Examining the mixed reaction of Arab public opinion to Saddam's capture Johnny Sarraf* wonders what happened to the WMDs The recent capture by American soldiers of Saddam Hussein was perhaps the biggest news story of 2003, but the most important part of it remains to be seen: what practical effects it will have on the region. It is equally important not to allow the Iraqi prize to distract us from what the pretext for the invasion of Iraq was. The mixed reaction by many in the Arab world, including by many Iraqis who loathed the tyrant, is curious. On the one hand, there was the feeling of relief that the man that many Iraqis had feared and who some opponents believed could still be a threat in their country, was no longer on the loose. The man who had tortured, killed, and oppressed his own people during his merciless, heavy- handed rule would now have to face justice for his crimes. The elation expressed by so many Iraqis especially was tempered partly in Arab countries, however, by two factors: the way Hussein was captured and who his captors were. As despised as Hussein was by Arabs for his brutal treatment of his own people, many Arabs had viewed him as a strong figure that would not be pushed around by outside forces such as the United States government. On the surface at least it is a contradictory impulse: people who despise Hussein rooting for him when there are outside powers such as the US involved. It is certainly a difficult thing to understand, but the recent history of nationalism in the region might help to explain it. It seems that since the Gamal Abdel-Nasser-inspired Pan-Arabism of the 1950s much of the Arab world's distrust of what has often been widely perceived as Western imperialism has lingered and been nurtured by various groups and is as visible and prevalent today as ever, aided and sustained by recent American actions regarding the Middle East and inconsistent inaction when Israel has been the aggressor. The movement had encouraged strong feelings of nationalism during the 1950s and until the (for Arabs) disastrous 1967 war with Israel that led to, among other things, the end of Nasser's political career. Even leading up to the most recent conflict, the Iraqi military was still considered a formidable force in the Middle East that made another enemy, Israel, more than a little bit uncomfortable, especially considering the recent history between the two. To see the once powerful leader of Iraq suddenly looking dishevelled and haggard as he was pulled out of a hole in the ground by American forces no less, without putting up any kind of fight was a low point for many Arabs, and I do not believe that it was because people necessarily related to Hussein or saw him as representative of the average Ahmed in the street. It seems to be something else. How could this man who had urged his people to fight the American forces to the bitter end now just allow himself to be taken away quietly by those same forces? Where was everything he himself had insisted on from his people? It was, to many Arabs, an undignified, cowardly, and unacceptable surrender, and seeing their former leader in such a state made many Iraqis, especially those who fought Hussein's past wars, feel betrayed. That his captors were Americans was another issue that made many in the Arab world ambivalent. It seems that the displeasure felt about this aspect of Hussein's capture is a reflection of the frustration, the sense of the Arab world's own sense of powerlessness, especially in regards to its leadership. Hussein was a dictator who bullied and murdered his own people, and rather than respond to him themselves, Iraqis needed someone from outside to come in and get him. That those who did were among the occupying American forces did not sit well with many Arabs. What appears to the outsider to be petty politics is actually more complex to many in the Arab world and tells them something about their own countries' futility. Despite this sense of helplessness, what the end of the former Iraqi regime appears to have given many Arabs is encourageme nt that their governments will feel the need actually to act on the reforms promised to the people for some time. In Egypt, for instance, the government passed a law in June that eliminated State Security courts. It was such a court that had twice convicted American University in Cairo professor of Sociology, and human rights activist, Saadeddin Ibrahim before he was retried in the nation's highest appeals court, the Cassation Court, and found not guilty. There has also been talk in government of other kinds of reform, including the need for political reform. Of course, some reforms will be more difficult than others to achieve since not all of them will be in the interest of the US government to pressure Egypt to reach. Addressing problems within Arab countries by those countries' governments would be very good for the people who have long been denied certain freedoms by their governments, and these are not limited to governments that the US government has considered tyrannical. The case has not only been bad in Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Syria but also by Israel, whose government is, of course, allied with the US and, consequently, does not get more than a little prodding by the US and not the threats that countries such as Iran and Syria get in generous supply. All the talk of reform and so far at least some effort in achieving change in the region make it easy for many Americans to set Iraq aside as essentially finished business. Yes, they say, the US must rebuild what it destroyed, and yes, the US must be present in order to ensure that a stable government is created democratically, but once these things are completed, many Americans believe, then the invasion of Iraq and the problems that followed it were worthwhile. This sort of thinking regarding the current situation in Iraq may be aided by the Pentagon's parading of various self-proclaimed experts who are invited regularly on such pseudo- news stations as Rupert Murdoch's embarrassment to journalism, better known as Fox News. Some of these "analysts" along with the network's own contributing spinsters appear more proficient at confirming their own simplistic, superficial understanding of the region of which they make various pronouncements than at actually offering credible insights to Americans who are not all in positions to know any better, in the process blurring the picture. But unlike many Americans, Arabs -- as well as most Europeans -- have not lost sight of the big picture, of what the main and as yet unfulfiled goal of the invasion of Iraq was: to find Hussein's so-called weapons of mass destruction, and then to disarm the country that Americans were told posed a direct threat to their safety. The Bush administration's interesting but obvious recent attempt to alter the perception of a failed campaign in that regard to one all about liberating people from tyrannical rule has not fooled people in much of the world, even if it has managed to divert attention of most Americans. This is not at all to say that Iraq and the region are not better off as a result of the capture of Hussein. It is simply to emphasise the importance of recognising what the pretext for invasion was, and to hold US President George W Bush and his cronies as well as British Prime Minister Tony Blair accountable for a preemptive invasion that resulted in killing thousands, among them over 500 coalition soldiers, many since Bush, while speaking aboard an aircraft carrier and in military regalia such as he has not worn in anything other than a decorative capacity, prematurely and foolishly declared the war essentially over. Capturing a cruel, self-serving tyrant is indeed a good way to end the year and, as Bush has said, especially good news for Iraqis, but it was not the stated reason for invading Iraq in March. Bush speaks often and sincerely of the importance of accountability for one's actions. If Americans really care about justice in the world, about where the US leads the world, and about America's and the world's security, they will hold their own leader accountable for the manipulation that led over 200,000 American and British troops to be sent to Iraq and many to return in body bags for things that may not even exist. Cheers for a Happier New Year for the world in 2004. * The writer is a faculty member at the American University in Cairo.
