While it is almost impossible to imagine that Israel can free Gilad Shalit by force, Netanyahu is adamantly against a prisoner exchange deal with Hamas, writes Saleh Al-Naami The four strangers who rented a house opposite the home of the brother-in-law of one of Hamas's military commanders, where he frequently visits, raised the suspicions of security in the city of Rafah in the southern-most tip of the Gaza Strip. Unlike the usual tenants in residential areas, these newcomers were all men and without family. Even more suspicious were their movements as they took turns to watch the house that the Hamas military leader frequented. Palestinian security forces moved quickly because the Hamas leader under surveillance is accused by Israeli intelligence of playing a leading role in the capture of Israeli solider Gilad Shalit. The four men were arrested and after a short interrogation were revealed to be Palestinian agents working for Israeli intelligence. Sources told Al-Ahram Weekly that by arresting the men, Palestinian security agencies foiled an Israeli plot to kidnap a number of leaders of the resistance whom Israel claims played a role in Shalit's fate. During interrogations, the agents confessed that their mission was to gather detailed intelligence about the movements of the military commander, to be used by a special Israeli military unit to kidnap him. Sources confirmed that the agents told interrogators that they rented another house in a rural area east of Rafah city, where the Israeli unit would be stationed to receive information about the arrival of the Hamas commander at his relative's house. They also confessed that they were going to play a decoy role to deceive Palestinian security agencies during the kidnapping. The plan was that the Israeli unit would carry out the operation using a microbus taxi with Palestinian license plates and head southeast towards the border between Gaza and Israel. Meanwhile, an identical vehicle would be driven north by the agents to deceive Palestinian security pursuing the kidnappers. Sources stated that Palestinian security agencies are assuming that Israeli intelligence planned similar abductions of a number of leaders of the resistance, telling the Weekly that security agents and members of the Ezzeddin Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas's military wing, have deployed across Gaza to foil any similar plots. The sources said that Israel's scheme shows that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's government still believes that the military option is the best way to force the Shalit issue. They explained that the kidnappings mainly aim at extracting detailed information about the location of Shalit, as well as undermining the conditions placed by the resistance in return for the release of the hostage. The source continued that such plots indicate that Israel is being deceptive by asking Egypt, Germany and others to intercede on the matter through a prisoner exchange deal with Hamas. He added that the primarily aim is to buy time and enable Israeli security forces to draw up plans to end the matter through force. At the beginning of 2008, Palestinian security agencies foiled similar plans by Israeli intelligence, in cooperation with agents, to kidnap senior resistance officials which Tel Aviv claims were involved in Shalit's capture. Observers believe that Netanyahu's procrastination and preference not to reach an agreement to a end the Shalit affair is rooted in his belief of gambling on military options to reach one of two goals: first, resolve the issue without conceding to any of Hamas's demands by recovering Shalit dead or alive; second, ongoing military action would result in curbing demands by Hamas. Observers stated that Netanyahu still insists on asking former Mossad leaders specialising in stealth operations, that are known for their skill in intelligence operations to kill beyond the border, to take over the Shalit issue. These include Hagai Hadas, who was formerly in charge of the file, and the current official in charge David Madan. The admission by Israel's security leadership, mixed with dejection and pain over the failure of Israeli intelligence agencies in gathering information about Shalit's location despite physical proximity between the Gaza Strip and Israel and intense investment by Israel in recruiting agents and using advanced technology, is a sore point for Netanyahu. Meanwhile, a media campaign by former heads of domestic intelligence, Shin Bet, and Mossad demanding the payment of any ransom to guarantee the release of Shalit (since his chances of release while alive are close to non-existent) limits the prime minister's ability to manoeuvre since he is the only one who can conclude the matter. Nonetheless, Netanyahu is trying to swim against the tide and is secretly building the foundation for military action to conclude the Shalit affair with minimum losses. Netanyahu resorts to elaborate statements about his readiness to make "painful sacrifices" to ensure the release of Shalit, but in reality he does not mean anything he says. He realises that the Palestinian people have not been defeated and have endured immense sacrifices to ensure that the resistance achieves its goals by holding Shalit captive. The question now is why Netanyahu is so adamant in refusing any prisoner exchange deal while knowing it is impossible that the Israeli army liberate Shalit by force. At the same time, he realises that Israeli public opinion would support any deal that would secure Shalit's release and that he can also count on the support of his cabinet for any agreement he concludes. Israeli observers believe that the primary reasons behind Netanyahu's preference for the military option in relation to Shalit is opposition by Shin Bet to any prisoner deal. The domestic intelligence agency, as the agency responsible for confronting Palestinian resistance, is the most influential constituency in decision-making circles in Israel when it comes to Palestinian issues. It is true that the government of Israel can take any decision it sees fit since it is an elected entity and it is also true that security agencies are obliged to follow the instructions of the government, but in return governments are careful not to take any steps that contradict the recommendations of security agencies, especially Shin Bet. This agency has for a long time been strongly opposed to a prisoners exchange deal with Hamas, arguing that such a deal would advance resistance operations in the West Bank especially. This, despite claims by Shin Bet that it was able to limit resistance operations in the West Bank to a large extent since Operation Defence Shield in April 2002. Observers cannot understand why Netanyahu is lending such value to the position of Shin Bet, aside from weakness of character. Observers note that strong Israeli prime ministers have in the past gone against the wishes of Shin Bet, such as Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon. But Netanyahu is no such leader, being fearful of shouldering responsibility for the repercussions of his actions. Netanyahu is further weakened by the fact that the two most infamous intelligence operations carried out during his tenure were failures: namely the attempt on the life of Khaled Meshaal, the chief of Hamas's politburo, and the assassination of a leading figure in Al-Qassam Brigades, Mahmoud Al-Mambhouh in Dubai. While Netanyahu is eager to execute a military operation to end the Shalit issue, all signs indicate that he wants guarantees by the military that the operation would be successful, which is something officers cannot assure. Accordingly, Palestinian leaders have called on Hamas to be especially vigilant and not believe Netanyahu's deceptions �ê" to instead, prepare for the worst.
