Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses the implications of a new Egyptian legitimacy The 23rd of July will not be celebrated this year as it has been since 1952 because, for the first time in 53 years, Egypt's head of state will be chosen not by referendum but in a multi-candidate election. This means that he will accede to power in terms of a new, and different, type of legitimacy that does not derive exclusively from an event that transpired over half a century ago. As we stand on the threshold of what could theoretically be a monumental change in Egypt's political landscape, public perceptions of the government's reform initiative as represented in the controversial amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution are mixed. Some dismiss it as a public relations ploy, arguing that if President Mubarak decides to seek a fifth term in office, a bid in which he will surely succeed, then nothing will have changed (at least as far as the final outcome is concerned). Others believe that the mere fact of allowing more than one candidate to run for the highest office in the land is in itself cause for celebration. Even if the new electoral system has yet to set a limit on the number of consecutive terms for which one candidate can run, and even if the final outcome is preordained, they argue, the constitutional amendment has introduced a radical change to the political landscape. Which of the two assessments is the right one? In other words, is the change tactical or strategic in nature? So far, reform as it has been introduced has been basically to bring about change within the framework of the past, that is, without challenging certain fundamental doctrines that have become part of the national psyche over the years. Today reform is focussing on the future and as attention passes from the past to the future, the reform process cannot be stretched out indefinitely but must unfold within a reasonable time-frame that can be measured and assessed. These are problems of great importance in the present. A variety of issues have been raised, including that of moving directly to the final phase in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The step-by-step approach formulated by Kissinger in the early days of the peace process has proved to be more effective in placing new obstacles on the road to peace than in removing those already impeding fruitful negotiations between the parties. The sooner a final settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict is reached, particularly on the Palestinian track, the sooner we can concentrate on putting our own house in order. This is a strategic imperative that should take precedence over all else in the coming period. According to the UN Charter, resistance to foreign occupation is to be undertaken by all possible means, including armed struggle. As long as the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian land continues, it if safe to assume that violence will continue and peace will remain elusive. But while violence is condoned in some cases, its use is totally illegal in others. There is absolutely no legal justification for terrorism, for example, or for the use of force against civil society or against unarmed civilians. When we talk of the Arab-Israeli conflict today, we are faced with an issue that cannot be ignored, namely, that "revolutionary legitimacy" cannot logically be made compatible with the search for a peaceful settlement, because a common denominator is necessary for negotiators to initiate a dialogue. This can only be initiated and sustained in the framework of "constitutional legitimacy". Another issue worthy of attention is that a republic, even one founded through a revolution, does not necessarily maintain its revolutionary character and thus need not embrace revolutionary legitimacy. Moreover, it could be tempted to acquire a hereditary character. Paying lip service to revolutionary values does not necessarily mean renouncing dynastic aspirations. Actually, "constitutional legitimacy" is firmly related to the republican system. The issue does not arise if the alternative is a monarchy, which is not expected to tolerate anything revolutionary. That is why accepting the supremacy of the law and the rules of democracy is so important. Preventing all violations of the law, of rigging elections and other similar crimes, is essential when it comes to reform and for replacing one legitimacy by another without allowing the situation to degenerate into turmoil. How legitimate is a religious party? I put forward this question, not because the issue is actually raised, but because it could eventually arise and also for the debate to include all parties concerned. It is true that Islam is both "religion" and "state", but a distinction should be made between "religion" as a conviction and "religion" as a political practice; as a relationship which ties a human being to the Creator, but also without damaging the relationship of man to man; i.e., that precedence be given to inter-human relations in the fields of politics and legislation, but not of religion itself every time human beings differ over problems related to their religious convictions. In this connection, how consistent is it not to recognise the Muslim Brotherhood as a party while recognising Al-Wasat Party, which is actually an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood that broke away from the mainstream movement for tactical reasons? Accepting Al-Wasat Party means that it is acceptable to ignore the ideological basis of a given party, provided it does not insist on openly proclaiming its religious identity. But how to reconcile such a logic with the logic of transparency, openness and accountability, the key factors in any genuine democratic system? Republicanism goes hand in hand with secularism which incidentally, has nothing to do with atheism. Secularism proceeds from the assumption that the bond linking the citizen to his Creator differ fundamentally from the one linking him to the fellow citizens. The French Revolution was the first legitimate movement to embrace secularism, thus bringing to an end a stage of history that had lasted for 50 centuries which began with the construction of the Pyramids.
