The secession of southern Sudan could pose a serious threat to Egypt's national security, writes Abdel-Moneim Said Egypt and the Egyptian people have a lot to worry about with innumerable urgent problems at home and inescapable issues abroad. In addition, certain regional issues, such as the Palestinian cause, the situations in Lebanon and Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear question, are moving so quickly as to leave observers short of breath. Yet we have little choice but to keep track of the succession of events in these areas in view of the direct impact they can have on Egypt's national security and higher interests. On top of all these subjects there is one that has enormous implications with regards to our national security and interests, and that will come to a head in exactly one year from now. I refer to the referendum over the secession of southern Sudan scheduled for January 2011, as stipulated under the 2005 peace treaty that ended the 21- year long civil war in that country. Although the treaty provided for a six-year interim period (from 2005 to 2011) for the parties to reach a formula that would induce the people of the south to remain in Sudan, there are several indicators that they find the incentives for secession and the creation of a new and independent state in south more appealing. The most recent indicator is the statement issued by First Vice-President of Sudan and former president of South Sudan Silva Kiir Mayardit on 31 October 2009, urging southerners to vote against unity. Speaking in the St Theresa Cathedral in Juba, he said, "You have the opportunity to choose between being free in your own nation or second class citizens in a unified country." The statement coincided with the inauguration of what UN officials have described as their biggest task in Africa, namely the registration of voters for the first multi-party legislative and presidential elections in Sudan since the beginning of the interim period. They are due to be held in April 2010. The opening of the voter registration process in the south occasioned several other pro-secession speeches. Foreign Minister Deng Alor -- a southerner -- said, "Why, when given the choice, would I remain in a state that oppresses me in the name of Arabism and Islam?" He added, "If we are talking about an Islamic state we can't be talking about unity." Even some northerners favour secession. Some believe it offers the opportunity to shed the legacy and the burden of the south that, for decades, had been a major obstacle to the development of the north due to its wars and economic problems. Others, inspired by a purely religious fervour, want to apply Islamic law on the whole of Sudan, a task that would become easier if the predominantly Christian and animist south were to secede. Yet in the south more concrete signs point to secession. For example, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research has earmarked $750 million for a separate budget for infrastructural projects, and the Ministry of Finance is cooperating with the government of the south on a plan to relocate the headquarters of southern universities to better enable them to take part in the social reconstruction process in the south. Also, according to numerous reports, the government of the south has opened SPLM (Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement) representational offices in many African, European and Arab countries and established a central bank. Perhaps more significantly, the Max Planck Institute has been engaged in a project to draft an interim constitution for an independent state in the south and feasibility studies have been conducted on a railway line between southern Sudan and Kenya with an eye to promoting economic and commercial relations between the two countries and facilitating the transport of oil from southern Sudan to the Kenyan port of Mombasa after independence. Nevertheless, some southern leaders are being somewhat evasive, taking the line that "unity is not attractive to southerners under the current conditions," as though a modification of conditions would resolve the issue. The likelihood is that this is a ploy to minimise the difficulties and alleviate fears that would arise from choosing secession, which could trigger widespread unrest. On the other hand, one can not be a hundred per cent sure that SPLM leaders are not using the secession issue to a different end, such as leveraging for better terms in the framework of a partnership with the north. What is certain is that not all southerners are in favour of secession. This would apply particularly to the southern tribes and militias that had allied with Khartoum and that fear that secession would usher in a sectarian state and internecine warfare between major tribes. In all events, the repercussions of the referendum on the fate of the south of Sudan could strike the heart of Egyptian security and interests in several ways. The rise of a new state in the south could affect our water security, especially in view of the fact that several Nile Basin states have already expressed dissatisfaction with the legal framework for the partition of Nile waters, in accordance with which Egypt is entitled to 55 billion cubic metres in contrast to Sudan's 5.18 billion, and they have proposed a new Nile waters agreement that would set new quotas between the nine Nile Basin states. The addition of a tenth state would open the doors to a further reduction in the proposed quota for Egypt. To complicate matters further, Uganda and Kenya appear determined to obstruct a new agreement and abolish all previous agreements regulating the relations of Nile Basin countries. The creation of a new state could easily heighten tensions over the issue and lead to its internationalisation, as occurred with the dispute between north and south Sudan over the Abyei border area that had to be referred to international arbitration. Not that such a prospect is definite. Some believe that a new state in the south would be too weak to stir trouble of such magnitude, all the more so since it would be too preoccupied by internal problems and disputes. In addition, secession would give no automatic legal grounds for the revision of the Nile Waters Treaty. Signed in 1959, the treaty is "eternal" and can only be amended upon the approval of both Egypt and Sudan. Second, a newly created state in the south could develop into a new crisis zone as the consequence of strife between the various tribes. The breakdown in security, civil strife and, perhaps, the emergence of a third state could reverberate throughout the African Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa that, in turn, could threaten international maritime routes passing through the Suez Canal. Third, a new state would offer fertile ground for any number of regional and international players keen to extend their influence in this region through offers of various forms of economic and material aid. Interestingly, such spectres could, themselves, form the major barrier to secession. For example, the prospect of secession triggering a series of other secessionist movements in the three zones that make up the south could propel many neighbouring countries to reject the secession of the south, for fear of the possible spill over of tribal and sectarian strife. Consider the trans-border ramifications of the thorny question of delineating the border between Sudan and a newly created state in the south given the fact that most of the oil fields are located in the vicinity of the border zone. Then there is the humanitarian question of the situation of the southerners living in northern Sudan. How would they be treated? Would they be transferred to the south? Or if allowed to stay in the north, what would be their status? Egypt is acutely aware of all the possible negative repercussions of secession, which is why President Hosni Mubarak visited the south of Sudan on 10 November 2008 for discussions with Silva Kiir on how Egypt could assist with development projects in the south. The visit was a major part of a series of steps, most in the form of offers of developmental assistance, aimed at encouraging the southern Sudanese to vote for unity. Following Mubarak's visit, Egypt agreed with the government of South Sudan to resume work on the Jonglei Canal, of which 260 of the planned 360 kilometres have been completed. When the canal is opened it is expected to supply between two and four billion cubic metres of water. Also, in addition to lending the south experts in administration, irrigation and agricultural, Egypt has extended grants to southern Sudanese to study in Egyptian universities, opened a branch of Alexandria University in south Sudan, supplied it with electricity generating stations, and dug wells into subterranean aquifers to supply certain areas with potable water. Such efforts have been greeted with diverse responses in Sudan. Whereas Kiir lauded Egyptian efforts, saying that Cairo has done more to support and develop the south than Khartoum, Hassan Al-Turabi, secretary-general of the opposition Popular Congress Party, was suspicious. He felt that Kiir's visits to Egypt and certain other African countries were laying the groundwork for secession. Not only were the South's African neighbours encouraging secession, in his view, countries as far away as South Africa and Egypt would not venture a word against secession. "After all where does the water come from? Now Egypt is pouring more developmental efforts into the south than the northern Sudanese government. It is supplying it with electricity for the cities, hospitals, education and other services." Indeed, from the Egyptian perspective, the primary concern is not so much the relationship between the north and the south but rather the situation in the north once the southern question is settled, whether the solution is secession or continued unity. One can foresee both risks and opportunities. The former would come from a Sudanese government bent on intensifying Islamic rule and exporting its extremism to Egypt and elsewhere; the latter would be contingent upon a government in the north that sees its future in closer ties with Egypt. Both prospects require us to remain alert and keep close track of the situation.
