While leaders across the Palestinian political divide head to Damascus for renewed reconciliation talks, few are optimistic about the probable result, writes Saleh Al-Naami Abdel-Rahman Ouda, 49, tried to convince his friends and neighbours to watch a discussion programme on the prospects for Palestinian reconciliation. The programme was aired on an Arab satellite network on the eve of the resumption of inter-Palestinian dialogue in Damascus. Abdel-Rahman's friends and neighbours were not in the mood. They preferred to stick to watch the next instalment of a Syrian soap opera. Ghassan Abu Samha -- Abdel Rahman's nephew and neighbour in the central district of Gaza -- was adamant. "We can be sure that they will never reach an agreement and that the rift will continue, so why bother?" In fact, Ghassan and his uncle's friends were only echoing the prevalent feeling among the Palestinian public in the run-up to that crucial meeting in Damascus on 9 November. Palestinian political elites had more varying opinions. Whereas Salah Al-Bardawil of the Hamas politburo and Azam Al-Ahmed, a member of the Fatah Central Committee, were optimistic over the outcome of the dialogue, many other officials feel that such optimism is unwarranted. Chairman of the Palestinian parliament's Security Committee Ismail Al-Ashqar, who has been appointed to head the Hamas delegation in Damascus, expressed more cautious optimism. Too may obstacles from Israel and elsewhere in the region could sabotage any agreements reached, he told Al-Ahram Weekly. Nevertheless, he hoped that a Fatah-Hamas agreement would prove durable. He said that the Hamas delegation in Damascus was ready to listen to Fatah's point of view on everything pertaining to the "thorny" security question, adding that the most crucial ingredient to the dialogue's success is good intentions. Al-Ashqar is aware that various Arab powers are bent on imposing a certain outcome on Palestinian reconciliation. For example, some insist that Hamas officials should not head any Palestinian Authority (PA) security agency in the future. Al-Ashqar's response to this demand is that Hamas will abide by the provisions of the Egyptian proposal for inter-Palestinian reconciliation and related inter-Palestinian understandings. There are clear provisions for restructuring the Palestinian security agencies and if these are handled sincerely and with good intentions no insurmountable differences should arise, Al-Ashqar said. Nevertheless, he does fear the impact of conflicting interpretations of the Egyptian text. For example, the paper calls for the apprehension and punishment of Palestinian informers working for Israel. In Hamas's opinion this provision covers the current security cooperation between the PA and Israel, which it regards as no less abhorrent than the activities of individual informers in the pay of Israeli intelligence services. The problem of conflicting interpretations of the Egyptian proposal could also arise on the question of political detainees. For example, Fatah might claim that resistance fighters in PA jails can not be deemed political detainees whereas Hamas believes they should, especially as they had been arrested and tortured on the grounds of their political affiliations and in order to comply with the demands of Israeli security agencies. Various Palestinian news media have reported that Egypt has informed the PA of its opposition to Hamas elements taking leadership positions in PA security agencies after reconciliation. Nevertheless, informed sources said that Egyptian General Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman and Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul- Gheit told Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in a meeting Thursday that Egypt does not mind Hamas elements being included at other staffing levels. According to these sources, Egypt is annoyed that the forthcoming round of reconciliation talks are being hosted in Damascus. They say Fatah asked that the talks be moved to another location after an angry exchange at the Sirte Arab Summit between the Palestinian and Syrian presidents. Hamas could not agree because President Bashar Al-Assad had been responding to an attack by Abbas on Hamas and Hizbullah during a summit designed to focus on Israeli intransigence. Undersecretary-general for the Islamic Jihad Movement Ziad Al-Nakhala voiced a more pessimistic forecast for the forthcoming inter-Palestinian dialogue. He said the PA insists that any change in the current security situation must only apply to Gaza on the grounds that the events that led to the Palestinian rift occurred in Gaza. He added that Israel, which supervises the PA's security agencies, would not permit Hamas's participation in those agencies. Al-Nakhala underlined that Hamas would not accept any condition that Fatah might later use to undermine and eliminate Hamas. Political analyst and writer Hani Al-Masri is of the opinion that the progress made towards Palestinian reconciliation is "limited and purely tactical", and "does not reflect a strategic shift" on either side. Regarding points on the agenda of talks, Al-Masri decried that they "are all largely procedural matters that have to do with Hamas's role and share of power in the PA and the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO], and that have nothing to do with the essential issues regarding the welfare of the Palestinian people and nation." Al-Masri was piqued, "especially at this time when the Netanyahu government has unleashed a full-scale assault on Palestinian territory, rights and history with the aim of imposing the Israeli solution which is to expropriate the Palestinians' land and future." According to A-Masri, any inter-Palestinian dialogue should be dealing with the formulation of an alternative national strategy. Participants should be focussing on how to restore unity, organising effective resistance, and what constitutes the bases for a productive negotiating position in the future. They should be talking about the place of the PA in the Palestinian political system and how to restructure the PLO so as to be properly representative of all Palestinians and capable of mobilising their skills and energies everywhere. They should also be discussing the construction of institutions capable of playing a role in ending the occupation and the realisation of Palestinian liberty, the right to return and national independence. As diverse as their prognoses may be, observers agree that the parties will most likely sign the Egyptian proposal. They also share apprehensions over what will follow when it comes to implementing the provisions of the agreement, which need to be worked out in detail in order to be put into effect, and which might still be open to interpretation. The question of reconstituting the PLO, for example, promises to be a touchy issue. Hamas believes the organisation should be restructured on the basis of the new political balances of power in Palestine, as reflected in the last legislative elections or new elections in the West Bank, Gaza and the Diaspora. All indications are that Fatah would reject moves in this direction. Observers fear that if the parties get bogged down in squabbles over such issues, reconciliation efforts will grind to a halt yet again. (see p.6 & Editorial p.12)
