Former member of the Revolution Command Council and now president of the left-leaning Tagammu' Party, , still considers that he has not been properly honoured for the role he played in the 1952 Revolution, as he explains to Khaled Dawoud Click to view caption After falling out with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, leader of the military coup d'état that toppled the monarchy in July 1952, over the issue of restoring democracy and Egypt's multi-party system, resigned from the Revolution Command Council (RCC). As a result, he was never given the country's highest honour, the Grand Order of the Nile, which grants its holders presidential treatment, unlike other members of the RCC. "I spoke to [President Hosni] Mubarak about this, but he told me that if my former colleagues [Nasser and Sadat] had not given me the honour, how could he? I can't forgive Nasser for that decision, never." Today, Mohieddin does not attend official ceremonies, "because I don't want to be seated in the back row while some assistant-minister gets a chair at the front. This is an insult to the history of the 1952 Revolution, as well as to one of its key participants." Following are excerpts from a four-hour interview conducted with this week in Cairo. What pushed you as young army officers to form a secret organisation to topple the monarchy in 1952? After the conclusion of the 1936 Anglo Egyptian Treaty, Egypt's Military Academy opened its doors to members of the middle classes who wished to join the army. Before that, the army as a career had been limited to the sons of upper-class families, and to university graduates. But when it became clear that Britain would allow Egypt to build its own army, even if it was still under British control, many young men who had nationalist feelings decided to join. I joined the Military Academy in 1938 and graduated in 1940 at the age of 18. However, my happiness in joining the army was quickly dissipated by two incidents. The first incident took place shortly after joining the Cavalry Forces (now the Armoured Forces). At that time, the British had decided to confiscate most of our tanks, in order to use them in campaigns against the Germans in the Second World War, and I felt humiliated by this, as did many other officers. The second incident was in 1942, when Britain, facing German troops on the outskirts of Alexandria, forced King Farouk to accept the appointment of the Al-Wafd leader, Mustafa Al-Nahas, as prime minister. But why did you support the king in 1942, only to send him into exile 10 years later? I did not really support the king at that time, but many of us in the army still considered him to be a symbol of Egypt and its independence, and we rejected the way Britain had forced him into accepting Nahhas as prime minister. Our main concern was what we could do to get rid of the British occupation and achieve independence. There were many political trends active at that time, and I read as many books as I could, trying to find a path that could help in achieving our goals. In 1942, I got to know a leftist officer in our unit, Hassan Ezzat, who had been put in prison, together with Anwar El-Sadat. Sadat only stayed for two days, and was later taken to another prison. I spoke a lot to Ezzat about the national issue, and I consider him to be my first teacher about nationalism. In 1944, I was introduced for the first time to Nasser through another officer who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel-Moneim Raouf. When I first met Nasser, I found many books in his room, mostly in English. I was impressed because at that time I was seriously considering leaving the army, and I had an appetite for reading. I had a theory that after the United States had used the atomic bomb in WWII, conventional armies had become useless, and I wanted to change my career. And three years later I did join the Faculty of Commerce at Cairo University, and graduated in 1951. Raouf also introduced me to another officer, Mahmoud Labib, who was known as the Brotherhood's man inside the army. At the same time as I started meeting members of the Brotherhood I met another leftist officer, Osman Fawzi, who provided me with many books. However, I was still drawn to the Brotherhood, thinking that religion could be strong enough to move the people against the British occupation. After many meetings with Labib, some of them also attended by Nasser, Labib decided that since we both had many questions he should ask the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood himself, Hassan El-Banna, to meet us. I was probably influenced by the books given to me by Fawzi, and I used to ask Labib for detailed answers on the Brotherhood's political programme. To all my questions, Labib's answer was, 'Islam, and the Shari'a [Islamic law]' However, that was not a convincing answer for me, and I needed more details. I asked him what they were planning to do about fighting the British occupation, as well as about their social and economic programmes and their