Neither side in the current clash between the military and protesters in Egypt has the capacities to vanquish the other, so a negotiated outcome is the only way forward, writes Khalil El-Anani* One of the facets of stalled democracy in Egypt is the inability of either side of the civilian-military divide to resolve the conflict between them in their own favour. The resultant situation is what we term the "equilibrium of the weak," for neither side has an advantage it can press over the other. The generals may have material might in the form of the army and in their capacity as the de facto rulers of the country; however, they lack legitimacy and, more recently, the credibility that would entitle them to remain in power. This is all the more true after a revolution that was presumably waged in order to restore power to civilians after six decades of military rule. The civilians possess revolutionary legitimacy (or at least those civilians that actually launched the revolution and protected it with their lives can claim this legitimacy), but they lack the necessary political homogeneity and cohesiveness. One day they are arguing over who represents the revolution and who has the right to negotiate in its name; the next they are falling out for any number of other reasons, some incidental, others structural and ingrained in the nature of the Egyptian political order. If either side had possessed both material and moral strengths simultaneously, they would have been able to settle the conflict in their favour long ago. It seems, therefore, that the political system in Egypt will continue to vacillate between the two sides, or more appropriately, between the civil and military options for some time to come, for neither is in a position to deliver the definitive blow. This situation is not unique to Egypt. In other countries that experienced similar revolutionary uprisings, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and some East European countries, the military was a major obstacle to democratic transition. If the flip side of conflict is negotiation, then how would negotiations take place and what conditions would guarantee their success? This question may seem highly theoretical. Most democratic transition experiences do not offer a single answer. Also, actual results of the negotiating process are often contingent on the very dynamics of the process itself, which can lead to consequences neither side had anticipated. In other words, in civil-military relations, negotiations are subject not to hypothetical criteria but rather to the complexities of the processes involved and to the ability of the negotiators to capitalise on their respective strengths. There are four models for civil-military negotiations in the context of the democratisation process. However, before proceeding it is important to bear in mind that the models discussed below may have occurred under conditions quite different from those that exist in the Arab world. Also, they are part of a complex social struggle (over power, interests and the future) and therefore not as straightforward as they might appear at first glance. Lastly, we are speaking of a negotiating process that must ultimately give rise to a winner and a loser, at least in relative terms. The first model is "confrontational". Both sides refuse compromise in the hope that at some point the situation will turn to their advantage and they will be able to settle the conflict in their favour. The confrontational approach can prove highly costly, and increasingly so the longer either side fails to realise its goals. Egypt verged on a confrontational mode of this sort when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and civil forces clashed with a violence unprecedented since the beginning of the revolution. Following what has since become known as the "Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud Street," which claimed 40 lives, both sides initially imagined that they were within inches of a victory. The demonstrators of Tahrir Square escalated their demands to include the immediate handover of power to a civil authority immediately. SCAF countered with the threat that it would bring the matter to a popular referendum, confident -- on the basis of some opinion polls -- that the referendum would come out in its favour. The second model is the "concessionary" approach. Each side offers certain concessions to the other side, although the compromises they make would vary in accordance with their respective strengths (or perceived strengths) and in accordance with the dynamics of the negotiating process in which both the structure of the process itself and the cleverness of the negotiators come into play. Nevertheless, the primary condition for the success of this approach is that both sides acknowledge the legitimacy of the interests -- or some of the interests -- of the other side. Examples of this approach are to be found in some Latin American and East European countries where civilian elites acknowledged the vast economic and social interests of the military establishment and were confident that they could gradually leverage the generals out of the political game and bring the army under civilian control. If this approach is to succeed, however, both sides need to sustain a degree of cohesion and unity during the negotiating process, a condition that so far appears difficult to obtain, if not entirely out of reach in the Egyptian case. The civil elites are too fragmented, while SCAF, to judge from the conflicting statements of its members, is unclear or even divided over the powers it would hand to an elected civil authority. The success of this model also requires that the military establishment possess a fairly high degree of political acumen. There appears to be some doubt as to whether the military establishment in Egypt meets this condition, at least on the basis of developments up to the present. Third, is what we might term the "face- off mode" in which one side continues to try to impose his conditions on the other, but without engaging in direct and open confrontation, which could be costly. The approach is more in the nature of a game of nerves in which each side attempts to protract the conflict while simultaneously evading direct and public negotiations in the hope that the other side will eventually yield. Generally, this scenario occurs in cases when neither side has a viable alternative for resolving the conflict in its favour. The longer the negotiating process is deferred the more scope there is for obstacles to accumulate. This model may explain certain aspects of SCAF's political performance, which has swung between deliberate foot-dragging and incompetence. Occasionally, too, it appeared as though SCAF's reluctance to negotiate stemmed from a fear that it would ultimately have to yield to the civilian option. Fourth, we have the "mutual accommodation" model, in which both sides resign themselves to the conclusion that coexistence is the only -- unavoidable, if unpalatable -- solution. The option is akin to a state of no war-no peace in international relations. Both sides retain their strong cards but instead of attempting to force their conditions on the other side they attempt to capitalise on the mistakes committed by the other side. The military establishment's appointment of a civil authority (or civil Advisory Council) is an example of such an accommodation. The civil authority may be fully empowered to manage the day-to-day affairs of society, but its authorities fall short of the power to take strategic decisions for the state. Pakistan and the Philippines furnish examples of this form of military-civilian coexistence. In the process of reaching such an accommodation, the negotiating framework would never reach a level that could alter the balance of powers between the two sides. Then, over time, the accommodation would become routine and, in and of itself, come to pose an obstacle to democratic transformation in the form of a hybrid political system that blends totalitarian military rule with a formal or restricted democracy. In the Egyptian case, the current negotiating context remains confused and unclear. While it seems to contain elements of all four models above, the current political situation leads me to believe that it falls somewhere between the second and fourth models, which is to say the concessionary and accommodation modes. Three factors lead me to this conclusion. First, since 1952 the military establishment has enjoyed an exceptional status that rendered it above civil accountability and supervision for six decades. However, the historical circumstances that arose with the 25 January Revolution, which suddenly drew that establishment back into the political process as an overt player, have forced it to think twice before choosing the confrontationist option, with which it would put its very future at stake as a national institution, let alone its image and network of international relations. Secondly, as divided as they are among themselves, the Egyptian civilian elites will not accept the third option (which would ultimately entail bowing again to military rule). This is not only because of the long decades of maltreatment they have suffered under the rule of the generals but also because going this route would be to commit political suicide. Thirdly, the Egyptian revolutionary forces may still have enough vitality and drive to move the street, especially after every gross misjudgement and wrong move on the part of the military; however, they do not have the power or resources to settle the conflict through the confrontationist or face-off mode. What is certain is that the political crisis in Egypt can only be resolved through negotiations between the military and civil camps. This will be a long and complex process whose success will ultimately depend on the ability of both sides to overcome their mutual denial. * The writer is a researcher at School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
