The assassination of Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov will have deep repercussions, possibly region-wide, writes Mona Abdel-Malek Khalil Russia's Federal Security Agency (FSB), the centre of Russian state intelligence, reported on 8 March that Aslan Maskhadov, 53, leader of Chechnya's separatist movement, had been liquidated. Later the same day FSB Chief Nikolay Patrushev met Russian President Vladimir Putin to report in person on the operation. Putin, in turn, asked Patrushev to verify every detail and submit to his office a list of agents who participated in the targeted killing. They will be awarded state medals. According to the official version, Maskhadov, together with his closest supporters, had been hiding in the cellar of a house that belonged to his distant relative in the Chechen village Tolstoy-Yurt. To get the rebels out from the cellar FSB forces exploded the hiding place and Maskhadov was killed, while three of his supporters were arrested. Chechen sources, however, allege that Maskhadov either ordered his followers to shoot him dead, in order not to be taken alive, or his supporters decided to kill him so that their commander avoided a disgraceful arrest. The truth of what really happened in the cellar will probably never be revealed. The wave of reaction to Maskhadov's death followed immediately, both in Russia and around the world. Officialdom in Moscow expressed full satisfaction with the results of the operation, making clear that the assassination of Maskhadov, who had been accused of organising numerous terrorist attacks in Chechnya and other Russian regions, was but the inevitable end awaiting any terrorist. Maskhadov's destiny should demonstrate to remaining Chechen terrorists the seriousness of the centre of the federation and of President Putin himself, who more than once promised to exterminate terrorists wherever they were. Chechen parliamentary in the Russian Duma, Ahmed Zavgayev, also stressed that the elimination of Maskhadov would show to his followers that the same end awaited them: "No matter where they hide they will be found and eliminated," he said. Western officials voiced a different view, criticising Moscow for killing the "only peace-oriented legitimate Chechen official". State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said there was a need to add "a political aspect" to efforts of finding solution to the Chechen problem. Meanwhile, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Tefft was tougher, expressing dissatisfaction with how Russia was handling the situation in the region. Tefft said that although both Moscow and Washington shared a desire for stability, Russia "appears to interpret stability in a fundamentally different way". Curiously, the severest criticism came from Poland as Alexander Cheshko, press secretary of Poland's Foreign Ministry, called the assassination of Maskhadov "not only crime, but also political stupidity". Born in Kazakhstan in 1951, Maskhadov had a bright career in the Soviet army as a colonel. He resigned in 1992, however, and joined Chechen rebel leader Johar Dudayev, who started the dramatic conflict between Grozny and Moscow. In 1995 Dudayev gave Maskhadov the title of brigade general. A year later Moscow accused Maskhadov of setting up illegal military formations in the Chechen republic. After Dudayev's assassination by federal troops in 1996, Maskhadov became the acknowledged leader of the Chechen separatists, representing the rebels in negotiations with Alexander Lebed, secretary of Russia's Security Council at the time, leading to the Khasavyurt peace agreement, aimed to end the bloodshed in Chechnya. In October 1996 Maskhadov took the post of prime minister of the Chechen coalition government and in 1997, with strong backing of the Yeltsin-headed Kremlin, Maskhadov won the Chechen presidential elections. At the time Moscow officials believed that Maskhadov would succeed in bringing peace to the tortured Caucasian republic; that his influence would put an end to military actions that cost dearly in Russian and Chechen lives. These illusions were shattered as the new Chechen president introduced Sharia as an official law in the republic and dismissed the legitimate Chechen parliament. Later Moscow revealed that military guerrilla groups were continuing to function in Chechnya and getting even stronger. Nonetheless, after Khasavyurt Moscow decided to leave Chechnya alone for some time, believing that Chechens would solve their own problems by themselves. Later it became obvious that the situation in the republic had drastically worsened. Kidnappings for ransom flourished. Training bases for terrorists proliferated. Meanwhile, drug production was activated. President Maskhadov either couldn't -- or didn't want to -- introduce normalcy into Chechnya. Thus, in 1999, after Chechen militants attacked the neighbouring republic of Dagestan, federal troops entered Chechnya to carry out "anti-terrorist operations" against illegal armed groups headed by Maskhadov and other field