specific stands on a variety of issues. At that time, the Brotherhood, and El-Banna, clearly welcomed our presence in the group even if we did not fully agree with them, because they wanted to have a strong presence within the army. Yet, when we met with El-Banna, I asked him again about the Brotherhood's programme, and he replied that he did not want to outline a detailed programme in order not to create divisions within the movement. Finally, in early 1947, the Brotherhood invited myself and Nasser to join the group. We were both led to a dark room, where we repeated the Brotherhood's oath of loyalty while laying our hand on a copy of the Qur'an and a gun. Although we both took this oath, we were not happy with these secretive rituals, though we felt we needed a strong political group to back us when we carried out our movement. The Brotherhood at that time was a very strong movement, with 500,000 members and 4,000 branches across Egypt. However, our relationship with the Brotherhood did not last for long, and Nasser remained suspicious that the Brotherhood only wanted to exploit our presence in the army. We were also unhappy with the Brotherhood's stand on the national issue and on getting rid of British occupation, and we did not think they were doing enough on that front. As for me, I strengthened my ties with other leftist officers. What is your opinion of claims that the Brotherhood's attempt to assassinate Nasser in Alexandria in 1954 was actually a plot by the regime in order to increase Nasser's popularity? This was a true attempt on Nasser's life. I asked my cousin and member of the RCC, Zakariya Mohieddin, and he confirmed to me that it had been an assassination attempt and was in no way a part of a plan to increase Nasser's popularity. The man who fired the gun was a Brotherhood member. When I asked him whether they had exploited the incident in order to liquidate the Brotherhood, he replied, 'yes, of course. They made the biggest mistake in their lives.' What led you to move against the monarchy in 1952? The war in Palestine in 1948, and the humiliating defeat we suffered, was an important turning point. The Egyptian army was forced to enter that war without being prepared for it, particularly in terms of arms and training. When the war ended, I met Nasser, and we decided that we had to do something. He told me that he was already in touch with a number of nationalist officers, and we agreed to meet for the first time in Nasser's house in the summer of 1949. At that meeting, we came up with the idea and name of the Free Officers. We all agreed that each of us would seek to recruit more officers, each in his own unit. Our meetings continued, and in early 1950, we issued the first statement signed by the Free Officers entitled, 'An Appeal and a Warning.' At that time, we were around 40-50 officers in all. What was the role of Mohammed Naguib in the Revolution, and when did the Free Officers contact him? We must give Naguib the credit he deserves, but we should also not ignore Nasser's central role. Nasser is the one who established the Free Officers. He was the one who first offered me membership in the organisation, and he remained the leader of the group till its final day. Naguib had no relation with the Free Officers, but he was a popular and respected senior army officer. We also wanted to keep him for a later stage as a front for the movement, due to his seniority and popularity. Don't forget that most of us were only in our late 20s or early 30s at that time, and the Egyptian people tend to respect seniority and high rank. When he offered publicly to lead the group should our movement succeed, we immediately welcomed it. Strangely enough, he did not even ask us about our numbers or preparations. He simply said, 'I am with you.' Naguib did not have an organisation or a party to back him, and he depended mainly on his popularity among the people as a whole. I had the Armoured Forces behind me and was popular there, and the rest of the RCC members were part of the Free Officers. Naguib, however, did not recognise this fact and started demanding the authority of a president, pushing towards a confrontation with Nasser. Seeing the demonstrations in his support wherever he went, Naguib started saying that he should be the one to represent the revolution and meet with the public. This led him to clash with Nasser, who had the same strong tendency, loving to appear in public and enjoy the support of the masses. Yet, I cannot deny that Naguib played a vital role in the Revolution, risking his life with us in case we failed. I also disagree with what happened to him after his being ousted in 1954, putting him under house arrest for 18 years. This is one of the darkest points in the Revolution's history. He suffered injustice, and Nasser always avoided any reference to Naguib as Egypt's first president . Can you describe your relationship with Nasser? I always felt that I was the closest to Nasser, despite our disagreements. When we first formed our organisation, he