With the rapid fall from grace of some Islamists leaders, the Egyptian public is waking up to the real requirements of revolution, writes Ayman El-Amir* After more than one year of protests, demonstrations, coalitions and divisions, Egyptians have come to the crossroads of the country's political future. Political parties and religious factions that surged in Tahrir Square last week have come to the conclusion, some of them grudgingly, that the middle road is their safest option. Other choices are more divisive and precarious, ranging all the way from the disruption of normalcy to civil war. As no single party or group seems to have inspired the nation at large by its programme or foodstuff hand-outs, Egyptians are becoming increasingly sceptical about the veracity of those religious sects that pose as spokesmen of God. For more than 5,000 years Egypt has been a country of deep religious conviction. No religious wars were fought, except for the Crusades, and its religious fervour has always been tempered by tolerance. Egyptians, even the most Westernised liberals, have never been seen as lacking in their faith in God or in Islam. Radical political Islam has been espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood from time to time, culminating in political assassination. At times of political turmoil the Muslim Brotherhood's "Special Section" carried out political assassinations, including the murder, in 1948, of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmy Al-Nukrashi (Pasha) and the attempt on the life of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. A streak of violence still survives among some activists of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the Qotbists, the followers of Sayyed Qotb who declared Egypt a society of apostates, decreed political assassination, was accused of plotting to overthrow the regime and was arrested, tried and executed in 1966. Finally, former President Anwar El-Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by members of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamia. This latent radical trend reappeared in the statements of two religious presidential candidates: Khairat Al-Shater, deputy supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafist leader Hazem Salah Abu-Ismail. Upon hearing that the Presidential Electoral Commission had disqualified their candidacy for the presidency, one said the decision meant "civil war" and the second threatened that "there will be blood". However, they realised that mainstream Egypt has coalesced around moderate Islam through the ages. Al-Shater and Abu-Ismail later recanted. The 25 January Revolution opened up a Pandora's Box. Islamists of all shades were free to become politically active and to establish political parties. The conditionality that political parties should not be religious parties was outmanoeuvred, particularly by the Brotherhood. Despite statements about the "independence" of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) no one could trust the claim that it was not directed by the Supreme Guide of the group. Then came the first trick. The Muslim Brotherhood promised twice it would not offer a candidate for the presidency. Later, under "changing circumstances" that could not be plausibly explained, they offered Al-Shater, and when rejected replaced him with the head of the FJP, Mohammad Morsi. The Salafists were less apologetic about their ultraorthodox interpretation of Islam or Sharia law. They virtually posed a threat to the Islamic sense of moderation. No one really knows how or from where they came, or why they decided to turn from religious piety to political activism. The fact that they have the closest mentality to Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism suggests that they were among the hordes of Egyptians who had worked in Saudi Arabia for decades and were indoctrinated in Wahhabism, away from the Abu Hanifah denomination to which most Egyptians belong. Some commentators suggest they are awash in Saudi funding that helped them organise, attract thousands of voters and spend lavishly on election campaigns, especially for membership of the People's Assembly. Despite their proclaimed devotion to piety they, and other Egyptians, got the shock of their lives when their leader, Abu-Ismail, was disqualified because the Presidential Elections Commission found out beyond doubt that his mother was a naturalised US citizen as far back as 2006. When submitting his candidacy papers Abu-Ismail had reluctantly to sign a statement confirming that neither one of his parents carried any nationality other than Egyptian citizenship, qualifying it with the caveat "and God only knows". Abu-Ismail and his followers raised a hue and cry to cover up the issue, arguing first that the immigration papers of the mother were forged and later resorting to conspiracy theory -- that the US government lied "to divide the nation". The Egyptian nation was shocked indeed. After all they realised that the preachers of the way of God could indeed lie when it comes to political interest and curse doubters as secularists. However, to many participants in the most recent Tahrir Square demonstration it became clear that the whole campaign was about politics, not religion, and that the "People of the Lord", as Islamists call themselves, were not averse to lying, cheating and bribing to attain their goals. Long beards and appearance of piety were misleading to both common Egyptians and Saudi financiers. All of a sudden Egyptians found themselves face to face with real choices that would determine the future of Egypt. After the Islamist coalition captured the majority of seats in the People's Assembly it moved on to topple the government of Prime Minister Kamal Al-Ganzouri, to dominate the Constituent Assembly that would write the country's permanent constitution and push candidates for the presidency. The question Egyptians faced on 20 April's million-man march was whether or not they wanted Egypt to become a theocratic state like Saudi Arabia, where expression of opinion deserved flogging, or worse still, like Afghanistan where fratricidal wars tore the nation apart. What made the "Friday of Self-Determination" more critical is that the Islamist trend lost its credibility and the long-bearded religious figures their respect. The choices before Egyptians were thrown wide open in a way that was reminiscent of the early days of the revolution, after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. Of all the post-revolution protests and demonstrations, the last one was the most significant. Despite the Islamist black flags that fluttered in some sections of Tahrir Square, Islamist parties failed to dominate the scene as they did before. Some voices were louder than the others but all political factions were there: secularists, Islamists, socialists, liberals and nationalists. This was followed by a court ruling that dismissed the composition of the proposed Constituent Assembly on the grounds of the ineligibility of members of parliament to be also members of the assembly. It was seen that the dominant Islamist members of parliament were electing themselves to the membership of the Constituent Assembly to control the drafting of the constitution. This contravened the principle of the separation of powers and the balanced representation of all sections of the people in drafting the constitution. Egyptians are increasingly aware that they have only two months before the end of the transitional period and the setting-up of the permanent institutions of governance, including the election of a president and the drafting of the constitution. They better understand that to be a Muslim is not synonymous with membership of the Muslim Brotherhood or support for its indoctrination, particularly after the scandalous lies that undermined the integrity of the main Islamist candidates. They found out they have other choices to make and new coalitions to build. In this vein, Mohamed ElBaradei, former presidential candidate who withdrew earlier from the race, announced the founding of a new party, the Constitution Party. There is also a flurry of activities, consultations and consolidation among other currents. The Eg yptian revolution of 25 January 2011 is reaching maturity. * The writer is former corespondent of Al-Ahram in Washington, DC, and former director of the UN Radio and Television in New York.
