Putin's recent visit to the Middle East marks the beginning of the end for the Iranian-Russian alliance, argues Mustafa El-Labbad Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent Middle East tour ushered in a new phase in Russia's Middle East policy. The tour was confined to Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority and didn't include Iran. Moscow is apparently looking for a role to play in the Middle East. Egypt wants Moscow to support its quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, and would be happy to support Russia's quest to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in return. Putin then flew to Israel, the first visit ever by a Russian president to the country. There, he signed agreements for security cooperation and for combating "Islamic terror". The Russian president then launched an initiative for an international conference for peace in the Middle East. But Moscow's initiative was thwarted by Israel and the US. In the Palestinian territories, Putin had some photos taken with President Mahmoud Abbas and at the tomb of late president Yasser Arafat and left soon afterwards. On the whole, Putin's tour of the region was little more than a visit to Israel flanked by perfunctory stops in Egypt and the Palestinian territories. But Putin's most memorable statement came during his visit to the territory, when he declared that Iran has "to reassure the world about its nuclear programme". The Iranian nuclear issue, thanks to US and Israeli efforts, tops the international agenda, and Russia is one of the main backers of Iranian nuclear technology. Russia is also Iran's best international ally, and perhaps the only Middle East country in which Russia is still a major player. The fact that Putin made a point of admonishing Tehran at a time when threats of military strikes against Iran are reported constantly in the media is nothing less than startling, and suggests that Russia is reconsidering its ties with Iran. Russia and Iran became close in the 1980s and 1990s. Their alliance was crucial for controlling the area extending between the Caspian Sea and Afghanistan. Both Moscow and Tehran saw eye to eye on a number of strategic issues, regionally and internationally. The two countries may not have signed a strategic alliance agreement, and their history of conflict in the 19th century is known to all, but the two managed to stay in close touch. The Russian-Iranian alliance, so to speak, became stronger in the 1990s, to counter US hegemony of the region. The US blockade on Iran pushed the latter towards Russia. And when the US tried to edge Russia out of its traditional sphere of influence in Central Asia, Moscow had no option but to stick to their Iranian friends. Within Russia, an industrial-military wing favoured close ties with the Iranians. But Russian traders, bankers, and businessmen with Western connections preferred to appease the Americans, and by extension the Israelis. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars did little to enhance Russian-Iranian ties. With Taliban gone, the Russians had little to fear in Central Asia, and therefore less incentive to stay on Tehran's good side. And when Russia began signing bilateral agreements with Caspian Sea littoral countries for oil exploration and production, the Iranians were not thrilled. Other developments in the region had a similar influence on Iranian-Russian ties. The help the US gave Azerbaijan in politics, security, and oil strengthened the latter in the face of Armenia, which Russia and Iran used to support. Also, Tehran had to keep silent about Moscow's actions in Chechnya, as the latter became Russia's best hope of maintaining a foothold on the Caspian. As things stand, the Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation is the strongest bond between the two countries, and this is likely to change at any moment. But Tehran and Moscow still have good reasons to maintain close ties. For economic reasons, Moscow needs a foothold in the Iranian gas and oil market, especially now that the US congress has banned American companies from investing in the Iranian oil sector. Tehran, for its part, needs Russian military help and expertise. In particular, Iran wants continued access to Russian missile and nuclear technology. Iran started work on the Bushehr reactor since the time of the shah and with German help, and when the Germans pulled out, the Russians stepped in. Tehran still hopes to join the nuclear club and Russia is its only hope.