asked me to be responsible for recruitment in the Cavalry Forces, and he did not ask other members, like Hussein El-Shafie or Tharwat Okasha, despite their senior ranks. After he accepted my resignation in 1954, he asked me to leave the country. He told me that if I stayed I would speak out, opposing the views of the RCC, and that would not please him. Nasser offered to let my daughter go abroad and appoint me as ambassador. But after my colleagues in the Armoured Forces led a mutiny shortly after my departure, I received a message saying that it would be difficult to appoint me as ambassador and asking me to remain in Europe. However, one good aspect of Nasser's character was that he would not harm any of his close friends. In 1965, when the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP) decided to dissolve itself and join the Socialist Union, I went to Nasser and asked him to meet the ECP's secretary-general, the late Fouad Mursi. He refused, saying that if he met Mursi, he wouldn't be able to take any measures against him or arrest him, if needed, in the future. Nasser named his son Khaled after me, and I was closer to Nasser than I was to any other RCC member. I may have differed with Nasser, but he never publicly criticised me, unlike Sadat later. Were you a member of the communist Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL) and is it true that the movement was behind your resignation from the RCC? Did you feel bitter about Nasser accepting your resignation? I was never a member of any communist party. My first loyalty was to the revolution yet I always enjoyed good relations with the communists. But the communist movement made a big mistake by not making use of the fact that there were two communists on the RCC [the second being Youssef Seddiq], forcing them to adopt hard-line stands. No, I didn't feel bitter towards Nasser but I felt that power for him was something very important. Yet, I can't forget that in several disputes with other RCC members after July 1952, it was Nasser who protected me from plots by other colleagues, including some who demanded my arrest and trial. He used to ask me to stay and defend my views. When I reminded him of this years later, he replied, that he hadn't defended me 'that much.' I found it difficult to bear living abroad in exile for more than 20 months, and I felt that no true politician could stay away from home. Therefore, I asked Nasser if I might return to Egypt, and he agreed, giving me the alternative of either being appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia or being put in charge of Egypt's first evening newspaper, Al-Masaa. I chose the latter because I did not want to leave Egypt again, and I also decided to run for a seat in parliament. Why did the revolution end the democratic system that existed before 1952? I should say first of all that the democracy that existed before the Revolution was far from ideal. Elections were faked, and we were ruled by minority governments while the really popular party, Al-Wafd, only ruled for a few years. However, I can't deny that there was more freedom then than there was after the revolution. The majority of Egyptians at that time tended to support the view that what the country needed was a 'just dictator,' and we felt that the public was ready to accept the presence of army officers in power in order to carry out major reforms, disregarding the issue of democracy. I discovered the truth of this during my falling out with the RCC in March 1954, when I supported a return to parliamentary and political life while the rest of the RCC insisted on clinging to power, seeing how the public warmly received them. We also issued the Agrarian Reform Law immediately after the revolution, which increased our popularity. When I toured different towns, I found people saying that the return to democracy would mean putting an end to the revolution, and even my wife and family members opposed my stand on behalf of democracy. I was the only one calling for the return of democracy in the RCC, and that is why I felt I had to resign. Naguib supported me, but that was to keep his post; originally, he had not supported democracy or the return to parliamentary life. How do you justify that era's terrible record in terms of human rights, torture in prisons and the key role played by the intelligence services in the life of the country? Well, besides this there were many positive aspects of the time. We built schools for the farmers, and provided drinking water, hospitals and electricity. I differ with the revolution's record on democracy, but I support the reforms it introduced to benefit the majority of poor Egyptians. Until today, farmers and workers adore Nasser and the RCC members, and because of the reforms it introduced I decided to maintain links with Nasser's regime, while at the same time continue to preach my views on democracy. I opposed the non-democratic measures taken by Nasser, but I did not have a newspaper to express those views. Political reforms