European equivocation over the peace process continues to undermine any hopes of progress, writes El-Sayed Amin Shalabi* The role of the EU in the Middle East must be discussed in the context of its efforts to formulate a common European foreign policy. These efforts intensified in the 1990s following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar era. The Maastricht and Copenhagen agreements of 1992 and 1993, in particular, were landmarks in the drive, spearheaded by France and Germany, to broaden and deepen the EU through the creation of united foreign, defence and fiscal policies. Although the EU took part in the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East as an observer European efforts to establish a common policy on the Middle East began in earnest with the Tormina Conference in February 1992. At the time the EU was keen to stress that its role in the Middle East would complement, rather than rival, that of the US. The EU only began to assert itself with greater confidence after 1993, when it accorded Yasser Arafat a reception as head of state in Brussels. Since then the EU has been a strong supporter of the Palestinians and increasingly expanded its involvement in the Middle East, primarily in an economic capacity. With the 1995 Barcelona agreement for a Euro-Med partnership the EU stepped up its drive to stake a stronger position in the Mediterranean and Middle East, although the Middle East conflict continued to cast a heavy shadow over the dynamics and potential of the Euro-Med partnership. With the arrival of the current Bush administration and the reversal of the hands-on approach towards the Middle East of the Clinton administration, the Arabs expected Europe to fill the void. Israel, however, sought to dampen such expectations, declaring through its foreign minister that it could not conceive of an EU role in the Middle East conflict. The EU responded by creating a new position: a special envoy to the Middle East. Now, with the virtual collapse of the Middle East peace process and the conspicuous absence of the US as a serious and honest mediator, can the Arab world expect Europe to become an effective partner in attempts to revive the peace process? The Arabs hold Europe responsible for many of the problems plaguing this region. At the same time, for historic, geographical and cultural reasons, as well as for reasons pertaining to European interests and security, Europe seems the party best poised and most qualified to play an instrumental role in resolving the Middle East conflict. Arab hopes for closer and more effective European involvement in the process are all the more urgent in light of Washington's total embrace of the positions of the Israeli right, undermining any claims Washington had to being an honest broker. If Europe is to be effective, though, it must be as willing to use the stick with Israel as the carrot. It should, for example, freeze the protocols it signed with Israel within the framework of its partnership agreement. Israel is in breach of article two of this agreement, which stresses "the importance of observing human rights", and in its use of excessive force against the Palestinians is in perpetual violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. That the EU is Israel's largest trading partner affords considerable scope for EU pressure on Israel. Reluctance to apply any pressure contrasts sharply with the EU's position towards Syria: before any partnership agreement is signed the EU has demanded Damascus sign all agreements pertaining to the ban on WMD. The Arabs want Europe to take a firmer and stand against Washington's stonewalling on Middle East issues. They are dismayed at the frequency with which the EU issues encouraging statements it then quickly retracts. A case in point was Berlin's call to recognise the Palestinian state as soon as it is declared, an appeal that was quickly withdrawn following an onslaught of American objections. Arab public opinion reads such inconsistency in EU stances as indicative that the EU is not as opposed to US positions as it may appear: that, in fact, it frequently supports these positions. What perhaps surprises and rankles with them most is that while Europe proclaims its sympathy for the Palestinians because of the inhumane battering meted out to them by the Israeli war machine, many European countries, such as Germany and Britain, continue to supply Israel with arms. Israel's recent nuclear submarine and missile deals with Germany and its British arms deal of the summer of 2002 are the most salient examples. During three years of escalating Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people the Arabs had hoped Europe might actively support an international force to protect civilians in the occupied territories. But, here too, deed did not follow word. Again, in spite of declarations of sympathy for the Palestinian plight, several European countries abstained during the Security Council vote on sending international observers to Palestine. In statements on events in occupied Palestine the EU not only fails to distinguish between the perpetrators and the victims, condemnations of what they refer to as Palestinian violence outnumber any criticism of Israeli repression by more than three to one. Nor has the EU issued any objection to Israel labelling exports produced in its settlements as being made in Israel. On the other hand, EU foreign policy coordinator Xavier Solana recently urged the US to be sterner towards Israel on the question of Jewish settlements in the West Bank which, he said, not only violate the spirit but also the text of the roadmap. In spite of EU concerns for security in the Middle East, its keenness on disarmament and mechanisms for security cooperation and confidence building, the EU remains silent, if not obstructive, on the greatest threat to security in the region. Israel's nuclear programme creates a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region, encouraging other nations to attempt to counter the imbalance. The Arabs believe that if Europe's ideas on security and disarmament are to be credible then it must begin by pressuring Israel to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. The EU's role in the Middle East developed significantly with the creation of the Quartet. A response to the need to expand the base of international cooperation in the peace process, the inclusion of the EU, along with Russia and the UN, has important ramifications. On the whole the Arabs view this as a positive development since it offers Europe the opportunity to play a more constructive and effective part in managing the peace process. Nevertheless, close observers of the Quartet, including European analysts and commentators, are dismayed by the extent to which Washington dominates the group. (The Russian foreign minister remarked in one Quartet session that 90 per cent of its statements had been formulated in advance by the US.) Contemplating the prospective role of the EU in the Middle East it is impossible to avoid the conclusion if the EU does not begin to exercise independent judgement, and to assert itself more firmly, in the Quartet it may become little more than a fig leaf for American policy. * The writer is the executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
