Ghassan Salame, the UN's senior political advisor in Iraq, speaks with Jihan El-Alaily on Iraq's political future Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello arrives in Egypt tomorrow to discuss Egypt's possible role in the political, humanitarian and economic reconstruction of Iraq. De Mello and his Senior Political Advisor Ghassan Salame will meet with President Mubarak, Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher and Arab League Secretary- General Amr Moussa. Egypt is the seventh stop on de Mello's regional tour. In Turkey this week he met with Abdullah Gul, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, to discuss Ankara's role in supporting Iraq's recovery. He was also briefed on the ongoing debate regarding the prospects of a Turkish military contribution to Iraq's stabilisation. In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly in Baghdad, Dr Ghassan Salame described the Turks, the Kuwaitis, and particularly the Iranians, as supportive of the development of the political process in Iraq. He could not say the same of many Arab countries, though, describing their positions regarding Iraq as "blurred". Salame recognised that Arab countries were working with a different set of calculations: "First they have to figure how to deal with the Interim Governing Council (IGC) with regards to Iraq's seat at the Arab League; second with the possibility of the IGC appointing an interim government and third with the implications of all of this on each country's relations with the US." Salame appreciated the dilemma in Arab capitals of wanting to be supportive of the Iraqi people but advised that was unrealistic without "first hand knowledge of what is truly happening in Iraq". Salame was particularly frustrated by the dismissal in some Arab countries of the unelected IGC. He asked them to practice at home what they preached: "At least in their cases they have election laws, voter registries and stable conditions, none of which are present in Iraq." Active in the current unfolding of the political process in Iraq since his arrival in Baghdad two months ago, Salame was optimistic that "Iraq is taking serious strides in the direction of filling the political and administrative vacuum." He was keen to differentiate between two important processes in Iraq -- sovereignty and empowerment of the governing council. Security Council Resolution 1483 suspended Iraq's sovereignty and gave near complete powers to the coalition authority and the senior US official, Paul Bremer, to run the country. He described as "very regrettable" the failure of the Security Council in its most recent meeting on Iraq to endorse the secretary-general's call to "set a timetable for the withdrawal of the occupying force". This, he argued, would have been interpreted as a very strong signal by the UN for the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty. The thorny issues of Iraqi sovereignty and peace- keepers in Iraq are expected to reemerge during General Assembly meetings in September. Salame expressed the hope that the Security Council would adopt the position of the Secretariat on a timetable for troop withdrawal: "If we have this then we can build on it because Iraq will not become a sovereign country all of a sudden, it has to struggle for it, to clinch back the components of sovereignty and of empowerment, and the UN is beside the Iraqis on that one. If the UN was not beside the Iraqis, I would not be here today." Many Iraqis see the IGC as a façade for Bremer's authority over Iraq. According to the most recent survey, by the Centre for International Research in Baghdad University, six per cent of the chosen sample believed that the IGC could take independent decisions while 62 per cent said it did not fill the political vacuum, and 65 per cent did not trust it to draft a new constitution. Dismissing the survey's methodology as "unscientific", Salame summarised the role of the IGC as filling the power vacuum and preparing for future permanent governing institutions. He emphasised that the IGC possesses many executive powers not envisaged by Resolution 1483. "We tried to interpret the resolution in the direction of begetting to the IGC what was most possible within the constraints of 1483... Mr Bremer made several concessions. Changes happened, beginning with the choice of the council's name, the representation of its members, and the executive powers with which it has been endowed. All these were not planned for." Opinions are daily voiced in Iraq on the legitimacy of the IGC and its role in the constitutional process. While the 30 year-old fiery Shi'ite Cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr dismisses the "occupation council" in his weekly sermons in Kufa, the more senior and moderate grand Ayatollah Al-Hussein Al-Sisstany in Najaf has remained quiet. He has neither issued edicts in support, or rejecting, the IGC. He has, though, issued a fatwa calling for a two step constitutional process; selection by "popular choice" of delegates who are then to be entrusted with writing the constitution, and his opinions are likely to sway a wide section of public opinion that has so far taken a neutral stance from the IGC. Other moderate Shi'ite leaders see Al-Sisstany's suggestion of elected popular delegates as an attempt to stall the process. Salame sees no contradiction, saying that Al- Sisstany's opinion is one among several on the drafting of the constitution currently being discussed by the IGC. "You are pulled by two constraints; you need to give the widest possible legitimacy to the constitutional process but you cannot hold elections in the absence of voter registration and at the same time you do not want this process to be delayed." The UN has advised the IGC to form a committee of senior constitutional experts in Iraq. This committee will not draft the constitution but will advise on the "best procedures of drafting the constitution". Their work is expected to take four to five weeks. A UN team from the electoral assistance department in New York is currently visiting Iraq to assess needs and capabilities. Salame hopes that by the end of their mission, the UN will have an estimated time-frame on when Iraq could organise elections.
