Former CIA official Graham speaks to Amira Howeidy about the forces Bush has unleashed in the region More than two months after the fall of Baghdad and the collapse of the former Iraqi regime under the Anglo-American invasion, a volatile region seems set for more turbulence. Although the bombings in Casablanca and Riyadh last month were largely perceived as post-war repercussions, "it's not quite over," says Graham , former vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA. "I think most regimes in the Arab world," said in an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, "are being undermined and de-legitimised year after year as a result of their non-democratic character and particularly, because they have been forced to follow policies towards Palestine and Israel that I think are very much against popular opinion." The war on Iraq made most Arabs "very angry" with their own governments, which they say in no way reflect public opinion, said. "I'm not saying we're going to see immediate explosions of terrorism everywhere, but I expect we'll continue to see terrorism for sure. More to the point, I think regimes are finding themselves more and more undermined; in other words, this is hastening their collapse at some point. Now, when and where this will happen is not fully clear, but I would say no regime came out of this process looking better to their people." , who served for 17 years with the US foreign service, is former resident senior political consultant at the RAND Corporation in Washington. An expert on the Middle East and political Islam, authored several works, the latest of which is The Future of Political Islam published last April. He is widely perceived as a critic of the "New Bush Doctrine" which is why his views clash in large part with those expressed by the US administration's "hawks" such as Bernard Lewis and Richard Perle. He agrees with the administration's ideologues in that "the Iraq campaign" will lead to new opportunities in the Middle East. Bush, he says, has done more for the process of change in the Middle East than any other American president. "But it's not change that he can necessarily control or even wants. He's breaking the logjam, opening the gates to change that no one can fully foresee." If democratisation expands in Iraq, "then we will have Islamists in power and this isn't what Washington wants." Change in Saudi Arabia "might well be for more conservative forces". While in Egypt, "the Muslim Brotherhood will be a major beneficiary of more democracy. And I think this would be true in other countries as well. So democracy is necessary and desirable, but not necessarily what the Bush administration wants." With the continuing weakening of existing regimes, suggests that the gap "between the ruler and the ruled is very wide and getting wider". The trend "is in the direction of more confrontation and more anger than it is improvement of that situation. So a regime that might look stable today could be destabilised in a few months if there is more violence". Jordan and Saudi Arabia remain the most vulnerable, he says. The former, because of the possibility that the Israeli Likud might attempt to transfer Palestinians to its territory. Such a prospect was a source of serious concern during the period leading to the US-British invasion of Iraq. That possibility hasn't entirely disappeared, says , "and if it does happen, that would ultimately mean regime change." Saudi Arabia is also at risk because the more the regime is "forced to cooperate with the US, the angrier the public becomes". This is hardly news. Arab leaders have repeatedly warned of the repercussions of the invasion of Iraq and continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Pundits reiterating the same admonition before and during the war as mass anti-war and anti- government protests swept several Arab capitals including Cairo, couldn't but agree. But when nothing really happened and when the much-discussed Arab anger didn't topple regimes, or change anything for that matter, Arab intellectuals immersed themselves in discussions about the pan-Arab experiment and where it went wrong. , however, doesn't see things as a lost cause yet. Nothing has happened, he agrees, but asks in the same breath, "Are people now more satisfied with the regimes than they were five months ago?" Things are getting worse, he answers, "even if we don't see immediate manifestations of that phenomenon. I don't see anything positive here about people's attitudes. I'm sure there are going to be unanticipated consequences of the Iraq issue, and it could go several different ways." But the question posed every day in the region is: what makes the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration so blind to what people like seem to see very clearly? "Power", he says after a pause, "can be very isolating." He explains, "While people in this part of the world who do not have power are extremely informed about elsewhere in the world and particularly the US, because it has a direct impact on them, this is not the case across the Atlantic. When you have power like the US government and even the American people themselves, there is the feeling that you don't have to be that well-informed. Nobody would admit this, but this is the attitude." Says , "I think there's a sense on the part of the neo-conservatives that their determination and will can impose many things in this area and they're right, in part. [They can see that they can] bring big changes as we saw in Iraq. Regimes such as Iran and Syria will now be much more careful. But I think there is naiveté in the end about the sources of anti-Americanism. There's a feeling that it's simply because Saddam was a bad man -- and Saddam was a very bad man -- and that once he's gone the situation will be much better. I think this is quite nonsense. Having Saddam go is probably good even for the broader development of the Arab world, but it doesn't mean that the deeper sources of conflict are going away. They're still present and they have not been dealt with. Actually they've been intensified. I think that the war against terrorism is intensifying this gap between the US