The Muslim Brotherhood is taking a significant risk in running for the presidency, while it is a milestone in its development, writes Khalil El-Anani* Other than the controversial nature of the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to nominate Khairat El-Shater to contest the Egyptian presidential election, the decision itself is a significant shift in the doctrine and actions of the aging group. It is the first time since the group was established more than eight decades ago that it is contesting the top political job in Egypt, the post of president. The move has many symbolic aspects that should be explored. First, the Muslim Brotherhood has become bolder in demanding power, transforming from a purely religious movement into a political party seeking to govern. Over the past decades, the general outlook of the Muslim Brotherhood was that it was not seeking power or governance, but rather reform of society. After the revolution, however, the group's appetite for power has grown and it became more specific about its plans and objectives. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to contest the presidential elections is a clear transition from the logic or philosophy of "ordeal" or victim to that of power and political supremacy. Perhaps the political void left behind after the fall of the Mubarak regime encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood to shed the condition it had embraced for many decades as a solely opposition group. Third, the presidency is no longer taboo for the Muslim Brotherhood, although the group had always claimed that it "is not asking for power for itself," as Hassan El-Banna stated in his letters. Today, reaching power has become a critical matter, not to achieve desired reform -- as the group claims -- but to protect itself in the face of the military junta who recently turned on the Brotherhood as their paths are diverging. The fundamental problem is the consequences of this strategic shift in Muslim Brotherhood thought and the losses that could result, whether on the domestic or foreign fronts. Abandoning the strategy of stages written by Imam Al-Banna (the Muslim individual; the Muslim family; the Muslim society; the Muslim government; the Muslim state; the caliphate) could cost the Muslim Brotherhood dearly. Mohamed El-Beltagui, a leading member of the group, said as much and added that the policy of "torching the stages" could result in grave consequences. In order words, the group wants to combine the stages of government and state into one because of changes in the political environment. This reflects the Muslim Brotherhood's fear that history could repeat itself if it does not seize this opportunity to take control of the state, since it is the most significant stage on the domestic front. This shift in the position of the Muslim Brotherhood can only be understood by viewing it through the lens of escalating tensions with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Over the past few weeks, relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and military have been strained because SCAF adamantly refuses to fire Kamal El-Ganzouri's cabinet. The Muslim Brotherhood views this position as intransigence and an attempt by the military junta to rig the upcoming presidential elections in favour of a particular candidate. This also explains why the Muslim Brotherhood sought to impose its hegemony on the Constituent Assembly that was formed to write a new constitution, which can be seen as an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to barter over the cabinet. On the other hand, the current crisis between the Muslim Brotherhood and military indicates a snag in the understandings and arrangements that began after the revolution and continued until recently. Very disappointingly, it is apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood was betting on the military rather than the revolutionaries and other political forces, and over the past few months the group gradually moved away from the demands of the revolution in favour of achieving short-term political gains. After the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won nearly half the seats of both legislative chambers, the group became excessively confident, which further isolated it from the rest of the political powers. Some viewed this as arrogance and an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to monopolise all state institutions, and the military used this situation to put pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood and manipulate its political isolation. The Muslim Brotherhood is now in a difficult position. On the one hand, El-Shater's nomination is a challenge to the power of the military, who reject Muslim Brotherhood hegemony over the presidency since it became apparent that there was a tacit agreement that parliament would go to the Muslim Brotherhood and the presidency to whomever the military supports. On the other hand, nominating El-Shater is a risk that can backfire not only because of his political and organisational influence inside the Muslim Brotherhood, but also because how this will affect the group, especially if he loses the presidential race. Theoretically, El-Shater -- like any other Egyptian citizen -- has every right to contest any political position, as long as there are no legal obstacles. But realistically, his nomination will further polarise and antagonise the Egypt's political scene that seems even more fragmented than it was before the revolution. Despite the ramifications of El-Shater's nomination for president, at least it will end the disharmony that afflicted the group of late. The largest political group in the country cannot remain out of power after a revolution that changed many of the rules of the game. Hence, the entry of the Muslim Brotherhood into the presidential race can be viewed as a critical milestone in the group's political development. * The writer is a researcher at School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University.
