Divided on violence

By Khaled Dawoud
Mistrust is usually the initial reaction of London-based Islamist militant when he is approached for an interview by an Egyptian reporter. Though he makes it his job to spread news among Islamist militants, he is cautious about what he says and the motives of the press. Sentenced to death in 1994 by an Egyptian military court for his role in plotting an attack against then Prime Minister Atef Sidki, Serri says that he is nearly certain that he would be sent to the gallows within minutes of setting foot in the country. Sentences handed down by military courts cannot be appealed and are only subject to ratification by the president of the republic.
Serri, 38, belongs to the post-1981 generation of Islamists that emerged following the assassination of late President Anwar El-Sadat by the extremist Islamist group Jihad. Once an activist in the coastal city of Suez and an associate of Sheikh Hafez Salama -- a figure revered by Islamists -- Serri also had close relations with Arab-Afghan groups. He did not join the war in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation, but support received from the United States, Saudi Arabia and President El-Sadat during that time provided thousands of Islamists with a great opportunity for paramilitary training. Following the end of the war and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, a small army of Arab militants, or mujaheddin, turned their guns against their own governments in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen and Jordan, engulfing the region in a bloody cycle of violence.
Many Arab militants would later seek refuge in European countries to escape heavy-handed security crackdowns. Taking advantage of human rights-protection laws and guaranteed freedom of expression, London-based militants not only publicised opposition to their own governments, but also raised funds to finance militant activities back home.
After repeated arrests, Serri left Egypt for Jordan in 1988 and later worked in Yemen as a school counsellor. From Yemen, he left for Sudan, a common stop on the route of many Islamists before the Khartoum government gave in to US and international pressure in the mid-1990s and refused to house militants. Many, like Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden and Ayman El-Zawahri, leader of Egypt's Jihad group, returned to Afghanistan, but Serri and other associates tried their luck in Europe.
In Britain, Serri established the Islamic Observation Centre (IOC), a forum for militant Islamist groups in Arab countries, Pakistan and Chechnya. Through the IOC, Serri distributed militant statements to the Arab and foreign press. Some years ago, he was almost forced to close his operation due to the expense of extensive inter-country communication, but the advent of the Internet has changed the speed and ease with which information is disseminated. Serri boasts that he has sources in all Arab countries, adding that it is the IOC that informs the press and media of arrests and extraditions in his home country.
But the Islamists' European honeymoon ground to a halt with two critical events: the Luxor massacre of November 1997, in which 58 Europeans and Japanese tourists were brutally murdered by Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya militants, and the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.
In the interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, Serri conceded that a confrontation with the world's superpower was a mistake. In February 1998, six representatives of Islamist groups signed a statement with bin Laden declaring war against the United States and Israel. Among them was Afghanistan-based Rifaie Ahmed Taha, the man described in press reports as a hard-line Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya leader. At the time, members of the Jihad group said their leadership had decided to halt attacks against the Egyptian government and focus instead on attacking American and Israeli targets. But Taha's signing of the jihad declaration apparently angered a number of key Al-Gama'a figures, who viewed the action as a threat to their own safety.
Taha later said that he signed the statement not as the leader of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya, but in his personal capacity only. Bin Laden, in an interview with the Qatar-based satellite television channel Al-Jazira, also stated that Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya was not part of his organisation, although the group sympathised with his ideas and call for jihad.
Taha, a mysterious figure believed to be close to Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya spiritual leader Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman -- now serving a life term in a New York prison -- was one of the most outspoken opponents of a non-violence initiative proclaimed by Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya's jailed leaders in 1997. The devastating Luxor massacre was widely seen as Taha's defiant response to the cease-fire call. His argument was that a truce should be conditional on the release of thousands of jailed militants and an end to the government manhunt for militants hiding in the mountains of southern Egypt. It took more than a year of inter-Gama'a debates until the group finally decided to halt all anti-government attacks in April 1999.
A few months after the announcement, reports were leaked by Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya that Taha had resigned the group's leadership. Mustafa Hamza, the main suspect in the failed attempt on President Hosni Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in June 1995, replaced him. But Taha continued to issue statements in his capacity as "one of the leaders of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya," criticising the truce and questioning whether it could serve even the group's most basic objectives.
Following the October police shooting in Aswan of a leading Al-Gama'a militant, Alaa Abdel-Raziq, Taha issued an angry statement again lambasting the government and the non-violence initiative. A few weeks later, a group of gunmen staged a daring robbery against a bank in Maragha, in the southern governorate of Sohag, killing 11 people. It remains an open question whether the assailants were Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya members -- an act that would effectively declare an end to the two-year-old truce -- or highly professional bank robbers.
Serri does not deny that he is close to Taha and that he is the person responsible for disseminating Taha's statements through the IOC. Pressed to say whether it was Islamists or thieves who staged the Maragha robbery, Serri refuses to provide a direct answer. "It is possible that it was an attack by Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya, but I cannot confirm this or deny it," Serri told the Weekly. "Yet, we should realise that in addition to the two main groups, Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya and Jihad, there are other smaller groups who embrace the jihad ideology, and who refuse to subscribe to the non-violence initiative. It is possible that one of these groups might have carried out the attack and decided not to take responsibility because they don't care about the press and media, but prefer action on the ground."
Serri added that "it is also possible that one of these [militant] groups lacked finances or supplies, and decided to carry out the attack to replenish their resources. The attackers didn't want to kill people; they only shot at those who stood in their way. This means they simply wanted the money and weren't looking to harm people. Therefore, it's possible that Al-Gama'a members could have been involved in the attack."
Fiercely criticising Islamist lawyer Montasser El-Zayat -- the man believed to be the architect of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya's non-violence initiative -- Serri laid bare glaring divisions within the ranks of Al-Gama'a. Stopping short of accusing El-Zayat of being a police agent, Serri charged that El-Zayat twists the information that he gives the group's jailed leaders. "We don't question for a second the credibility of those leaders," Serri remarks, "but we question the information that is conveyed to them, as well as the views that this lawyer attributes to them."
So did Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya write an epitaph for the truce? "This is something to be settled on the ground and not by means of statements. Yet, I remain unable to understand the reasons behind the continued calls for commitment to the truce." Denouncing big efforts for little reward, Serri demanded, "Why should Algerian Islamists fare better than Egyptian ones? In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Army signed a truce that granted a general amnesty, and the agreement was reached with the top political leadership. What did we get in Egypt? "
Serri said that the group's jailed leaders were also vulnerable to being influenced by selective information. "When someone [El-Zayat] goes to the jailed leaders and tells them that our brothers and sisters are suffering outside -- that women are forced to sell tissue packets in the street -- isn't this psychological pressure on them? Those who say that we have to remain committed to this truce are selling us out to the regime to serve their own interests."
Serri disclosed that Taha will soon publish a book reviewing Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya's strategies and addressing the issue of staying committed to the non-violence initiative. "In other words, there is an ongoing debate on our future strategy," Serri admitted. "There is no doubt that there is an internal crisis, but we have to reaffirm the Gama'a's principles and goals."
Related stories:
Militant arms to stay down 29 June - 5 July 2000
London militants released 25 - 31 March 1999
Jihad reject cease-fire 8 - 14 April 1999
Struggle within the ranks 5 - 11 November 1998
Who are the UK-based militants? 3 - 9 September 1998
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