By Graham Usher According to Palestinian and Israeli press reports, the US State Department had given Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu an "unofficial deadline" of 24 June to respond to its proposal for a 13 per cent further redeployment in the West Bank to clear the 18-month jam in the Oslo process. The deadline came and went, with Netanyahu giving no firm answer to the proposal. The US neither published its proposal nor issued the slightest rebuke against the Israeli premier's stonewalling. And PLO leader Yasser Arafat, realising once more that the US was unwilling or unable to "pressure" Israel, fell into one of his periodic depressions. "All processes are at an impasse," said a communiqué from the presidential office on 24 June. And "the Americans are not carrying out negotiations either." But depression has not meant passivity. On the contrary, the last week has seen the Palestinian leader preparing the diplomatic and domestic ground for scenarios that go beyond the US proposal to a possible future beyond Oslo. The deadline for this is commonly accepted as 4 May 1999, the date when Oslo's five-year interim period expires and when Arafat has repeatedly vowed to declare a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank "with Jerusalem as its capital." One forum for this preparation is the United Nations (UN). On Tuesday, the 15-member Security Council started to debate a resolution condemning the Israeli cabinet's decision last week to expand Jerusalem's borders westwards and set up an "umbrella municipality" for Jewish settlements in occupied East Jerusalem. According to the PLO's deputy representative at the UN, Marwan Jilani, some 80 nations have requested to speak on the resolution at the UN General Assembly, which "in itself is a clear condemnation of the Israeli government and Netanyahu's policies in Jerusalem." Less clear is whether the US will use its power of veto on any resolution critical of Israel. On Monday, a State Department official said any intervention by the Security Council over the status of Jerusalem "would not be fruitful," suggesting that the US would use its veto. But there is speculation, at least in the Israeli press, that the US would support a "softened version" of the resolution. If so, it would be the first time since the 1994 Hebron massacre that the Security Council has passed a resolution condemning Israel and it would be read as an implicit criticism by the US of Israeli policies in Jerusalem. But even with a US veto, given the current weight of international opinion against Netanyahu, the UN debate on Jerusalem is bound to score a propaganda coup for the PLO. Of equal importance also is the resolution submitted for 7 July by the UN's Arab bloc. It calls on the UN General Assembly to upgrade the PLO's status from one of "observer" to that of a "quasi-nation" with rights of representation in the various UN bodies, but without the rights of voting and candidature. The Arabs had submitted a similar draft resolution in December 1997, but lacked a majority in the Assembly due to US and European objections. This time round the vote is expected to be a good deal closer. More importantly, especially for Arafat, the division of member states for and against will be a useful indicator of the strength of international support should he make any unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. Another indicator that Arafat is thinking of post-Oslo Palestinian national politics are the moves he has made to form a new PA government in the self-rule areas. Following the resignation on 24 June of the PA's 22-member cabinet, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) granted Arafat a two-week extension to form a new cabinet. But rather than address the causes of the resignations, such as the PLC's charges of mismanagement and corruption in the old PA cabinet, Arafat appears to be using the reshuffle to broaden the factional base of the Palestinian leadership in the Occupied Territories. On Sunday, PA Civil Affairs Minister Jamil Tarifi confirmed that he had requested permission from Israel to allow PLO executive member Farouk Qaddoumi and Fatah Central Committee member Mahmoud Ghnaim to return to Gaza. The PA's requests were interpreted as an attempt to strengthen Arafat's standing in the self-rule areas, especially among the "opposition" in Fatah. Both Qaddoumi and Ghnaim voted against the Oslo Accords in 1993 and have been critical of the PA's performance since. A similar logic of preparing for the post-Oslo era seems to be behind Arafat's ongoing "consultations" with the PLO's opposition Popular and Democratic Front (PF/DF) factions and with Hamas. The three have so far ruled out joining any new PA cabinet without (in the PF's case) a "comprehensive and genuine review of policies" and (in the DF's) rejection of the US proposal for renewing the negotiations with Israel. But the fact that both the PF and DF have made their rejection conditional and retain membership of the PLO executive suggests that they could be co-opted if and when Arafat decides that the only road to Palestinian statehood is by declaring it. Hamas has rejected Arafat's intention to declare a state, saying that such a move would be meaningless as long as Israeli occupation has not been ended.
