By Ibrahim Nafie President Mubarak's forthcoming visit to Turkey, which begins on Saturday, is part of a drive to give renewed impetus to Egyptian foreign policy. The extension and solidification of a network of close international relations between Egypt and the world is a way to secure the future of forthcoming generations. The infrastructure for this foreign relations project has already been laid out. We have made gains which would not have been possible in the absence of firm, unwavering foreign policy principles. Turkey, of course, is a natural focal point for Egyptian foreign policy. Egypt and Turkey are bound by strong religious and historical ties. For five centuries, Egypt was part of the Ottoman empire, with the seat of the Caliphate in Istanbul and the seat of culture in Cairo. These bonds, deeply entrenched in the consciousness of every Egyptian and Turk, provide an indispensable foundation for reformulating relations in light of current circumstances. At the same time, both countries occupy strategically vital positions. Turkey, straddling Europe and Asia, is a member of NATO, a bridge between Asia and the Middle East and between the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Balkans. It acts as an important gateway for the flow of Egyptian exports into these regions. Egypt's strategic location at the threshold of two continents also offers Turkey a gateway for the channelling of its products into the Middle East and Africa. Economics being the primary driving force of contemporary international relations, there are many avenues for cooperation between Egypt and Turkey. Egypt can benefit from Turkey's membership in the European customs union, while Turkey can benefit from Egypt's standing in the Community of Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA). Closer bilateral economic ties will contribute to increasing the volume of trade between the two countries, which currently stands at only $800 million, but will also spark increased interest in joint projects, while attracting Turkish investments toward major development projects such as Toshka, the Gulf of Suez and the Aswan steel plant. Of immediate concern in Mubarak's forthcoming visit is the need to hasten the smooth implementation of the natural gas deal between Egypt and Turkey -- the largest joint Egyptian-Turkish project to date, estimated to cost $4 billion. It is also essential to speed up bilateral negotiations over the free trade accord, to sign the cooperation agreement over the development of export trade between the two countries, and to promote the exchange of expertise in the New Valley Project in Egypt and the Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey. Increasing these spheres of cooperation should be relatively easy following the success which President Mubarak has met over the past decade in establishing good relations with Turkey, crowned by his efforts to defuse the tension between Turkey and Syria last October. Closer Egyptian-Turkish relations will also serve as the nucleus for stronger Arab-Turkish relations, which are essential if the Arabs are to maintain their strategic weight in the region. To be perfectly frank, however, it is important for us to revise some of our perceptions of Turkey. When we saw Turkey orienting itself towards Europe, we instinctively felt it was moving away from the Arab world. Our gut reaction was to turn away. Undoubtedly, this reaction was fed, in part, by our collective memory of some negative aspects of Ottoman rule. More palpable, at present, is our anger at the growing ties between Israel and Turkey. Perhaps because these issues are highly emotive, they demand even greater objectivity. Turkey's orientation towards Europe is, after all, a domestic matter that concerns Turkey alone. The Turkish government is responsible for delineating its options; it is accountable before its people for the choices it makes. Certainly, the decision to opt for a Western orientation is insufficient ground for the Arabs to spurn Turkey, particularly in view of the fact that Turkey, of all the countries bordering the Arab world, is the least inclined to tamper in Arab domestic affairs. Ankara is not seeking to export an ideology or system of government, unlike some other countries. Simultaneously, a Western orientation is not necessarily exclusive of other relations. Indeed, Turkey's failure to integrate into Europe so far has prompted considerable revision in Ankara of the relation with the Arab and Islamic worlds. If some Arabs continue to harbour residual bitterness for the injustices perpetrated under Ottoman rule, it is unfair to hold modern Turkey responsible for the errors of the past. Conversely, it is only fair to recognise that the Turks themselves harbour certain historical grudges against the Arabs. Both sides should realise that this residual bitterness must not hamper the future of Arab-Turkish relations today. As regards Turkish-Israeli relations, we should be frank with ourselves. First, before Israel and Turkey concluded the military pact in 1996, Arab diplomacy had not made itself sufficiently felt, a fact that places a certain measure of responsibility on our shoulders. After the pact was signed and joint manoeuvres took place with US participation, we were at odds over whether to characterise it as an ordinary cooperative arrangement or as a military pact that deliberately targeted the Arabs. In the end, we opposed it regardless of its actual nature. Whatever happened, it is not the end of history. The pact does not mean that Turkey is lost to the Arabs forever, nor that it has allied itself to Israel's military power. The situation requires determined political realism. Leaving Turkey to Israel does not serve the interests of Arab nationalism. It would be far more politic to draw closer to Ankara, in order to prevent it from drawing closer to Israel. In so doing, as I said, we have considerable cultural, strategic and economic stock to draw on. In an interview I conducted last September with Turkish President Suleiman Demirel, I asked him how he perceives the dialogue between Turkey and the Arabs. Demirel answered: "We have always consistently backed the Palestinian cause and we continue to support the Arab cause. For many years we have stood clearly and firmly behind Arab rights as embodied in the resolutions of the Security Council." These positions were one of the bases on which President Mubarak announced that he would clarify the facts behind Turkey's cooperation with Israel in order to prevent the rift between the Arabs and Turkey from augmenting. Thus, when President Mubarak flies to Turkey tomorrow, he will be embarking on a new phase of closer bilateral relations between Egypt and Turkey. These bonds, in turn, will serve as a model for future relations between Turkey and the Arab world.
