In Egypt now, as one year ago, you can change the leaders of the state, but you cannot bury the state itself, writes Abdel-Moneim Said Will the first anniversary of the 25 January Revolution mark a new beginning for the Egyptian people, one that will occasion a healing of wounds, a recuperation from pain, and a reconciliation with the past (for better or for worse) so that we can get down to the business of forging a better future? Or will it mark the beginning of another revolution, one meant to accomplish what, according to the revolutionaries, has been left undone; and perhaps even more than that, in order to set the revolution back on course after it strayed in unimagined and unexpected directions? Both alternatives have their advocates who are readying themselves for the day and who are making frequent appearances on satellite television screens in order to explain their points of view, rouse enthusiasm and mobilise support behind their lead. While legitimacy has found a comfortable home with the first camp, in the form of the newly elected People's Assembly that is scheduled to convene two days before the anniversary, the second camp still clings to the banner of "revolutionary legitimacy," beneath which it has continued to march over the past months, as though there had been no elections, winning parties, or a single step forward on the transitional agenda. At first glance, it looks like the state versus the revolution all over again. However, the country is indisputably different than it was at this time last year. The parties involved, the rules of play, and the political equations totally changed. Perhaps the situation was best epitomised by the fact that the "revolutionary forces" rejected Prime Minister Kamal El-Ganzouri's appeal to all political forces to coordinate celebrations of the revolution's anniversary. The revolutionaries refused because, quite simply, they do not want to celebrate the revolution but to make another one. Towards this end they have been busily organising marches and demonstrations in Egypt's major cities, with an eye to a great culmination on that appointed day in Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the magnificent events last year. But it is impossible to ignore the profound changes that have taken place since then. From the "forces of the revolution" there emerged groups that have crossed the threshold into government, not as an opposition bloc but as decision-makers and legislators. The various Islamist movements have coalesced into powerful political parties that, combined, won 70 per cent of the seats in the People's Assembly and will probably obtain pretty much the same ratio of Shura Council seats. In addition, a significant portion of former soldiers of the revolution took part in the electoral process through newly formed parties. Although they were disappointed with the results they are nevertheless reconciled to the fact that this is how the democratic system works. They will now take their place in the opposition, which is that part of the system that regards itself as an alternative to the elected government and that believes, like parliamentary oppositions everywhere, that that government does not have the correct answers to Egypt's formidable problems. These problems have grown increasingly intractable. In the past year, which was punctuated by 23 "million- man marches," the economy crumbled and national reserves plunged from $43 billion in January 2011 to $18 billion in January 2012. Against this bleak background, a new phenomenon surfaced. The silent majority -- or the "Couch Party" as some spirited wit has called it, because until recently political participation for this segment of the populace was limited to sitting and watching the news on television -- has taken up headquarters in Abbasiya Square. Now, these people, who are taking up placards and chants today, had no objection to the 25 January Revolution a year ago. However, they do desperately yearn for a return to stability, not, it should be stressed, beneath the standard of the former regime -- no one has called for the return of that regime -- but beneath a standard that promises to take Egypt forward, not backward. The way forward is clear. It is to complete the rest of the steps of the interim process, which are scheduled to end by 1 July, by which time we should have a newly elected civil president and a new constitution, and the army will have returned to its barracks and the revolutionaries to their homes, and life should return to normal. The anniversary of the revolution stands out among other special days and dates that we commemorate because the memories and the sense of pride connected with that date are still fresh, and because the ardour for better days to come is strong. However, this is not sufficient reason for revolutionaries such as those of the 6 April Movement, the Revolutionary Socialists and other such coalitions. They did not launch the revolution, lead it until it built up momentum, risk their lives and lose colleagues only for it to be inherited by the Muslim Brotherhood or to give way to economic and social ideas that, from their point of view, are little different to those advocated by the former National Democratic Party (NDP). Egypt is still committed to the peace treaty with Israel and it still adheres to the principle of a market economy. But perhaps more significantly, the pillars of the old regime have been turned over to justice and the rule of law, which effectively means accepting the possibility of reduced sentences and, perhaps, even acquittals. A proper court of law relies on concrete evidence and testimony. A gun, a bullet, a coroner's report and eyewitnesses have to be produced and tied together in a way that proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that a certain protester died at the hands of a particular policeman. Without such proof, the accused can only be acquitted, as occurred in the cases of those accused of firing live ammunition on demonstrators. This may well apply to the Mubarak trial; it will be difficult if not impossible to prove that he issued the orders to kill demonstrators and he may well be pronounced innocent. The "revolutionary solution" is different. As with other revolutions in history, this solution relies on "revolutionary courts" in which the revolutionaries issue verdicts with no need for proof or evidence. But such solutions no longer suit the Egyptian stomach, especially after the recent elections that brought the first Egyptian government institution that can legitimately claim to speak in the name of the people. Most likely, the first actions of the newly elected People's Assembly will be connected with the anniversary of the revolution, a day that I predict will not see a confrontation between revolution and the state but rather between the nascent legitimacy of democracy and the advocates of perpetual revolution who now depend on another people in order to begin the next round of revolution. This people are the Egyptian poor, the destitute, the inhabitants of the slums and shantytowns. As everyone knows, the January revolution was borne by the middle class and educated youth, who benefited from the IT revolution and contact with the world abroad. At the height of the revolution, this segment of society cooperated with the forces that had formed the conventional opposition under Mubarak. That opposition, under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party, has become part of the system, again through the electoral process. The alternative now will therefore have to come from the approximately 40 per cent of the Egyptian people who did not take part in the elections and precisely from that portion of this 40 per cent that is unlikely to see a share of the national wealth anytime soon. However, it is doubtful that the revolutionaries will succeed even here. As enamoured as they are with television appearances, passionate speeches, revolutionary ballads, and marching to the rhythm of chants telling the Supreme Council of the Revolution to leave, the fact is that the gap between them and the masses they want to mobilise is far bigger than they imagine. If put to a vote, they would probably meet the same results as they did in the 19 March referendum and in the legislative elections. The fact is that you can change the leaders of the Egyptian state but you cannot bury the state itself.
