Security Council Resolution 1559 marks a new phase in the international community's response to Syria's presence in Lebanon, writes Anwar Al-Bounni* United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 came in the wake of changes in the US position towards Syria trailed by the Congress-approved Syrian Accountability Act and a flurry of statements by US diplomats. Yet Damascus consistently misinterpreted these shifts, assuming that the goal of this mounting pressure was to force Syria to accept the American presence in Iraq and to corner Damascus into helping establish stability there. Such, at least, were the readings offered by more than one Syrian official. But then came Security Council Resolution 1559. Lebanon has long been the arena within which Syria has managed political conflicts, whether with Israel -- following the calm that descended on the Golan front in 1974 -- or the international community, to which messages were directed via the Lebanese arena. Damascus once again assumed Lebanon was being used as a post box for indirect messages, and fully expected that it would be able to simply shrug its shoulders and wait for the pressure to recede, as had always been the case. The first sign that such complacency was no longer appropriate came with French support for the Security Council resolution. That Paris was happy to help Washington on this issue clearly perturbed the Syrian regime and the extent of their concern became apparent in the frenzied efforts to extend the term of President Lahoud in an attempt to pre-empt the Security Council vote. It was a ploy that failed miserably, resulting in the resolution being issued rather more speedily than would otherwise have been the case. Damascus initially attempted to absorb the shock by questioning the legitimacy of the resolution and by claiming, by some convoluted logic, that it had somehow won a diplomatic victory since the secretary-general's report had not mentioned Syria by name. Damascus then attempted to sidestep the requirements of the resolution and the secretary-general's report, offering compromises on the Iraqi front and voicing readiness to return to negotiations with Israel at the point where talks last ended. Damascus also made concessions to European concerns over weapons of mass destruction and stated its willingness to join the European-Mediterranean partnership. But Syria's manoeuvring, in the end, proved futile. Only after the resolution was passed and the Syrian regime found itself face to face with the international community did it start to realise the potential consequences of the situation it had found itself in. Syria's presence in Lebanon was no longer being viewed as a part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unfortunately, Syria's presence in Lebanon has generated a class of political middlemen who have accrued huge economic interests. This class was born and grew under the protection of the Syrian regime, amassing vast fortunes through any number of corrupt practices. And it is this class of corrupt individuals, in both Lebanon and within the Syrian regime, who refuse to give up their interests under any circumstances. Their interests tie neatly with many of Damascus's other concerns. Losing Lebanon as an arena for Syrian politics would force Syria to focus much closer to home in managing the conflict with Israel. Syria would have to confront Israel directly, without pretexts or the masks provided by Hizbullah and other Palestinian organisations. Hence Syria's frantic attempts to muster some international legitimacy for its continued presence in Lebanon. These attempts include spreading fear of civil war. Lebanon, it is claimed, is not qualified to manage its own affairs or security. And only Damascus, it is regularly suggested, can act to disarm the militias, the subtext being that it would be fatal for Syria to leave Lebanon before the militias are disarmed. All the signs are that Damascus is determined to maintain a Syrian presence in Lebanon. It is willing to make many compromises to this end. On the Iraqi front it has increased coordination with Washington in an attempt to stabilise the situation, and attended the Sharm El-Sheikh conference in support of the Iraqi government. On the Arab-Israeli front it has shown willingness to withdraw support for Palestinian organisations, even shutting down offices in Damascus. And following Terje Rod-Larsen's recent meeting with Bashar Al-Assad, the UN envoy announced that Syria was ready to return to the negotiating table with no pre-set demands. Lebanon obviously dominates the thinking of the Syrian regime, and it is not solely because of economic interests. Damascus has long viewed Lebanon as the strongest playing card in Syrian hands, certainly when it comes to preserving the regional and international role of the Syrian regime. Yet Syria has increasingly limited room in which to manoeuvre. Whatever options it had shrank dramatically following the occupation of Iraq, and this is the new reality which Damascus must face. Damascus must act, and quickly so, to show that it respects the will of the Lebanese people. It must end intervention in Lebanon's affairs and take the steps necessary to foster trust between two peoples who have many interests in common. But for this to happen political reforms within Syria are required. Political life must be revitalised. There must be greater scope for freedom. Political parties and a free press are essential prerequisites, as are democratic elections that would effectively end the single-party hegemony now in operation. * The writer is a Syrian human rights activist and lawyer.
