analysts. Nor is there need for conspiracy theories. Given the turmoil that obtains in Syria it would be surprising if Al-Qaeda or foreign jihadis were not involved. During the Iraq insurgency they have used Syria as a base, transit route and resource -- capacities that can now be used against their former host. In February Al-Qaeda leader Ayman El-Zawahri urged Syrians and others in the neighbouring states to join the "revolution" against the Al-Assad regime. And while the link has not been established with Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra's first video in January did display the movement's signature black flag. Finally Syria offers Al-Qaeda a possibility to restore some of the prestige it has lost not only with the Arab Spring but in Iraq, says analyst Shasshank Joshi. "Al-Qaeda made itself enormously unpopular in Iraq by unleashing untrammelled violence against Iraqi civilians. Now, it may see a chance to gain credibility and support in a fight against President Al-Assad's self-declared 'secular' government". And unlike Iraq the jihadists would not face a foreign military power steeling the government or, as they would see it, fighting on the heretic's side in a civil war. Western and Arab states have made it clear the worse Syria gets the less likely foreign intervention becomes, precisely because of the Iraq precedent. And that includes the UN peace mission. Even the current levels of violence in Syria are likely to restrict the observers' freedom of action once they reach their full quota of 300. And should there be any kind of attack on them the pressure on UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon -- not to speak of the contributing countries -- to pull the mission would be immense, say diplomats, especially if (as now) there is no truce to monitor. Indeed the UN looks increasingly irrelevant. Regime and resistance appear to be using its putative ceasefire only to improve their position for when it finally unravels. (The current struggle for the central Syrian town of Al-Rastan -- in which 30 were killed, including 23 soldiers -- is a case in point of that kind of attrition). Foreign fighters, including Al-Qaeda, can be expected to be part of this lethal contest. In theory the two sides could draw back from the brink, adhere to a truce and at least begin a political transition. But that scenario looks increasingly unlikely. On the contrary, with each passing month the future of the Syria revolution appears less like Tunisia, Egypt or even Libya; and more like Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia.
