Washington is determined to impose a puppet regime on Iraq dependent on US troops for its own survival, writes Hassan Nafaa* Though it was the interim government of Iyad Allawi that proposed the holding of an international conference on Iraq no "interim" government in an occupied country could make such a proposal without first consulting with the occupation authorities that had brought it to power. So, it was generally assumed, the move was more American than Iraqi. Allawi asked President Hosni Mubarak if Egypt would host the conference, preferably ahead of US elections. But no one, Egypt included, was prepared to participate in a conference that might be viewed as providing propaganda for George W Bush. The conference, as a consequence, was scheduled immediately after the US presidential campaign. Many welcomed the idea and timing of the international conference. Some were even optimistic, seeing it as an implicit admission by Washington that it couldn't run the show alone in Iraq. The US, many assumed, wanted help from the international community. The latter was ready, under certain conditions, to provide assistance. Everyone believed that the conference would be useful, regardless of the intentions of the US administration. By the time the conference was held George Bush had won the elections. Many governments had wanted Kerry to win, not least because he seemed at least willing to explore an "exit strategy" from Iraq. Had Kerry won things would have been different. The international community would have found appropriate "political cover" for a new US strategy and mechanisms would have been devised to implement it. Some countries, particularly those that opposed the war, were willing to go the extra mile to help the US find a face-saving way out of Iraq. Instead, the Sharm El-Sheikh conference was held against the backdrop of Republican victory. Instead of an exit strategy Washington wanted to consolidate its occupation of Iraq. The American people re-elected, with a comfortable majority, the man who challenged the international community and the UN Security Council, the man who came to Iraq with a rightwing agenda the aim of which was not just to occupy Iraq but to turn that country into a launching pad from which he could change the map of the Middle East. The American people not only elected Bush but gave the Republicans a clear majority in both houses of congress, something that would enable Bush to reshape US domestic life according to the same agenda. It is worth noting that the US right has a domestic agenda that is as extreme and perilous as its foreign policy. By the time the conference was held the international mood had shifted from uncertainty to alarm. It was clear that President Bush was not going to change direction during his second term. The only question was how far he would go in pursuing already known objectives. The wording of the Sharm El-Sheikh final statement betrays two forces at work: a US that is as extreme as it is intransigent and an international community that is alarmed as it is suspicious. The statement makes no reference to the illegitimate occupation of Iraq or to any timetable for withdrawal. It denounces "acts of violence" without differentiating the latter from legitimate resistance. The statement supports the ongoing "political process" without guaranteeing that any government that emerges with be representative of Iraq's political spectrum. For many the statement handed the US a mandate to press ahead with its policies, perhaps even to create a proxy regime in Iraq that would allow the US a permanent base in the country. The Sharm El-Sheikh conference will have little impact on the course of events in Iraq. The US does not really need rhetorical backing for its policy. What it wants is to impose its own status quo, though it is having some trouble in doing so. This is why it asked for the help of a reluctant world. But when the Americans insist on holding elections the outcome of which is determined in advance there is little anyone can do. For elections to be valid they must result in a legitimate government that represents the will of the people. Elections have to be conducted in such a way as to ensure that everyone can participate. Either you have fair and free elections or you don't, and elections cannot be fair and free unless they are held in a climate of calm and stability, one that allows citizens to participate on equal footing. Everyone, in every part of the country, must have an equal opportunity to run, campaign, and vote. None of these conditions currently pertain in Iraq. Some people want Iraqi elections held immediately, at any cost. Many Kurds argue that the elections be held now whatever the circumstances, and hope eventually that they will lead to federalism and, beyond that, an independent Kurdish state. So too many Shias, who expect to win a majority and control the country's future. The US is pressing ahead with elections in the belief that the men who came to power on the backs of US troops will win and then allow US military bases to stay in the country. Washington wants a puppet regime dependent on a permanent US military presence for its survival. The situation is much more complex, and potentially explosive, than it appears. During its invasion of Iraq the US relied on sectarian forces. The US vision of a greater Middle East involves a delicate balancing act between the sectarian groups found in Iraq. In this sense Iraq is a microcosm. Nor is it a coincidence that this is precisely the vision Israel has dreamed of for years -- a region made up of sectarian mini- states into which Israel can blend but still manipulate, through military superiority, advanced technology and its special relationship with the US. This vision is not about to happen. Unless preceded by a nation-wide reconciliation, Iraq's elections will not lead to stability. Unless representatives from across Iraq's political spectrum are allowed to take part, the elections will be seen, both at home and abroad, as a sham, as a sectarian ploy that must be challenged and resisted. The Iraqi government could do worse than heed the advice that emerged from Sharm El-Sheikh on dialogue in the country. Bahrain has already offered to host a conference to promote this dialogue on which the future stability of Iraq, and the region, hinges. Unfortunately the interim government is not enthusiastic about the suggestion. The Allawi government wants the conference to be held in Baghdad where its chances of success would be seriously compromised. The real problem is not what the interim government wants but what the US wants. If the US truly wants a democratic regime in Iraq, which it says it does, then it has to accept that elections be held under the supervision of the UN and with the presence of international forces under UN Security Council control. The argument has been made that withdrawal of US forces will result in civil war. But Iraq does not need all international forces to leave, only those that invaded the country. Countries that took no part in the invasion must be encouraged to send troops to Iraq under UN supervision. Nor is there any need to maintain current troop levels. The UN could negotiate in advance an agreement under which resistance would end once the UN assumes political and security control in Iraq. When will the US understand that it is no longer part of the solution, but of the problem? * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
