In the face of Israeli machinations the Palestinians must hold their resolve, writes Ibrahim Nafie In all struggles against foreign occupation there comes a time when conditions are ripe for a political settlement that will allow the people to finally reap the fruit of their long resistance and innumerable sacrifices. Generally, at such a moment, the occupying power has been so sapped by the cumulative toll of political, economic and human losses that it finally welcomes the road to an equitable political settlement and the ultimate prospect of peace. Taking advantage of the opportune moment requires political leaderships with the wisdom and foresight to read realities squarely and take the necessary decisions to pave the way to negotiations at the appropriate time. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has long swung sharply back and forth between escalation and trends towards peace, has finally reached a juncture where all sides are convinced that there can be no military solution and that only direct negotiations offer a way out of the quagmire. Clearly, the current Israeli government has come to recognise that the continued occupation of Palestine will not bring the security it pledged to the Israeli electorate in the elections of February 2001. Upon coming to power the Sharon government unleashed its full range of weaponry to quell the Intifada. It used F-16 fighters to bombard PA territories, it ploughed into camps and villages with tanks and armoured vehicles, it committed countless war crimes against innocent civilians, yet it failed to stop the Palestinian resistance. At that time it was necessary to support all acts of resistance in retaliation against Israeli aggression. The Israeli government and people had to realise that recourse to force, however brutal, would not bring the Palestinians to their knees. The message finally hit home, as was evident in recent statements by Sharon. Israel cannot continue its occupation of three and a half million Palestinians forever, he said, following his government's approval of the roadmap. And during the Aqaba summit he said: "It is time we share this Holy Land with the Palestinians." Before this Sharon, along with the whole spectrum of the Israeli right, was loath to mention the possibility of a Palestinian state, given its implications with regard to the notion of a Greater Israel. It is clear, too, that the Palestinians are prepared to enter into new negotiations with Israel in order to liberate territory occupied since June 1967. While the PA was able to win great international sympathy in the confrontation against the occupation forces following the outbreak of the Al- Aqsa Intifada, it came to recognise that certain forms of resistance do the Palestinian cause more harm than good. Although suicide bombings may have been a powerful response to a brutal occupation, targeting innocent civilians is morally unjustifiable and was bound to alienate international public opinion. That the Arab world as a whole has reached a clear and cohesive position on its conflict with Israel has also propelled events to this propitious moment. The Arab position is epitomised in the Arab peace initiative, adopted by the Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002, calling for normalisation of Arab relations with Israel in exchange for the latter's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Not long afterwards the current US administration embarked on an intensive drive to promote a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict. This major shift away from its former hands-off policy was signalled by President Bush when, in his speech of 24 June last year, he called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel. These developments prepared the ground for the internationally sponsored settlement plan, known as the roadmap and, following its approval by the Palestinian and Israeli governments, for President Bush's visit to the region on 3 and 4 June. I believe that Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) rose to his responsibilities in the Sharm El-Sheikh and Aqaba summits. In his speech in Aqaba Abu Mazen reiterated his commitment to the provisions of the roadmap and pledged to do everything in his power to ensure calm on the Palestinian side. Much to his credit he resisted all Israeli pressures to disarm and ban the activities of the Palestinian resistance organisations. Instead he proposed a formula geared to meet the demands of the Palestinian opposition and safeguard the Palestinian people's internationally sanctioned right to resistance. A truce by its very nature is temporary and contingent upon reciprocation. The Palestinian prime minister pledged to hold talks with the various Palestinian factions in order to secure their backing for such a truce. In spite of this performance Palestinian opposition groups lashed out. Hamas, in particular, misconstrued the prime minister's statements and in a manner that does no service to the Palestinian cause. In a statement declaring their intention to "sever the dialogue with the Palestinian prime minister" Hamas leaders claimed that Abu Mazen had pledged to halt the Intifada. Others went so far as to suggest that he was forfeiting the rights of the Palestinian people because in Aqaba he had not pressed for a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the release of Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons. Such claims completely missed the point of the summit. This was not the occasion to manoeuvre or press for rights. The purpose of the summit was purely symbolic, reflecting the dedication Washington is now devoting to a resolution of the Middle East conflict and giving the starting signal to the roadmap. It was Abu Mazen, himself, who delivered the most succinct reply to his critics. The pledges he made in the summit, he said, were intended to convey his government's commitment to the roadmap. These pledges, moreover, had been agreed in advance with Yasser Arafat. In a marked departure from his customary calm, Abu Mazen described the statements protesting these pledges as "fishing in troubled waters". In a press conference in Ramallah he said: "Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue is vital. It is the only way to guarantee political stability on the Palestinian side. But this dialogue must not be exploited as a means for blackmail." He went on to declare his resolve to "end the militarisation of the Intifada" and stressed the need to work seriously and intensively "to halt the blood bath". His mission, he explained, was to "alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people and set ourselves on the course to a Palestinian state". Abu Mazen's resolve stems from his awareness that the Sharon government will take advantage of any action on the part of the Palestinian resistance to wriggle out of the roadmap. It is for this reason, too, that he has taken pains to counter those spurious attempts to distort his relationship with President Arafat. Abu Mazen had met with Arafat before Sharm El- Sheikh and Aqaba to agree on the outlines of the positions he would declare and he met with him afterwards. Following that meeting Arafat praised the efforts of the Palestinian delegation, headed by Abu Mazen. But perhaps more indicative of the relationship between the two Palestinian leaders was Abu Mazen's refusal to meet with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi because the latter had refused to meet with Arafat. The moment is at hand for Palestinian factions to rise to the level of responsibility demanded of them. True, there are many justifiable doubts as to the intentions of Sharon. But it is also true that the regional and international climate is set for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Given all the factors that have combined to bring this aspiration within reach the Palestinians must remain paragons of unity and purpose. Sharon has not suddenly been converted into a man of peace; he is certain to remain true to his bloodthirsty history and seize upon any pretext to renege on his commitments. In rallying behind Abu Mazen and the PA the Palestinian factions will contribute to exposing the true culprit behind the cycle of violence that threatens the stability of the region. In stark contrast to Hamas was the position of the Palestinian Jihad which refused to lend itself to Palestinian-Palestinian confrontation. Such level-headedness on the part of Jihad and other factions helped contain tensions, smoothing the way for Egyptian diplomatic efforts to promote a constructive dialogue aimed at reaching agreement on a truce. Undoubtedly such efforts raised the hackles of Sharon who ordered the assassination attempt against Hamas leader Abdul-Aziz Al-Rantisi in the hope that this attempt would provoke Hamas into breaking off dialogue with the PA and, even better, into an act of retaliation. Such ploys make it all the more imperative for the Palestinians to exercise the utmost self-restraint and cohesion.