under Nasser were slow to come because of his charismatic character, and whatever he decided he found support from those surrounding him. Did the lack of democracy and transparency under Nasser lead to the devastating defeat in 1967? We were defeated in 1967 because we were not ready on the military level. Nasser was a strong individual ruler, but in return he offered something to the public. For him, freedom had two sides: social justice and political freedom. Yet, the 1967 defeat was a horrible event in my life, and it was another dark point in the history of the revolution. I was abroad at the time meeting with international socialist and Communist parties and getting assurances of their support for Nasser, but I think Nasser should not have entered the war because he was not ready for it. The defeat changed him a lot. After he accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, I asked him whether he was aware that doing so meant recognising Israel, and he replied, 'Yes.' What is the truth about Nasser's relations with the Americans before and after the revolution? Shortly before the revolution, and despite his links with the left, Nasser started arguing against references in our leaflets to Anglo-American imperialism. I was always surprised how rarely Nasser was worried about the possibility of Britain's fully re- occupying Egypt if we carried out our coup. Yet, I learned later from a French journalist when I was in exile abroad that Nasser had been given assurances of American support in the event of a coup, the Americans acting to put pressure on the British not to suppress the movement. The Americans were clearly not in favour of the return of the Wafd and the other political parties, and they preferred to deal with a strong leader who would help them in their growing confrontation with communism. However, I would never say that Nasser agreed to submit to the Americans. He knew how to deal with different parties, even with conflicting sides, if that would serve his interests. He would not allow any one party to control him. Nasser wanted to 'neutralise' the Americans, especially when the former Soviet Union opposed our movement, saying it was fascist and triggered by Washington. Can you describe your relationship with Sadat? Sadat was an exception among the Free Officers. He was older than most of us, and he had a long political experience. Nasser suggested his name as a member of the Command Council, and Sadat stuck close to Nasser and never questioned his views. During the 1960s, when I was editor of Akhbar El- Yom, Sadat used to claim that he was a socialist. But when I went to him with a statement opposing the US war in Vietnam, he refused to sign it, saying he was about to carry out a visit to the United States and did not want to spoil the mission. Sadat, in my opinion, was more right-wing than anything else, and he knew about my leftist tendencies, dubbing me 'Red Major' shortly after I left Egypt in 1954. However, Sadat did three important things: Firstly, he decided to go to war with Israel in 1973. Although Nasser had already completed nearly two-thirds of the plan to rebuild the armed forces, Sadat was the one who took the decision. He managed to make us feel that we had 'defeated' the 1967 defeat. Secondly, Sadat re-introduced the multi-party system, even if he wanted the opposition parties to be in his pocket. I was unhappy with his sharp attacks on the Tagammu' shortly after its establishment, accusing us of being agents of the Soviet Union and going so far as to accuse us of being traitors. As a result, I won several libel cases against writers like Moussa Sabri who supported Sadat and reiterated his accusations against the Tagammu'. The third important decision Sadat took was to make peace with Israel. I opposed Camp David, and the style in which Sadat conducted the talks, thinking that he could have gained much more. But the decision to reach peace was an important one. Finally, how do you judge President Hosni Mubarak? Mubarak considers himself to be an extension of the legitimacy created by the 1952 Revolution. That is very important, especially since nobody asked him to adopt this position. I also appreciate his policy of restoring Egypt's ties with the Arab countries after Sadat's assassination in 1981 and his always setting the interests of Egypt and its people as his first priority. Probably his experience as a pilot has made him cautious. However, as leader of the Tagammu' Party, I differ with his domestic policies, and we have repeatedly rejected the government's annual statement in parliament. Yet, in 2000, we decided to abstain on the NDP's [the ruling National Democratic Party's] request to renew Mubarak's presidency for a new term, after having said no to the past three terms. Again, my experience has taught me that one should not remain committed to one position forever, but should always consider the surrounding circumstances. Being pragmatic is not a bad thing; it is a style of thinking about and practicing politics.
