By Ibrahim Nafie Last week's strike against Iraq was not the first of its kind and is unlikely to be the last. It was the result of the ambiguous outcome of the Gulf War which saw Iraq subjected to the harshest sanctions imposed since World War II while, at the same time, preserving the Iraqi regime in tact. The end of the Gulf War, as a consequence, has witnessed crisis after crisis, as Iraq sought an end to crippling economic sanctions while the US looked for opportunities to complete the unfinished business of the Gulf War, i.e. the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But both the regime in Baghdad and the American administration, whatever the rhetoric, have failed. And the tragedy is that the main victims of these policies have been the Iraqi people. The other victim of the strike is the Arab World. US behaviour, as exemplified by the strike, is particularly worrisome. Washington has assumed the mantle of spokesman and policeman for the entire international community. The fallacy of this assumption became abundantly clear when China, France and Russia, permanent members of the Security Council, vehemently condemned America's unilateral actions . The US strike also delivered a lethal blow to the UN by bypassing the authority vested in the Security Council which never authorised this punitive mission. Kofi Annan was not exaggerating when he said, on the day of the strike, that it was a sad day for the international organisation. The US acted precipitously, without consulting anyone, as though any excuse, no matter how flimsy, would do to unleash its technological and military prowess against a virtually defenceless country that has suffered under a stringent economic blockade for eight years. Washington's pretexts for its assault convinced no one. If it was to prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbours, none of its neighbours had expressed any such fear. Whatever reservations Iraq's neighbours may have about the nature and behaviour of the Iraqi regime, they are perfectly aware that Iraq's military capacity has been so eroded as to render it effectively powerless against them. Another declared objective of the strike was to eliminate Iraq's capacity to develop and employ weapons of mass destruction. Curiously, the air strikes themselves caused no seepage of suspicious chemical or biological substances from the sites that were bombed. No missile launching pads were exposed, nor missiles for that matter, which Iraq would have had to use to counter the US attack. More remarkable yet was the fact that Clinton alluded to the existence of nuclear weapons even though the UN inspection committee had already closed that file and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in its latest reports, had cleared Iraq from the charge of possessing nuclear weapons. Whatever the true reasons for the strike -- Clinton's personal predicament, an opportunity to exercise some muscle flexing on the international stage, a low risk chance to test new weapons systems have all been cited as plausible motives -- it had entirely the opposite effect to that intended. It alarmed other international powers who saw the strike as evidence of the US desire to monopolise international affairs. It created a breach between Washington and friendly countries in the region. More dangerously, it strengthened the hand of extremists and gave the Iraqi regime, a resounding, if counterfeit, certificate of victory since, after the smoke cleared, it remained firmly ensconced in power. Finally, it fed the insatiable ambitions of Binyamin Netanyahu, who pounced upon the occasion to drag a shroud over the Middle East peace process. The results of the military action against Iraq, then, are wholly negative, even as far as US interests are concerned. While the US, with its vast capacities, may withstand these consequences easily the same cannot be said of those closer to the flames. It is for this reason that the Arabs should act now to assume the initiative in dealing with Iraq. Indeed, a summit has been called for this purpose. If we are to avert a repetition of the crisis, such a summit should call upon the Security Council to issue a resolution that explicitly reserves for itself the right to resort to armed force. Should the US object, the General Assembly can be summoned to issue such a resolution which at least would counterbalance US claims to act as a spokesman for the world community. The Arabs could also urge that the "oil for food" resolution be extended to allow Iraq to develop its agricultural and industrial capacities. To help achieve this, the Arab countries that were effected by the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait could consider postponing the collection of compensations from Iraq until the Iraqi economy recovers. The ultimate aim of any measures would be to help Iraq out of its isolation. In this respect the summit will also have to make demands of Baghdad. It would do it no harm, for example, if Iraq were to offer a public apology to the people of Kuwait, to release Kuwaiti prisoners of war and to instruct its various media, educational and political apparatuses to set aside forever the notion that Kuwait is Iraq's 19th province. It is equally important that the Iraqi regime relax its grip on power and open up the political arena to opposition forces. Such actions would certainly bolster Iraq's standing in the face of attempts from beyond its borders to dictate the nature of the Iraqi state. I believe that Arab efforts to assume the initiative in dealing with Iraq will win strong international support, particularly among those powers that are growing increasingly anxious at America's arbitrary displays of military might. To be entirely frank, if the Arabs do not take the situation in hand and do not exercise the flexibility and imagination commensurate with the task, we will have, for all intents and purposes, conceded that the US, alone, has the ability to deal with Iraq. The situation is highly sensitive and complex, factors that compel us to explore new modes of joint-Arab action. More importantly, the Iraqi problem emanates from a situation far more intricate and comprehensive than the series of debacles and internal contradictions that have afflicted collective Arab action since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. What is essential, therefore, is to address the crux of the problem, which is the lack of a vision for future inter-Arab relations that transcends the specifics of our successive setbacks and brings us closer to the demands of the forthcoming century.
