Kofi Anan's negotiated transition out of the Syria crisis may seem a mission impossible -- but it's worth trying, writes Graham Usher at the UN On 12 March the foreign ministers of seven countries met in special session of the Security Council to cheer the first anniversary of the Arab uprisings. Celebration became recrimination as Western states and Russia accused each other for the council's abject inability to end the violence in Syria: the bloodiest, most intractable and dangerous of the Arab democratic transformations. Russia, with China, has twice vetoed council resolutions on Syria, either because they were deemed preludes to a Libya-like regime change or because they refused parity between the violence of the regime and that of the resistance. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made the same charges on 12 March. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the same replies. And British Foreign Secretary William Hague fumed: "In the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the world, this council has failed in its responsibilities to the Syrian people." His remarks were underscored by news that another alleged massacre by regime forces had been committed in Homs; that Idlib had been retaken by the military; that the Syrian army was mining the borders; and that the foreign ministers of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya all declined to attend the council session called in praise of their revolutions. They had other engagements, they said, but it looked like a snub. Is the UN irreparably broken on Syria? While the council bickered, UN and Arab League Special Envoy Kofi Anan talked. He met Arab League Secretary General Nabil El-Arabi, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad (twice), Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian opposition leader Burhan Ghalioun. Anan has ruled out the use of force (external or otherwise) in Syria, warned against arming the opposition and made no call for Al-Assad to stand down or even delegate authority to a deputy, as called for in the Arab League peace plan. Instead, his mandate wants an immediate end to the killings in Syria, humanitarian access for UN and other agencies and the start of a political dialogue between regime and opposition. These look like no-hopers. On 11 March Al-Assad said there could be no political dialogue as long as "armed terrorist groups" (the regime's moniker for the opposition) operate in the country. Humanitarian access would be at the whim of the regime -- and so a no-go in places like Homs, Hama and Idlib where the regime priority seems less relief than scorched, withering repression. And Ghalioun, for the opposition Syrian National Council, refuses to talk with Al-Assad. But, say sources, Anan's principle aim is not a ceasefire and dialogue -- at least not yet. It is to forge a coalition and new international consensus on Syria. He has the backing of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, the Security Council and Arab League. Critically he also has Russia and China. On 10 March Lavrov initialed a five-point agreement with the Arab League which broadly endorsed Anan's mission and three main goals. If that coalition holds, it would rattle the Al-Assad regime, says the International Crisis Group (ICG) think tank. "For the regime, Moscow is the key. Losing it would mean losing a significant contributing factor to internal cohesion -- the perception that, deep down, the international community remains ambivalent at the prospect of real political change" in Syria. Once that perception fractures, it may be easier to prize apart Al-Assad and his inner family cohort from those military, economic and confessional-political elites that have so far stayed loyal to the regime. Such defections could start a negotiated transition to a post-Assad future that may not spook countries like Russia, says the ICG. "Moscow's priority appears to be less upholding the existing Syrian leadership than ensuring institutional continuity and preserving both the state apparatus and what can be salvaged of the army". Such a "negotiated transition" would also enjoy backing by Britain, the Obama administration and Turkey, all of which fear an Iraq-like vortex should the regime explode. Anan's is a long road to Damascus. But there is a growing view in the Security Council that his diplomacy may offer the only peaceful way forward and that "the alternative to our unity on these points will be a bloody internal conflict with dangerous consequences for the whole region," said Clinton. That bloody conflict is measured not just in the dead bodies piling up everyday in Homs, Hamas and Idlib but in the dire prospect of another future. Sooner or later countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar will arm fighters resisting slaughter by the regime; Western states and Turkey will supply cash and non-lethal aid to the resistance; and Iran, Russia and Hizbullah will move to preserve the regime they know against an entity they don't know. The alternatives seem stark: either Anan's agreed transition to a new democratic order negotiated between Syrians and secured by the UN and Arab League; or an Iraq or Lebanon-like civil war in which the different parts of Syria fight as proxies for different parts of the region.
