By Yehya Ghanem "I came to Afghanistan to be trained in the use of modern arms, and from here I will go back to my country, Yemen, to liberate the Haneesh Islands from two years of Eritrean occupation!" It was with these words that Mahmoud, a 21 year-old Yemeni and one of scores of Arabs fighting side by side the Taliban forces, introduced himself. Mahmoud, one of the so-called "second generation" Arab-Afghans, is part of the "human arsenal" of the Saudi millionaire, Osama Bin Laden, whose bases were targeted by the US recent attack on Afghani sites. While the latest US raid marks a radical change in American reactions to those Islamist groups that seek to achieve their objectives by force, it hardly exonerates Washington's earlier role in sponsoring such groups. US support then, of course, was prefaced on ideological considerations. And today it remains equally clear, despite the rhetoric, that it is pragmatism rather then idealism that governs international relations. Before the two bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for which Bin Laden has been blamed, the US administration was already revising its policy towards Bin Laden, and towards the Arab-Afghans in Afghanistan. An informed Afghani source living in Islamabad told Al-Ahram Weekly that Asian republics surrounding Afghanistan, which had constituted part of the Soviet Union in the past, are fearful for a number of reasons. For one thing, the sweeping victory of the Taliban over the opposition alliance in the north has consolidated Taliban rule over vast areas stretching as far as the borders with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, each of which is concerned to deter the advance of the fundamentalist Islamist movement across its borders. The republics are terrified of the infiltration of extremist Afghani elements into their respective territories, and rumours are already rife about contacts between the extremist elements and the opposition militia in those republics. "There was implicit approval by the US to allow the Taliban to expand their military operations, and to tighten their control over all parts of Afghanistan, which is specifically what the warring factions in Afghanistan had failed to do in 1992," the source noted. "The aim was to secure the safety of the oil pipeline from the production fields in Turkmenistan, travelling from the northern to the southern borders of Afghanistan and across Pakistan to the port of Karachi." However, US efforts to mediate between the Taliban and opposition factions, which took place last June, came to a deadlock, mainly due to the hard-line political position adopted by the Taliban, emboldened by military conquests that have brought 90 per cent of Afghani territory under their control." The limits of Taliban expansion Washington was willing to sanction have not, though, been respected by the movement. Russia reacted by sending messages on its own behalf to the Asian republics and to the US, insisting it was not going to tolerate an Islamic fundamentalist threat to its soft belly in the Central Asian Islamic republics. It is against this backdrop that the US extended its offer to the Taliban, two weeks before the embassy bombings took place, offering official recognition in return for the extradition of Bin Laden to the US. Fearing that he may be sacrificed as part of a deal with the US, Bin Laden might possibly have breached his agreement with the Taliban, which allowed him to issue threats from time to time but at the same time to refrain from staging any operations on the ground. It appears logical that extraditing Bin Laden to the US is only a first step in a process that would result in the liquidation of Arab-Afghan leaders in Afghanistan. Al-Mulla Mohamed Hassan Akhond, the representative of the former Taliban prime minister and present minister of foreign affairs, said in an interview when questioned about Bin Laden's threats to the US: "They are only verbal and will never materialise into any concrete action... we have warned him that if he staged any operation outside Afghanistan, he would be expelled from the country. I have warned him myself, particularly against taking any action against Saudi Arabia as we are keen to maintain the Saudi's recognition of our regime, as well as to guarantee the flow of their enormous assistance." In the aftermath of the destruction of the Khartoum pharmaceutical factory, Sudan's foreign minister issued a statement charged with innuendo. "The US," he said, "knows that Sudan expelled Bin Laden, in compliance with US wishes, and is fully aware that he went to Afghanistan." Given that US intelligence satellites continuously monitor Afghanistan it seems almost impossible that such reconnaissance facilities should have failed to detect the movements of Bin Laden prior to the change in US policy towards him and his faction. Bin Laden is known to move with a large entourage -- some 500 strong -- comprising household members, his special guards and communication experts. Despite being a long time ally and a companion in arms of the Taliban, the financier behind several Taliban arms deals and the sponsor of development schemes in various areas under Taliban rule, the current regime seems anxious to be relieved of the burden Bin Laden represents. The Taliban may well be willing to deliver Bin Laden to the US, though in return they would expect tacit US approval for Taliban military expansion to the outskirts of the Asian republics.
