Defining the limits of terrorism

How will the post-11 September climate affect liberation movements and terrorist groups? Ian Bremmer* examines the dynamics of US-Russian relations, and their implications for Chechnya
US-Russian relations reached new levels of accord following the 11 September attacks. Moscow and Washington shared intelligence and offered military support to the Northern Alliance, and American troops used Central Asian bases with Russian assent. Presidents Bush and Putin proclaimed a new partnership between the two nations, which would encompass political, economic, and strategic objectives.
There was much speculation that the war on terror would nullify one of the most consistent public areas of disagreement between the two states: Russia's handling of Chechnya. Eventually, given US strategic priorities in Central Asia and Russia's tactical significance, Russia's fight against Chechen separatists was poised to merge with the US anti-terrorist campaign, and US policy on Chechnya seemed ready for conciliation.
A substantive change never came. Before 11 September, US condemnation of Russian policy on the conflict had little implication. Chechnya was secondary to a host of concerns linked to Russia, from missile defence, amending the ABM treaty and expanding NATO, to foreign policy in the Middle East.
Since the war began in 1994, American policy on Chechnya has been remarkably consistent. Despite periodic overtures to Chechen leadership and criticism of Russia on human rights grounds, Washington has been fundamentally unwilling to challenge Russia's sovereignty in the conflict. Even those seeking to use outward Washington sentiment on Chechnya as a bellwether for US-Russian relations would be disappointed.
CHECHNYA UNCHANGING: When President Bush came to office, there were few expectations that this would change. On one hand, Russian-US relations were expected to worsen. In the September 2000 Cox report, House Republicans detailed how Russian foreign policy had become sharply anti-American, developing ties with such regimes as Iraq and pursuing a strategic partnership with China. On the other hand, Bush's campaign criticised the Clinton- Gore years of cosying up to Russia, as well as meddling in internal affairs. US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice announced a new pragmatism focusing on limited, national security concerns -- which did not include Chechnya. In March 2001, a US assistant secretary of state met with representatives of Aslan Maskhadov's government of Chechnya, including Iljas Akhmadov, the self-declared "foreign minister" of Ichkeria. The first encounter between the Bush administration and Chechen rebels was the highest-ranking US meeting ever with a Chechen official. Stopping short of recognising Chechnya as independent, the Bush administration clearly wanted the Russian government to understand that Washington would meet with whom it liked, regardless of Kremlin opinion.
State Department spokesman Charles Hunter asserted that the United States would emphasise the need for a political resolution of the conflict in Chechnya, the renunciation of terrorism, and the importance of human rights. Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky responded quickly: "Russia views such contacts," which can only have "a negative influence on Russian-US ties," as "absolutely unacceptable." The view in the Russian press was no more equivocal, announcing: "USA supports Chechen fighters," and "Russian Federation against contacts between the USA and Chechen separatists."
Indeed, as late as 5 September a senior State Department official announced that US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow would be visiting Chechnya (pending Russian permission), as the US government was "distressed that no progress appeared to have been made in bringing Russian soldiers to justice for alleged atrocities in the republic." The official stated that the visit was aimed at showing "we are genuinely concerned about the path the Russians are on." Despite the American overtures to Chechen leadership, the conflict in Chechnya played second fiddle to ABM revision and missile defence plans, and any other bilateral issues. Chechnya continued to be a matter allowing periodic criticism of Russia for a poor human rights record, than an issue preventing stable bilateral relations. As such, it joined trade policy and press freedom as issues to which the Bush administration was indifferent. US-Russia relations actually perked up in the summer, with American plans for revising the ABM treaty. The unofficial Slovenia summit between Bush and Putin occurred in June, as preface to the G-7 meeting in July. President Bush's agenda was dominated by the future of the ABM Treaty, missile defence, NATO enlargement, and Russia's accession to the WTO, an agenda which prevailed at the meeting. Chechnya was occasion for some criticism on human rights grounds, but without serious consequence or cost to Russia.
CHECHNYA POST-11 SEPTEMBER: There appeared to be an abrupt change in attitude to Chechnya among world leaders following 11 September. In a telephone conversation with President Bush two days after the attack, Putin spoke of acting against "a common foe" in Chechnya. German Chancellor Schroeder asserted that "as regards Chechnya, there will and must be a differentiated evaluation." White House spokesman Ari Fleischer called on leaders in Chechnya to "immediately and unconditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups such as Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'eda organisation." Washington appeared to be moving toward solidarity with Russia on the conflict. Kremlin spokesman Yastrzhembsky stated that the American declarations were "a demonstration of a better understanding in the US that the normalisation of the situation in Chechnya is directly linked to the struggle against international terrorism." "Silence on Chechnya is the price for this new solidarity," said a senior member of Chancellor Schroeder's party, "and I don't think Germany will be the only country to pay it."
