When push came to shove, Iranian reformers failed to stand their ground. Mustafa El-Labbad previews the elections Iran is bracing itself for parliamentary elections tomorrow, Friday, amid extraordinary polarisation between reformers and conservatives. As the reformers fight a rearguard battle, the conservatives continue their onslaught, hoping to change the map of political power, rid parliament of its reformist majority and gain a head start in the 2005 presidential elections. Iran's political mosaic resembles Persian art: complex, colourful and titillating. But a careful look at the political scene shows how much the reformers and the conservatives have in common, for both operate within the rigid limitations of the system. The rivalry between them is in fact rivalry within the same game, emanating from its rules, confined by its boundaries. The political currents that lie outside the conservatives-versus-reformers dualism are not allowed to engage in public political activities. They are branded un- Iranian, suspected of being in the employment of outside powers. The election battle tomorrow is, therefore, a battle within the system, a chance to rearrange the chessboard, with the same pieces. The battle will be pitched, however. The reformers have the majority of the public on their side. Most Iranians oppose conservative policies, although many are disappointed with the apparent inability of the reformers to change the rules of the political game and bring about true democracy. The conservatives, meanwhile, may have limited popularity, but they have the legislative game on a tight leash. Under their control are Iran's key political institutions, such as the Spiritual Guide office, which has more power than the legislative, judicial, and executive branches combined. The Spiritual Guide is helped by the Guardian Council of 12 members. The council has the right to screen parliamentary candidates and overturn those parliamentary decisions it deems un-Islamic. The Guardian Council was the axe the conservatives used prior to the elections to ban 2,500 candidates, including 80 deputies, mostly reformers, from contesting the elections, on the pretext that they were hostile to the regime. Democracy may be a one-man one-vote arrangement, but the Iranian version controls the power of 70 million citizens by a 12- member council. The decisions of the Guardian Council cannot be appealed, and all pleas made by leading reformers to Iran's Spiritual Guide Ali Khamenei to reverse the council's decisions have gone unheeded. Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi, spokesman for the Reformist Alliance, a grouping of eight reformist parties, said that the alliance has no candidates to contest the elections in 72 constituencies because of the ban on its members. This means that the reformers have already lost a quarter of the 290 parliamentary seats, even before the elections start. The Iranian reformers face serious impediments that hamper their chances of winning the elections. One is the institutional composition of the Iranian state, which gives the Spiritual Guide and the Guardian Council more power than parliament. The reformers are divided. Some demand radical changes, such as the Participation Front of Mohamed Reza Khatami (brother of the president), which had all its candidates banned from running for parliament. Others urge gradual reforms and refrain from challenging the system, such as the Majma-e Rohanioun Mobarez, or Association of the Militant Clergymen, led by President Khatami and Parliamentary Speaker Mehdi Karroubi. This latter group was allowed to contest the elections. To make things worse, the reformist current has lost the confidence of many Iranians who had pinned great hopes on the ability of the reformers to change social and political life in Iran. A succession of events, culminating in the ban on parliamentary candidates, demonstrated the inability of parliament, and even of President Khatami, to bring about real change. The conservatives, for their part, are united and will rally their supporters to the last man at the polling stations. Yet they command a mere 25 per cent of the voters, judging by Khatami's first election in 1997, second election in 2001, and the parliamentary elections of 2001. The lesson one can learn from these elections even before they start is that the reformist current of President Khatami has suffered a major moral loss because of its inability to boycott the elections or stage the collective resignation Khatami threatened weeks ago. Khatami has proved yet again that he is the loyal scion of the Iranian regime, a man who draws his legitimacy from the regime. Khatami's theological rank, Hojjatul Islam, is second only to that of Ayatollah. He rose in stature after the Iranian Revolution from consultant to president of the Iranian Islamic Centre in Hamburg, to director of the National Library, to minister of culture under Rafsanjani. Khatami's ideas mesmerised the public in the 1997 elections and led the reformers to a landslide victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections. His written works about the "dialogue of civilisations" brought him international adoration, and his philosophical finesse made him the darling of Third World intellectuals. But his belief in the Velayat-e Feqih concept (government by religious scholars) ties his hands and leaves him incapable of making any radical or structural change in the Iranian regime. This was evident in the weeks preceding the parliamentary elections. Iranian politics is like a romantic affair: half-hearted reformers, like reluctant suitors, go home empty-handed. The reformers, by failing to stand up for their ideals, risk losing their popularity. Khatami's sophisticated words and fine demeanour were of no help when deeds, even resignations, were needed. So far, Khatami's actions have been as hesitant as his language is smooth. The outcome of the elections does not depend on the merits of the ideas presented by the candidates, but on the voters' turnout. The higher the turnout the more chance the reformers have of winning. At 80 per cent, Iran has one of the highest voting rates worldwide. To win, the reformers will need to match or boost this ratio. Otherwise, the conservatives -- who can rely on 25 per cent of the vote -- may succeed in securing a parliamentary majority. Iranian democracy has been scarred by the pre-election events, losing much of the lustre it once enjoyed compared with other countries in region. Now, the Iranian scene looks sadly familiar. Iran's political mosaic is receiving a conservative makeover. The conservative current will either win a majority in parliament or at least increase its representation. Regardless of how clean the methods used to change the Iranian political map have been, the Middle East geopolitical map is likely to change following, and perhaps as a result of, the Iranian elections.