commanders. By the beginning of 2000 Russian prosecutors included Maskhadov in a list of wanted criminals, offering rewards for his arrest. In 2001 Maskhadov promised to start a full-blown war, while on the eve of a terrorist attack on a Moscow theatre in 2002, Maskhadov declared that his people were working on an "exclusive operation". Until his recent death, Maskhadov took responsibility for numerous terrorist acts on Russian territory. At the same time, Maskhadov pursued a double-faced strategy, arguing in public for a political solution to the Chechen issue. In doing so he elicited significant support from the West, with envoys convincing officials in the US and especially in Europe that Maskhadov was committed to peace if leaders in Moscow would negotiate. Skillfully, Maskhadov played the role of the peace-seeker in contrast to Shamil Basayev, the second major force in the Chechen separatist movement, who never once called for negotiations with Moscow. By eliminating Maskhadov, Western analysts and officials believe, Moscow lost its only chance to conduct peace negotiations with Chechen rebels. Yuri Sharandin, head of the Legislation Committee at the Russian Federation Council, summed up these fears: "Now there is no one to negotiate with." What now after Maskhadov? While Russians seem sure that Basayev will share Maskhadov's fate soon, so long as he evades assassination he is almost certain to authorise new terrorist activities. Meanwhile, at the funeral of Maskhadov held in Azeri capital Baku, Abdul-Halim Saidullayev, 37, was named leader of the Chechen opposition, according to the will of the late Maskhadov. Little, as yet, is known about the new guerrilla chief. The mufti of Chechnya, haj Ahmed Shamayev, confirmed, however, that Saidullayev has been one of the most extremist-oriented among the militants: In the past he has called openly for the murder of civilians and for the creation of an independent Islamic state in the Northern Caucasus. According to Russian prosecutors, Saidullayev was behind the kidnapping of Kennet Clark, head of the Chechen Medicine Sans Frontiers mission, in 2001. Russian officials, on the other hand, seem hopeful that after Maskhadov's death financing of Chechen fighters will be significantly reduced, in part because the lion's share of foreign sponsorship was given to Maskhadov personally. Thus, officials expect the number of terrorist acts inside and outside the Chechen republic to be reduced. They also point out that Chechnya is led by a legitimate president, Alu Alkhanov. Earlier this month Alkhanov stressed the importance of building a peaceful and creative society with Chechnya remaining a Russian constituent republic. Government and state structures are also beginning to function better, despite rampant corruption. But perhaps the biggest problem for Moscow is not the Chechen rebels themselves but those who support them. Russian officials have more than once hinted that foreign forces have an interest in keeping Chechnya burning, making the Russian leadership vulnerable in the process. Along with the link to Islamic movements, some experts even point to Western regimes in this regard; charging them with contributing to the escalation of the Chechen conflict, which gives them means to pressure Moscow, Chechnya acting as a possible bridgehead for further separatism in Russia. This point of view is not without substance. The Caucasus has been named openly as a zone of geo-political interest to the US. It is no secret also that NATO officials named the Caucasus, through which very soon great amounts of Caspian oil will be transported, as being a geographical focus point in the process of disseminating democracy and market economy ideas to the countries of Central and Southern-Western Asia. The same understanding was confirmed by Kent Hill, manager of the US International Agency for Development (USAID) programme for Europe and Eurasia, who pointed out that plentiful oil and gas stocks in the Caspian region had essential value for the US. Geo-politics expert Alexander Dugin is sure that the West will soon be pushing Chechnya towards its own "Orange revolution" (referring to the installation, via US support, of the pro- Western leader Yuschenko in the Ukraine). On the other hand, others view the escalation of tension in Chechnya as a conflict between Christian Russians and Muslim Chechens. Such an approach supports well the image of "Muslim enemy" worldwide. It works well for those concerned to break friendly relations between Russia and the Muslim world and introduce severe inter- religious tension inside Russia. Russia, for its part, with its population consisting from more than 160 nationalities and professing four official state religions (Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism), is undertaking tremendous efforts to resist these fabricated provocations and to halt the dissemination of intra-national and inter- religious hostility, which could lead to disastrous consequences. Whether it can stem the tide remains to be seen.
