The recent cross border operation by Israeli forces has put much focus on Sinai and how to better manage the peninsula, Dina Ezzat reports Sinai is increasingly becoming a prime issue of concern for the public, intellectuals and ruling authorities like, both in Egypt and Israel. This is especially so after Israeli troops crossed the Egyptian border and killed five Egyptian border guards in August, allegedly while in pursuit of Palestinian fighters. Beyond demonstrations that sprung up in reaction, demanding the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador and even the suspension of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel altogether, the question of how to manage Sinai -- occupied by Israel in 1967 and fought over in October 1973 -- appears unavoidable. The main question for now is how to adjust the limited military Egyptian presence in Sinai in accordance with the detailed text of the 1979 peace treaty that divided Sinai into areas A, B, C and allowed only a police presence in area C -- the area closest to the Israeli border. Many commentators and wide sectors of the public have been demanding that more Egyptian troops be present in all parts of Sinai, including area C. Demands have also been put forward for better armament of Egyptian troops in Sinai, including beyond the tight limits permitted by the peace treaty that late president Anwar El-Sadat agreed to despite vocal opposition. "Today, the Egyptian military presence in Sinai is much higher than it ever was and the Israelis know very well that this is the case and that this will be the case for a while at least," said one informed official who declined to be identified. He added that given Israeli concern over the infiltration of some "seriously dangerous Islamist militant elements into Sinai," Israel has not contested the Egyptian decision. "In a telephone call earlier in the week, between Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi [head of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces] and [Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin] Netanyahu, the Field Marshal informed Netanyahu that Egypt will keep these troops in Sinai to secure the situation there," said Hassan Abu Taleb, a senior advisor in Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. According to Abu Taleb, Netanyahu has no choice but to accept the situation, as he knows that this presence, even though it goes beyond that permitted by the peace treaty, could undermine any future operation by "ultra-radical Islamist elements" that are still present in Sinai. "This would basically prevent a situation whereby another attack on Israel would occur and another Israeli [retaliation] operation follows, that could cost more Egyptian lives and further demands of the Egyptian public for Cairo to sever relations with Tel Aviv." The informed official acknowledged the truth of this account, adding: "Field Marshal Tantawi was very clear with Netanyahu. He told him, 'If you want to avoid further deterioration in relations, you have to prevent any future incidents involving Egyptian soldiers, or else put up with a firmer Egyptian reaction,' towards Israel." Two Western diplomats in Cairo said that beyond the details of the telephone conversation, both Tantawi and Netanyahu were in agreement that the situation in Sinai is serious and that it requires a firmer Egyptian military presence. "It is in the interest of everybody that the situation in Sinai is stabilised; and even for Netanyahu this is more important than the text of the peace treaty," said one of the diplomats. By the account of Egyptian and Western sources, including some whose countries participate in the multinational force that has been monitoring implementation of the peace treaty on the borders between Egypt and Israel since it went into effect, the current Egyptian military presence in all of Sinai, including area C, is almost unprecedented since Egypt recovered control over the Sinai Peninsula. Under the rule of ousted president Hosni Mubarak, Egypt went beyond the limitations allowed in the 1979 peace treaty at least twice, to confront security threats, including increased drug and human trafficking over the border. Mubarak also increased the troop presence in Sinai -- with the consent of Israel -- to prevent the penetration of Hamas and Hizbullah elements through the peninsula into Israeli besieged Gaza. "When the peace treaty was signed back in 1979, Israel had only one concern: to make sure that Egypt would have no combat capacity on its immediate borders. That includes all of Sinai, but especially area C. Now this is changing, and Sinai, especially area C, is becoming venue for much commotion," said Kadri Said, senior military affairs advisor at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Said added, today it is almost in the interest of Israel to agree to upscale the Egyptian troop presence in Sinai, to keep the situation under control. According to the official cited earlier, "Israel is aware that Egypt is doing all it can to keep the borders secure and stable. We are going on with the policy that was applied during the recent years of Mubarak, to prevent the smuggling of weapons by militants through illicit tunnels built between Sinai and Gaza." He added that the "only difference is that" Egypt sometimes chooses to turn a blind eye to the smuggling of food and medicine, because it is not in the interest of anybody to have a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and because "the Israelis know that today, unlike in the times of Mubarak, if there is a large scale crisis Egypt would not find it possible to shut its borders with Gaza." Egypt, the same source elaborated, is also doing all it can to protect pipelines for the transport of natural gas to Israel. "We do this despite the fact that exports of Egyptian natural gas to Israel are extremely unpopular," he stated. According to two other Egyptian officials, Egypt is currently re-examining the permanent scheme for its military and police presence in Sinai. It will reportedly take some time before a final plan is formulated. Then the matter will be subject to Israeli considerations. This, the same sources say, does not necessarily mean that the text of the peace treaty would be adjusted. An increase in troops could be left to the agreement of both sides with no legal caveat, provided it is done by the mutual agreement of both sides. Alternatively, it could be written down in an annex to be added to the text of the peace treaty. The last -- and least likely -- possibility is for the text of the peace treaty to be adjusted. For Egyptian authorities, as for intellectuals and the concerned public, the issue of Sinai is merely about Egypt's military presence on the peninsula. It is also a matter of long overdue development in Sinai. In the late 1980s, a national plan for the development of Sinai was formulated but never put into effect. Mubarak's critics say that it was the decision of the ousted president not to give the go- ahead to this plan because he knew it would irk Israel and hence risk the favour of the US. Others who served in the government at the time say that there was not enough resources to launch a mega- development plan for Sinai. The lack of development in Sinai is not uniform. Some parts of the peninsula, especially to the south, boast considerable development as world traveller destinations. In the north, some development was also pursued for domestic tourism projects. It is the middle of the peninsula that was -- and largely remains -- ignored. Today, according to a source in the office of the prime minister, there is a scheme to turn this part of Sinai into an independent governorate and to grant it a more generous share of the state budget and government jobs. "The essential thing is to end the sense of animosity between the largest part of Sinai residents and the state," said Abu Taleb. For too long, he said, the government gave hardly any attention to the Egyptian population in Sinai. "They had poor quality infrastructure, if any, apart from the highways built to link the peninsula with the rest of the country," he said. Today, Abu Taleb sees a pressing need for development projects, which can act as a kind of safety valve. "When the University of Sinai was built with an initiative of entrepreneur Hassan Rateb, for example, the quality of services and life in the area of this university was comprehensively uplifted, and it is these kinds of projects that Sinai needs today," he said. Abu Taleb underlines the need for an "immediate end" to hostility between the police and Sinai citizens. He argues that especially under the rule of former interior minister Habib El-Adli, in office from 1997 until January this year, Sinai's citizens tended to be treated as second class Egyptians, with an "assumed affiliation towards Israel, Hamas, or trafficking cartels," to boot.
