Hassan Abu Taleb* examines the implications of the series of leaks from the International Atomic Energy Agency A cloud of mystery surrounds the purported discovery of plutonium, which is used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, near an Egyptian nuclear research station. Analysis of the samples, taken in November, has yet to be disclosed, and international inspectors recently returned to Egypt in order to obtain more samples, ostensibly to help in their analysis. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAE) has said that Egypt's nuclear capacities will not be high on the agenda of its March meeting which appears to suggest that the matter is not quite as serious as we were led to believe when news of the discovery was leaked two months ago. The Egyptian foreign minister has underlined Egypt's clean record with the IAE. Egypt has not breached a single one of its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty it signed 22 years ago and it has been as cooperative as possible. IAE documents confirm this. Yet the fact that the claim that Egypt has a secret nuclear agenda could come from IAE sources, as has been reported, indicates that an unblemished record of cooperation is insufficient to prevent aspersions being cast against small-scale, peaceful nuclear activities which are supervised by the IAE itself. There are several possible explanations for the mysterious IAE statements and inspections. One is that they are part of an Israel campaign, aided by certain quarters in the US, to pressure Egypt into silencing its calls for the Middle East to become a WMD-free zone. These calls, initiated in 1981 and pursued as official policy since 1991, are motivated by the belief that Israel's nuclear arsenal should fall under IAE supervision and be included in the issues on the negotiating table in the process of reaching a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A second motive may be to undermine a nuclear programme geared to peaceful purposes, developing the medical, pharmaceutical, agriculture and food processing sectors. Third, and most important, may be the attempt to ratchet up the pressure on Egypt to sign the IAE's additional protocol on the inspection of nuclear facilities. The protocol, which Iran was compelled to accept in principle six months ago after Washington began to turn the heat on Tehran using the same WMD tactic with which it justified the invasion and eventual occupation of Iraq, puts paid to the principle of national sovereignty. Under the protocol inspection teams are entitled to conduct inspections of any research, industrial or educational facility without advance notice. Signatory governments are obliged to supply inspectors with all the information they request and investigators have the right to question scientists as if they were suspects involved in illegal activities. Egypt is not, and has never been, a country with a suspect nuclear programme. It is not, therefore, a logical target for the additional protocol. If there is a drive afoot to compel Egypt to sign this protocol it can be interpreted as nothing else but political blackmail. Of course, the three possibilities above are not mutually exclusive. Separately, or together, they provide incentives for a campaign the goal of which is to tie Egypt's hands in this important scientific and industrial domain. Those familiar with Egypt's peaceful nuclear programme say that it is far more modest than it should be and lags far behind the programmes of countries that began to explore nuclear technology much later than Egypt. Egypt's medium term energy plans, certainly up to 2017, do not include the construction of nuclear power generators. The campaign, then, appears to be designed to ensure that Egypt has no access to a technology that would place it on a stronger developmental footing. In doing so, it seeks to entrench a regional developmental configuration which prevents Egypt from becoming an economic -- let alone military -- rival to certain other regional powers. Egypt has only two nuclear reactors. One dates from the 1950s, operates at a capacity of two megawatts and is, more or less, redundant. The second, with a capacity of 22 megawatts, is technically classified as a research reactor. Constructed under a cooperative agreement with Argentina, it is used to produce the radioactive elements used in medical and various industrial and agricultural processes. Both reactors are subject to periodic IAE inspections which have found no evidence that they have violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in any way. Most modern nuclear reactors in Asia, Europe and the US operate at 220, 500 or 800 megawatt capacities, use heavy water and produce nuclear materials that can be converted to military use with little effort. Compared to these Egypt's nuclear activities are tiny. India has eight reactors with 220 to 500 megawatt capacities and South Korea has 23 reactors used for producing electricity. Neither of these two countries is categorised as a nuclear nation under the Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty. In fact, the former is not even a signatory. More importantly, neither faces the pressures that have been brought to bear on many other countries that have nowhere near their nuclear capacities, if they have any capacity at all. The campaign against Egypt's nuclear development will take its greatest toll in the area of human resources. Over the years Egypt has invested a great deal in the development of nuclear technology departments in its universities. The pressure that is currently being brought to bear on Egypt does not bode well. It indicates that the powers running today's world are determined to target any party that does not fully tow the line with their wishes, even if that party is a major regional power, a friend of sorts to the world's sole superpower and clearly intent upon using its influence to realise regional stability. If this is to be Egypt's fate, imagine what lies in store for those countries Washington, in the words of its new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, has termed bastions of tyranny. * The writer is an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and chief editor of the annual Arab Strategic Report.
