Graham Usher in New York looks at why Russia and China vetoed the Security Council resolution on Syria and what may come in its place The UN resolution supporting the Arab League peace plan was the most determined effort by the Security Council to respond to the crisis in Syria. It now lies in ruins. On 4 February Russia and China vetoed the resolution. They did so despite the council's 13 other members voting in its favour, 10 Arab states sponsoring it and what opposition activists said was the regime's deadliest assault yet on the rebel city of Homs, leaving scores and possibly hundreds dead. The double veto amounted to a "licence to kill", said the opposition Syrian National Council (SNA). A leader of the rebel Free Syrian Army said henceforth "only military options are on the table", raising the spectre of an armed civil war. Diplomats at the UN were only a little less aggrieved. The United States ambassador declared herself "disgusted" by the vetoes, the British "appalled" and the French railed that two states had made themselves "complicit in the policy of repression" carried out by the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Arab and Western anger was understandable. Not only had Morocco and Western states on the council marshalled a regional and international consensus behind the resolution. They seemed to have met most Russian objections. The text called for neither sanctions nor an arms embargo on the Syrian government. There were assurances that it could not be used to authorise outside military intervention or regime change. And while it "fully supported" the Arab League peace plan, it dropped explicit reference to its components: especially a timetable for a process in which Al-Assad "delegates" authority to a deputy to oversee a national unity government and new elections. And yet Russia vetoed, backed by China. Why? One reason is geostrategic. Syria remains Russia's strongest ally in the Middle East, bound by multiple diplomatic, economic and military ties, including Moscow's only naval base outside the Soviet Union. Russia has been only slightly less zealous in its protection of Syria at the Security Council than the US has been of Israel. This was its second veto in four months. But Russia also had specific problems with the resolution. For one, it didn't like its provenance and promoters. Russia had supported the Arab League observer mission sent to Syria in December, pressuring Al-Assad to accept it. For all its flaws, it believed the mission had been successful in reducing violence and giving a more "objective" picture of the conflict, including evidence that it wasn't only the regime but also the opposition that was using violence. Russia was thus leery when the Gulf States -- led by Saudi Arabia but backed by the US, Britain and France -- pulled their observers from the mission. It became thoroughly suspicious when the Qatari Prime Minister and Arab League chief came up with a new peace plan, the core of which was a demand by the opposition and the West that Al-Assad step aside. For Moscow (and others) the purpose behind this "precooked solution" was to internationalise the crisis. The fact that the new plan was being driven by the Gulf monarchies suggested it had little to do with democracy but everything to do with weakening Iran, Syria's main regional backer. Russia proposed an amendment whereby the Security Council would merely "take account of" the plan rather than act "in accordance" with it. Morocco, Qatar and Al-Arabi refused. Russia's second problem was the resolution's refusal to put sufficient blame on the armed opposition for the violence, demanding only that the Syrian army withdraw from cities and towns. Such an "unbalanced" position would mean "the Security Council is clearly taking one side in a civil war," said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He proposed an amendment in which the military would withdraw "in conjunction with" an end to attacks by armed groups. With the Syrian army pummeling Homs, it was no surprise it was refused by just about everyone. So what now? "Faced with a neutered Security Council", said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 5 February, the main path will likely be to squeeze the Syrian regime by cranking up US, European and especially Arab sanctions. The hope is probably less that pressure will force compliance with the Arab League plan than induce a palace coup or regime collapse. A flavour of Arab sanctions came on 4 February. Protesting the violence in Homs, the Tunisian government withdrew recognition from Damascus and expelled the Syrian ambassador. Tunis has also recognised the SNC. If the Arab League does likewise, arms, cash and fighters may also flow more openly to the Syrian opposition. Russia is persisting with diplomacy. On 7 February Lavrov is due to meet the Syrian leader in Damascus. Justifying the veto he was at pains to say Russia was "not protecting Al-Assad but international law," particularly the ban on the Security Council interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Some observers took that to mean that Moscow was not averse to the Arab plan per se but only to its imposition by the Security Council. So might Lavrov tell Al-Assad to accept a political transition similar to the one Russia has just vetoed? Probably not. More likely is that Russia will again call for national dialogue between the opposition and regime. But that seems hopeless. Both the SNC and FSA have said the bare minimum for any political dialogue is that Al-Assad surrender power. Diplomacy, in other words, is mired. Western states and the Arab League seem only to be able accept a political transition without Al-Assad; Russia and China, so far, seem only able to accept one with him. The Security Council tried and failed to bridge that gulf. In Syria -- in the absence of a political horizon -- there is Homs: an increasingly titanic and brutal struggle between a regime and an opposition that both have enough support to survive but neither has enough support to win.