and the Muslim world. Even though Bush has said this is not a war against Islam, it's seen by most Muslims as such." The neo-conservatives of the Bush administration have secured such power over American public opinion that even the scandalous debate on the US's failure to find any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which was the pretext it used to launch the war, has not backfired hard enough. agrees, but argues that "it's not over" yet. "I'm sure the Democrats will use this in the foreign policy critique in the coming elections, but so far it's not extreme because everyone understood that Saddam was a very dangerous and undesirable force. And most Americans probably feel that Bin Laden, terrorism, WMDs and an evil ruler are connected somehow. At this point, Americans will say the government probably exaggerated, but that it's not grounds for huge criticism." Not only has American public opinion been nonchalant about the failure of the Bush administration to justify the war, recent statements by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on the importance of the oil factor to the US military campaign, passed equally unnoticed. , however, doesn't attach much importance to the oil factor because he doesn't think the war was about oil. "I think for the neo-conservatives, the leading issue was their desire to essentially dominate the development of international politics in the region. In their perception, the world is now a very dangerous place with the end of the Cold War. Somebody has to take control. Saddam Hussein was one of the major forces who refused to accept American domination in the region. Therefore Saddam and any other countries that are going to openly resist American foreign policy goals will be seen as a threat. I think it's about balances of power in the region and, of course, Israel's position was also a factor." And since Iran has been a force that consistently fought or rejected American influence, it, too, is on the list. But what exactly is expected of Iran? Says , "I think Washington would hope that Iran will move towards a more moderate position vis-à- vis the US. And vis-à-vis Israel. I think Washington would like to see -- wants to see -- Tehran end its support for Hamas and Hizbullah." This isn't simple either as the former CIA official points out. "In the case of Hamas, an end to Iranian support would make no difference because Hamas derives its power from the Palestinian people. In the case of Hizbullah, it would make a difference, but not a decisive one because it's more than a guerrilla organisation. It's obviously a political party with a social programme." Iran's "partial democracy" however, has caused Washington to be "more careful in its dealings with Tehran". The power of democracy, as it exists in the Islamic Republic, is what's making it a very difficult target. In 's words, "the politics of Iran are amazingly transparent, unlike any Arab country," which is why it cannot be treated the same as Iraq was. This is the power of democracy and "other democracies have to recognise this to some degree." In clear contrast, the Arab world is way behind. Despite efforts towards 'reform' by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are "desirable", they remain "crumbs" in 's view. "I don't see signs of any serious change to the nature of these governments." Even if Bush wanted democracy in the region, "I think his focus on the war against terrorism -- which is a primary vehicle of American policy right now -- places the security agenda at the top of the list, which contradicts a liberalising agenda. So, I don't think the Bush administration will be capable of supporting genuine liberalisation in most parts of the world. And most autocrats are taking advantage of the war against terrorism, strengthening their internal controls." But if Arab governments remain static with respect to democratisation, especially in the era following the war on Iraq, believes that political Islam will continue to shake up Arab countries. And Iraq is no exception to the rule of the Arab and Muslim world "whereby the Islamist movements are the primary vehicles of political opposition." Actually, he does not see any competition for political Islam now in the Arab world, "and it's not surprising at all that political Islam, especially among the Shi'ites, should be emerging in Iraq." The real tension for American policy inside Iraq is when they will begin the process of a transfer of power? "And yes", he asserts the obvious, "they do not want to see Islamists in power. But they may accept them. Baqer Al-Hakim is not some monster, we dealt with him for years." Today, says , what stands between the Shi'ites and their dominance in Iraq -- "which will come about by a democratic process" -- is the US. "The longer America stays, the more they're delaying the Shi'ites from capturing their prize." But because "there are many Washingtons" there is no consensus as to what do with Iraq. "The ideologues and many of the neo- conservatives actually do want to see a spread of democratisation in Iraq. But there is this tension between those who have this value and others who say, 'look, it's nice and fixable and one day we'll get there, but in the meantime it's going to be very messy and very dangerous.'" But even "if Solomon was in charge" in Iraq, argues, it would be incredibly difficult. "Having to decide, should you fix the economy first, or should you open up the political system first? Should you give every little group rights immediately -- the Kurds, the Shi'ites, the Assyrians, the Turkoman, the Sunnis etc -- or should we try to get politics out until we relax the system and begin to have some representation? Should America stay there five years to facilitate this so that things don't break apart quickly, or should they get out as quickly as possible and run the risk of having everything fall apart after they walk out?" doesn't think America wants to stay and be the imperial power in Iraq. "Even in the US, it's not a simple matter of do we want to be imperialist or not imperialist? You can be an imperialist interventionist or a democratic interventionist and that is part of the debate."
