In an exclusive interview, , lead author of the third Arab Human Development Report, takes on the many controversies surrounding the report's release US and Egyptian objections to earlier drafts of the report held up its release for six months. How did you overcome this problem? Did you have to remove or compromise on some parts so the survey would ultimately see the light? No. There was absolutely no compromise on a matter of principle or position. It seems that the media campaign against the attempt to suppress the report was very successful, to the extent that the UNDP finally decided that they would lose even more if they didn't publish the report under their logo, and they took the brave decision to put their name on the report. Do you expect the US to follow through on its threats to cut its contributions to UN funds as a result? No. I hope not, at least. But I would not be surprised if the US administration or any Arab government tries to penalise the UNDP. The report expresses clear scepticism regarding the sincerity of the US commitment to democratisation in the Arab world. At the same time, it appears to argue that pressure from the outside, particularly from Washington, may help the cause of political change in the Middle East. How do you explain that contradiction? That is the personal view of an analyst, but the report does not say that. The report only admits that Arab regimes are susceptible to foreign pressure. We definitely don't single out the US administration for cooperation; on the contrary, my own personal opinion is that the American administration has lost [too much] credibility to be a supporter of reform in the region. But the report does not object to cooperation with external "governmental" actors, if all parties respect key principles, and suggests "a Western-supported project" as the most realistic reform plan for the Arab region... We believe that -- unfortunately -- our governments are more open to pressure from the outside than from the inside; we thus placed some conditions that Western powers should respect if they want to be genuine supporters of reform in the region. We believe that reform should come from within, but we cannot ignore or exclude the possibility of outside pressure helping Arab governments to act on the requirements of initial reform that would lead to the respect of key freedoms of expression and association. The outside pressure is helping to set the ground for an internal reform dynamic. But we also have to deconstruct the West. Europe stands to be a [more] genuine supporter of reform than the US administration, which has disqualified itself by supporting the Israeli occupation of Palestine and occupying Iraq. The US administration has also engineered significant violations of civil and political liberties in the US itself, especially against Arabs and Muslims. The position of the US administration is always linked to its interests in the region. Personally, I don't think that the US administration is interested in reform in Arab countries. Rather, it would be very unhappy with having truly democratic regimes in the Arab world. But there are forces in the West, other than the US administration, that might still stand the chance of helping reform in the Middle East. The report condemns "any loss of human life". In that respect, it appears to equate the massacres of Palestinian civilians at the hands of Israeli occupation forces with Israeli deaths that result from suicide bombings by Palestinian fighters struggling for freedom. Was that a kind of compromise? The only point we made in the report is that there are casualties on both [the Palestinian and Israeli] sides, and of course, out of humane consideration, any loss of innocent civilian life is unacceptable. But we don't equate them [Israeli occupying forces and Palestinian resistance fighters]. If that is a compromise, then it is a minor one in my opinion, because it is just an additional piece of reality. Besides, the report makes a distinction between the violation of the rights of innocent civilians and the right to resist to foreign occupation, which has been guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. What, in your view, is the report's main message? In a document like this there are many messages, but if I want to stress one, I would say that the call for reform is urgent. It cannot be partial or cosmetic; and it cannot wait for a long time. A number of major events took place after the report was completed in mid-2004; the most significant of these were the elections in Iraq and Palestine, and the plans for multi- candidate presidential elections in Egypt. Do these developments change the report's findings in any way? No. I think the West's celebration of these recent events is premature, because it is too early to tell whether they are going to be true steps in the direction of freedom and free governance. How do you assess the constitutional reform that will now allow multi-party presidential elections in Egypt? It is definitely insufficient. The problem is not just having multiple candidates for the presidency, which is a welcome reform for sure. The major problem, however, is in the fact that the constitution affords the president absolute powers, which would naturally lead to absolute corruption. How far does the report apply to conditions in Egypt? In terms of its fundamental analysis and recommendations, it applies fully. How do you find the reaction to the report so far? As usual, reactions are -- unfortunately -- much stronger outside the Arab world, and from our experience with the previous reports, reaction in the Arab world normally comes after foreign reactions. Even media coverage in the region comes after Western media coverage. This, perhaps, is part of a state of cultural dependence. What were the main obstacles your team faced while doing the survey? Doing empirical research work to construct a database for the report was very difficult, and it was not easy to negotiate a final text with a large team of 100 researchers.