This apparent willingness to reevaluate Russian operations in Chechnya intersected with Russian politicians' escalation of rhetoric against the separatists. In Germany following 11 September, Putin stated that "with terrorists, we cannot come to terms, we must leave them no peace," asserting that Islamic militants and terrorists funded the Chechen rebellion against Russia. Even Russian reformist Boris Nemtsov declared that instead of talks with the separatists, "the very term 'negotiations' should be dropped. All talks should be conducted in the language of Kalashnikovs."
Bush seemed to concur. "To the extent that there are terrorists in Chechnya -- Arab terrorists associated with the Al-Qa'eda organisation -- I believe they ought to be brought to justice," Bush announced. "And we do believe that there are Al-Qa'eda folks in Chechnya."
But 11 September aside, Al-Qa'eda's connection to Chechen separatists was old news. The State Department's April 2000 report "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999" stated that Chechen separatists "received some support from foreign mujahidin with extensive links to Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Central Asia Islamist extremists, as well as to Usama Bin Ladin." This link, however, delivered no blanket endorsement to Russia for its operations in the conflict. And even as Putin offered support in the anti- terrorism effort, Fleischer qualified Bush's statements by remonstrating: "The principle of adherence to human rights is always important." US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage went further, setting out the "new" policy very clearly: "We are trying to disassociate participation in the events in Chechnya of mujahidin... from participation of the Chechens themselves who operate on the territory that is part of the Russian Federation. As for the former category, we enjoy absolute understanding with the Russian authorities. There is a certain discord when the latter category is concerned. We have always thought that a political resolution offers the only way out and will actually be a blessing for Russia." The Bush administration had in fact set a policy that echoed Clinton's precisely: gain Russian cooperation while maintaining steady pressure on Chechnya.
With the momentum of personal friendship and military coordination between Bush and Putin leading up to the Crawford Summit in November, human rights qualifications were easy to dismiss. Yet after the Crawford public relations glow faded, it was clear that the summit brought no fundamental shifts in affairs.
Thus in January the US State Department announced that recent Russian operations in Chechnya were "a continuation of human rights violations" and an inappropriate "use of overwhelming force against civilian targets." On 23 January, State Department officials met with Ilyas Akhmadov after Washington criticised Russian security sweeps in Chechnya. In parallel with American statements, the British Foreign Office in January met in London with a representative of Aslan Maskhadov, Ahmed Zakayev, prompting formal protest by the Russian Foreign Ministry: "This London meeting with... Ahmed Zakayev is an act against Russian- British cooperation, notably in the fight against international terrorism." In the past, Russian anger at such meetings was as routine and inconsequential as the meetings themselves. Today, such overtures to Chechen leadership, combined with criticism of Russia, risk much more. The US now demands that other countries endorse the war without a quid pro quo.
Simultaneously, Putin's critics are increasingly vocal: renewed Western criticism on Chechnya, they protest, shows that support for the anti-terrorist coalition has delivered Russia nothing. Russia has become increasingly pragmatic about its Middle East policy at the same time that Washington has become value-driven. The United States has withdrawn from the ABM treaty, installed military bases in Central Asia, and pushed for an expanded NATO. Even as Putin closed the Lourdes listening facility in Cuba and announced withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Russia's accelerated membership in the Word Trade Organisation, and the write-off of Soviet-era debt, remained uncertain. The biggest upcoming problems are in the Middle East -- for which Russia expects to be paid. US interests have not moved decisively in this direction. Russia views the revival of criticism on Chechnya as a betrayal of the post-11 September understanding for the Kremlin's fight against terrorism. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement on 25 January made the point: "It is surprising that the US administration, which says it is necessary to fight any manifestation of terrorism all over the world, is actually encouraging Chechen extremists, whose direct connections with Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qa'eda are constantly being proved." Yastrzhembsky's office responded to renewed Western criticism of Russia by stating: "It is impossible to successfully fight Al-Qa'eda in Afghanistan and at the same time actually encourage its actions in Chechnya."
But a change still seems implausible. State Department officials are most likely to support a warming of US-Russian relations, but most critical of Russian activities in Chechnya. The US defence establishment, particularly given the international drubbing it has received over the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, is most sympathetic to Russia's Chechnya position -- but least in favour of friendlier relations.
WHAT NEXT? In the new vocabulary of the "war against terror," countries will increasingly be identified as friend or foe based on their acceptance of US policy. Kremlin opposition to widening the war could accordingly result in a volte-face in Washington. Simultaneously, Putin's critics angrily charge that concessions to the West following 11 September have brought few returns. In this polarised climate, the issue of Chechnya could lose its peripheral status...and US criticism on Chechnya could have more bite.
* The writer is president of Eurasia Group, a New York-based research and consulting firm, and senior fellow and director of Eurasia studies at the World Policy Institute.
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