As Egypt's presidential and parliamentary election campaigns were poised to begin, the country was suddenly faced with the deadliest terrorist incident in its history. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed comments The horrific attack launched in Sharm El-Sheikh just before dawn last Friday is certain not only to impact adversely on tourism, but to affect the course of events throughout the entire region at a particularly critical time of actual or potential conflict-situations in Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It is too early to tell whether there is a connection between this latest terrorist outrage and the attacks in Taba last October. After the London bombings, it was believed that the epicentre of terrorism had shifted to the Western capitals and that we were witnessing the globalisation of terrorism. But here is it back in Egypt. Before Sharm El-Sheikh, the issue that took precedence over all others was the coming elections, with the debate centring on whether the incumbent president would present himself for a fifth term and whether there would be a collective boycott of the elections by the opposition parties. As we go to print, only the Tagammu, the party of the Egyptian left, has announced that it will be boycotting the presidential elections in response to a majority vote by its members. Although so far none of the other legally recognised parties has taken a similar step, many are expected to follow suit if the ruling party clings to its present conditions. A sweeping boycott by the opposition parties will deal a severe blow to hopes of real democratic reform. It will also prevent both sides from achieving their goals. For the ruling party, the goal is to prove its good faith in expanding the scope of real participation in the political process, which it can do only if the opposition parties play along. For the opposition parties, the goal is to have a say in the decision-making process, which they can do only through the ballot boxes. As matters now stand, however, they consider the conditions imposed on them by the ruling party to be unacceptable and that they have no choice but to boycott. The government is keen to portray the coming elections as opening a new democratic chapter in Egypt's history. But this image cannot be reconciled with a boycott of the elections by the opposition parties. In the eyes of the world, particularly the Western world, including the United States, elections that exclude opposition parties cannot claim to be democratic. With neither the ruling NDP nor the opposition parties ready to back down, the crisis is unlikely to be defused any time soon. But they cannot remain locked in an impasse at a time a national reconciliation is vital to confront the local, international and regional challenges we are facing. By local challenges we mean those that can affect the regime when the actions of opposition forces get out of hand, as they did in Sharm El-Sheikh. By international challenges we mean the accusation now being levelled against the regime that its claim to democracy is refuted by its failure to convince the opposition parties, and independent candidates, that the conditions in which elections will be held are fair. Moreover, the government's insistence on keeping polling stations open for one day only means that the number of judges monitoring the process will be insufficient; while the task required 54,000 judges, only 12,000 are available. By regional challenges we mean those that threaten to plunge the entire Arab world into a state of chaos whose long term consequences are impossible to predict. Is there a way out of this vicious circle? Can we prevent the situation from sliding closer to the brink? In order to answer these questions, we need to address the issue from a theoretical point of view, specifically, to ask whether the "zero sum game minus" now playing out in the region to the detriment of all the protagonists can become a "non-zero sum game plus" beneficial to all. This would entail transforming the antagonistic contradictions now informing regional relations into non- antagonistic contradictions. The way to overcome an acute contradiction is to transfer it into a different setting with different rules involving different actors. For example, the "state of war" between the Arabs and the Israelis is a typical example of an antagonistic contradiction. Can it be turned into a non-antagonistic contradiction that will allow the parties eventually to reach a settlement? The lack of parity between the protagonists is a serious obstacle in the way of attaining this objective. But theoretically speaking the disparity in the balance of power can be offset by involving new actors who will carry part of the burden. For example, Palestinians could be compensated for the loss of their homes and belongings through a fund set up with generous financial payments from wealthy societies worldwide. The intervention of this third party could help transform the contradiction from antagonistic to non-antagonistic. Thus, overcoming a conflict is achieved through the rearrangement of contradictions and their transformation, whenever possible, from antagonistic to non-antagonistic. But that is not always feasible, otherwise long and difficult negotiations would not have been necessary in given circumstances. What is now required is to invent means by which antagonistic contradictions can be deprived of their antagonistic character and not stand in the way of a comprehensive resolution of the conflict. For example, it might appear that we are dealing with a "non-zero sum game plus" while actually not going beyond a "zero sum game" where Israel is the only winner and the Palestinians are the losers. Indeed, that is what happens if Israel pulls out of Gaza, according to Sharon's plan, while Palestinians fail in counterpart to obtain their sovereign state. Sharon wants the pullout from Gaza to be the last step in Israel's evacuation of occupied Palestinian territory while the Palestinians want it to be the first step. How to reconcile these two contradictory views? For this to happen, an original approach needs to be invented which would satisfy both sides and respond to their fundamental requirements. True, it could be said that Sharon exposed himself to extraordinary risks in stranding up to the refuseniks in his ranks who opposed the pullout from Gaza altogether and that this can justify some form of compensation. Sharon has asked the US for a staggering sum of $2.2 billion to finance his disengagement plan. On the other hand, Washington has always qualified the construction of Israeli settlements in Arab occupied territories as "illegal", and an "obstacle on the road to peace". In an attempt to find a way out of the fix, Condoleezza Rice was on her second visit to the region this week in less than one month. Will she succeed where others have failed or will she too succumb to Israeli blackmail?
