The sudden thaw in Egypt's relations with Israel chills Hassan Nafaa* The political terrain in the Middle East resembles parched earth gasping for even a sign of rain. This is the reason, perhaps, why the sudden inundation of political activity and initiatives, regardless of the fact that some of them are totally incomprehensible, have in the past two weeks been greeted with such euphoria. The outgoing US secretary of state, Colin Powell, initiated the downpour when he took the opportunity of his presence at the Sharm El-Sheikh to make a quick detour to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories to hold direct talks with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Since then foreign ministers and diplomatic envoys have been pouring into Israel and the occupied territories from all directions, especially from Europe. Egypt has taken this as a portent that even the deliberate and premeditated murder of three Egyptian soldiers in Rafah could not deter it from pressing ahead in its drive to shape a climate conducive to the resumption of the peace process. Towards this end Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit and Director of General Intelligence Omar Suleiman visited Israel and the occupied territories after which Palestinian leaders trickled into Cairo to meet with President Mubarak and, on occasion, the secretary-general of the Arab League. The Middle East is accustomed to these intense flurries of diplomatic activity that peter out almost as abruptly as they arise. Often they seem designed for no other purpose than to give the impression that the political process is still alive. Few sensible commentators expect this latest flurry to lead to tangible results though this time round their expectations may be misplaced. During Powell's visit to the region Israel pledged to do everything necessary to facilitate Palestinian elections. No sooner had Powell returned to the US than Washington announced that it would provide $20 million to assist the PA in holding the elections. Then, without advance notice, Egyptian- Israeli relations jumped back into gear. In a surprise development Egypt released the convicted Israeli spy, Azzam Azzam. It was then announced that on 14 December Egypt, Israel and the US would sign a Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) agreement, according to which Egyptian textiles will have unhampered access to US markets as long as they incorporate a 12 per cent Israeli input. Perhaps the most striking development, though, is Israel's attempt to portray Egypt as the driving force behind normalisation. Shortly before Mubarak's recent visit to Kuwait and Bahrain, Tel Aviv leaked rumours that Egypt would soon be sending its ambassador back to Israel. Following the visit some Israeli newspapers hinted that its real purpose was to urge Gulf countries to normalise and establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. Israeli propaganda is not only suggesting that Egypt is keen to defrost its "cold peace" with Israel but is ready and willing to play midwife to the normalisation process. Regardless of Israel's motives in disseminating such patently absurd claims, there are several indications that Egypt is revamping its management of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unfortunately, in the absence of sufficient inside information we have no alternative but to draw upon visible evidence in our attempt to explain and assess the nature and scope of this change of tack. Two major events may have spurred the Egyptian decision to reassess its approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first is the result of the US elections which not only handed President Bush a second four year term but also brought in a Congress with a clear Republican majority and ultra-conservative bent. The second is the death of Yasser Arafat, whose very presence, to some, posed a formidable obstacle to the peace process and, to others, served to protect Palestinian principles and to safeguard the cohesion of the Palestinian domestic front. Egypt's policy makers deduced, firstly, that the Bush victory would bring in a more hawkish, less flexible and perhaps more impetuous administration and, secondly, that while Arafat's death raises the prospect of the breakdown in the cohesion of the Palestinian front it simultaneously offers a new opportunity to revive a peace process that will lead to an acceptable settlement. If this is the current thinking, then Egyptian diplomacy will probably have adopted a two-pronged policy for the coming phase. On the one hand it will avoid anything that might provoke a US administration that is on the lookout for excuses to escalate tensions. On the other it will do everything in its power to capitalise on the current opportunity to promote the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and, perhaps, to build up the momentum for reviving the climate once ushered in by the Madrid peace conference. Only in this context is it possible to make sense of Egypt's decision to hand over the Israeli spy several years after Israel had exhausted any available forms of pressure to secure his release, and of Egypt's willingness to sign a QIZ agreement that obviously caters to Israeli interests. Only in this context can we understand why Egypt nudged Damascus towards agreeing to the unconditional resumption of talks with Israel, exerted its sway to ensure that Abu Mazen would be the "unanimous" nominee for PA president and encouraged the PA to open up to Syria and Lebanon. Egypt may be acting too hastily. Worse, it could be sacrificing negotiating cards for nothing. Egypt does not appear to have received firm guarantees from the US or Israel that Palestinian-Israeli negotiations will resume in accordance with the provisions of the roadmap leading to a final settlement that will permit for the establishment of an independent, fully sovereign state within pre-June 1967 boundaries. Apart from the Israeli commitment to evacuate the so-called Philadelphia Axis in the framework of its unilateral disengagement from Gaza and to permit a 750-strong regiment of Egyptian border guards to patrol this area neither Israel nor the US has given the slightest indication that they are flexible over a final settlement, or even on any of the individual issues over which the peace process foundered. We have no choice, then, but to conclude that the forthcoming negotiations, if they take place at all, will proceed in accordance with the Israeli agenda and in the absence of a fixed timeframe. In this context the apparent turnabout in Egyptian policy is disturbing. The sudden upswing in Egyptian-Israeli relations appears to be motivated by Cairo's attempts to demonstrate good intentions which so far remain unreciprocated. At the same time Egypt's relations with other regional powers, including Iran, have taken a turn for the worse. That the Egyptian public prosecutor chose to reveal the discovery of an alleged spy ring in the pay of Iran at the same time Egypt had released a convicted Israeli spy seems impolitic and reckless. If this announcement was Egyptian officialdom's way of signalling an abrupt realignment in the pattern of its international alliances it was both crude and a mark of their disregard for the sensitivities of the Egyptian and Arab public, both of which remain thoroughly convinced that it is Israel that is ultimately responsible for the collapse of the peace process. The Egyptian people cannot, and will not, tolerate the abuse of national security by any foreign power, regardless of the slogans and catchwords that are used as a pretext. However, we also understand the importance of judiciousness in the choice of when and how to make such revelations so that ultimately they serve, or at least do not work against, larger strategic aims. The victory of the ultra right in the US presidential and congressional elections should compel us to arm ourselves with greater prudence and vigilance; it should not drive us to panic. The escalating opposition of the Israeli ultra right to Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan is not proof that this plan is the only available route to reaching a settlement to the conflict with Israel. Rather, it is further proof that Israel is not yet ready or mature enough to reach a political settlement with the Arabs under the current regional and international balance of power. The road to a settlement should begin with a re- ordering of the Arab house, not with unsolicited and unnecessary unilateral concessions. The current US-Israeli drive has one objective, which is to ensure the smooth conduct of the Palestinian presidential elections in the hope that these elections produce a PA leadership prepared to accept a settlement on the conditions Arafat refused in Camp David. Such a settlement will not grant full Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the area of the Dome of the Rock and it will not resolve the refugee issue on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 149. If our past experience of negotiating with Israel has taught us anything it is that Israel negotiates in order to buy the time it needs to fragment the Arab world. If Israel truly wants peace there is a perfectly feasible course open to it. It should agree to a new international peace conference that takes the Arab peace initiative adopted at the Beirut summit as the sole basis for negotiations. * The writer is professor of political science, Cairo University.
